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Abstract
Radio Frequency (RF) emissions from electronic devices expose security vulnerabil-
ities that can be used by an attacker to extract otherwise unobtainable information. Two
realms of study were investigated, including the exploitation of 1) unintentional RF emis-
sions in the field of Side Channel Analysis (SCA), and 2) intentional RF emissions from
physical devices in the field of RF-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting. SCA
is the study of physical characteristics of cryptographic algorithm implementation to exploit
unintentional data leakages. By monitoring various side channels during an encryption or
decryption, SCA attacks can deduce the secret key stored in a device that would otherwise
be unobtainable to the attacker. RF-DNA fingerprinting uses physical layer features to en-
hance device authentication and security for distributive networks. This work advances the
state-of-the-art by 1) improving SCA attack research in Linear Regression Attack (LRA),
2) increasing SCA key guess success rates with the non-parametric Random Forest (RndF)
classifier, and 3) enhancing defensive methods for ZigBee distributed networks using RndF.
A type of SCA attack called LRA is improved by proper statistical analysis of the
linear regression at each collected time sample. The conditions for regression are examined
for the first time before proceeding to the attack phase. Attack performance showed an
order of magnitude improvement when the dimensionality of the distribution estimated in
the attack training phase is increased from 1 to 20, giving 98% success rate with as few
as 100 test and training traces. In 8 out of 9 cases examined, this novel attack method
performed better or equal to previous attacks from literature. Linear regression with an
the adjusted coefficient of correlation R2a indicator proved more effective in high-noise
environments, requiring as few as 50 test traces at Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)=15dB.
This method was also the most successful at identifying variables with high data content in
small training set conditions.
iv
In the presence of non-Gaussian distributed data, attacks such as LRA and Template
Attacks were found to be less effective due to their requirement of multivariate Gaussian
noise in the collected traces. Examination of a 40-sample set of microcotrollers revealed
that greater than 40% of the collected variables were non-Gaussian. Profiling attacks
with the non-parametric RndF classifier for the full-dimensional data set consisting of
50,000 variables correctly extracted all 16 bytes of the AES key when the training and
test devices were the same, and 15 bytes when devices differed. For a reduced set of the
first 3200 variables captured during the encryption, Random Forest achieved success rates
as high as 100% for attacks across 40 PIC microcontrollers from 4 different device families.
With further dimensionality reduction, Random Forest still outperformed Template Attack
for this data set, requiring fewer traces and achieving higher success rates with lower
misclassification rates.
Finally, the use of a RndF classifier is examined for intentional RF emissions from Zig-
Bee devices to enhance security using RF-DNA fingerprinting. Observations collected un-
der practical conditions showed non-Gaussian variables which degraded parametric Multiple
Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification performance. RndF
was introduced into the RF-DNA fingerprinting arena and improved ZigBee device authen-
tication was demonstrated. RndF outperformed parametric MDA/ML and non-parametric
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifiers, pro-
viding up to GS =18.0 dB improvement (reduction in required SNR). Network penetration,
measured using rogue ZigBee devices, show that at the SNR=12.0 dB (correct classifi-
cation rate %C=90%) the method correctly rejects 31 of 36 rogue access attempts based
on Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis and an arbitrary Rogue Accept
Rate (RAR) of less than 0.1. This is better than MDA/ML and GRLVQI which only rejected
25/36 and 28/36 rogue access attempts, respectively. The key benefit of the RndF method
v
is improved rogue rejection in noisier environments - gains of GS =4.0 dB and GS =18.0 dB
are realized over GRLVQI and MDA/ML, respectively.
vi
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ADVANCES IN SCA AND RF-DNA FINGERPRINTING
THROUGH ENHANCED LINEAR REGRESSION ATTACKS
AND APPLICATION OF RANDOM FOREST CLASSIFIERS
I. Introduction
This chapter introduces the research topics and provides motivation behind developing
attacks and countermeasures for unintentional and intentional Radio Frequency (RF)
emissions.
1.1 Motivation
Motivation is presented in the following sections for the two main research areas:
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) on unintentional emissions and RF-Distinct Native Attribute
(RF-DNA) fingerprinting for intentional ZigBee devices.
1.1.1 Side Channel Analysis (SCA)
Modern cryptographic algorithms such as Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
function under the assumption of complete key security. These algorithms are designed
to prevent an attacker from decoding the secret key provided only the input plaintext
and output ciphertext are available. However, when these algorithms are implemented
in hardware such as a microcontroller, additional information becomes available to the
attacker in the form of power consumption, Electro-Magnetic (EM) emanation, operation
timing, etc. This additional side channel information is combined with the plaintext
and ciphertext in SCA research to ascertain the secret key passively damaging the
microcontroller. SCA has been very successful across a wide variety of hardware and
for a variety of cryptographic algorithms [19, 34, 61, 84, 91, 92, 115]. Even masked
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implementations where intermediate cryptographic values are concealed by a random
value [72] have been defeated by higher order SCA attacks by combining multiple
intermediate cryptographic functions [3, 4, 45, 90].
In the field of SCA, often individual bits or bytes are attacked one at a time. If
these bits or bytes are stored in corresponding memory cells, then a power model can
be developed where the power usage of the microcontroller is correlated to the state of the
bits stored in these memory cells. For this type of attack, each bit is assumed to consume
the same amount of power. However, slight differences between how adjacent memory
cells are fabricated and routed lead to cases where power usage may not be equal in all
bits. In [115], a SCA attack called the Linear Regression Attack (LRA) was developed to
account for these differences. Since then, other research has advanced the state-of-the-art of
LRA [34, 49, 50]. However, in each of these the assumptions for a valid linear regression
were not verified. In addition, metrics used to identify a good model estimate fit to the
collected data are often incorrect and can be unreliable. A formal study of the LRA method
is needed to determine 1) if conditions for linear regression are present to allow a good
linear model estimate, and 2) determine a proper metric to assess the linear model estimate
fit that is more directly related to linear regression theory.
The most powerful SCA class of methods is the profiling attack, where the side
channel leakage of a device is characterized or modeled on training hardware similar
to that of the target hardware. If the side channel leakage is indeed similar, the side
channel model can be used to estimate the unknown secret key in the target device. Work
in [84] investigated conditions under which this assumption holds true. In most profiling
attacks to date, the side channel leakage is theorized to be fixed, and the noise in the
measurement assumed to be multivariate Gaussian [72]. However, in [72] it is shown that
a microcontroller may emit leakage that is non-Gaussian. Work in [26] theorized that a
non-parametric classifier may improve classification performance for a profiling attack and
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thereby guess the correct key with fewer required target observations. Analysis of side
channel data distribution is needed to determine if non-parametric methods are needed.
Further, research comparing parametric and non-parametric profiling attacks are required
to ensure attack success in the presence of non-Gaussian noise.
1.1.2 RF-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) Fingerprinting
A distributed network consists of many individual nodes that can be spatially
separated. These networks allow tremendous flexibility by connecting users and devices
and allowing either centralized or decentralized control of devices. ZigBee devices based
on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [56] offer low-power, low-cost communication alternatives
and are ideal for short burst communication separated by long sleep intervals. The
ZigBee protocol can be implemented in small devices allowing them to be low cost.
Due to these advantages, ZigBee networks have found widespread adoption in the fields
of building control [38], healthcare [58], and security systems [126]. However, their
simplicity and distributed nature puts these devices at risk of network intrusion attacks.
ZigBee security is commonly provided through the AES at the Media Access Control
(MAC), Network (NWK) and Application Support (APS) layers. Security researchers
however have developed several methods to exploit vulnerabilities in the ZigBee key-
exchange process [33, 99, 127]. In addition, it has been proven that power consumption
of authorized wireless sensor nodes can be passively monitored to determine the secret
encryption key through Side Channel Analysis (SCA) methods [76, 108]. The ZigBee
alliance has countered these threats by adopting AES in either Counter (AES-CTR) or
AES-Counter with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM) mode which are more resistant to SCA attacks.
However, AES-CTR mode has theoretically and practically been proven vulnerable to SCA
eavesdropping attacks in [57] where the full AES-CTR key was successfully recovered.
Thus key recovery in ZigBee devices is entirely possible and easily allows an attacker to
insert rogue devices within an existing network.
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RF-DNA fingerprinting provides a method to authenticate authorized devices on a dis-
tributed network by providing Physical (PHY) layer security. Slight hardware differences
between nodes leads to corresponding variation in their emitted RF signals. The device-
dependent variation can be exploited with various machine learning methods to identify
nodes based on their emitted signals. This method has been successfully demonstrated in a
wide variety of applications using classifiers to authenticate devices and identifying rogue
devices [25, 35, 46, 107]. In [106] it was shown that non-parametric classifiers (Generalized
Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI)) can outperform paramet-
ric classifiers (Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)) under
certain circumstances. However, further research is needed to analyze ZigBee RF-DNA
fingerprint features to determine potential for non-parametric classifier success in more
general circumstances.
1.2 Research Contributions
Research contributions from this work support three main thrusts, as shown in
Figure 1.1. First, advantages of using linear regression to estimate the power model versus
using the static Hamming Weight (HW) power model used in Correlation Electro-Magnetic
Attack (CEMA) SCA attacks are examined. A novel method to find time samples with high
information leakage of sensitive data using the adjusted coefficient of correlation R2a in a
linear regression attack is introduced [92]. Three linear regression attacks from current
literature [34, 50, 115] and CEMA [19] are compared with the new method for 9 different
cases, where the effect of the number of dimensions, training traces and test traces on attack
success are examined. A trace is the measured observation (emission collection) for one
complete encryption or decryption operation. The advantage of using R2a to identify a good
fit of the linear model estimate in high noise and small training set conditions is highlighted
over previous methods.
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Figure 1.1: Summary of research contributions.
Second, conditions are examined where non-linear relationships exist between
measured side channel data at a time sample and the sensitive information being
attacked [91]. These are caused by non-Gaussian distributed data, which leads to very
poor fit to a linear model estimate. Cross-device attacks were defined in [83, 84] as attacks
performed with training and test data from different devices. An alternate non-parametric
Random Forest (RndF) classifier was used instead in cross-device profiling attacks on 40
microcontrollers and benefits over parametric Template Attacks is demonstrated. Success
was achieved in very high-dimensional data sets where Template Attacks could not
mathematically function without collecting more training traces. Distribution analysis
of the training data from 40 microcontrollers with Random Forest variable importance
revealed that many with high information leakage had non-Gaussian distributions. Cross-
device attacks with Random Forest and Template Attack after variable reduction were
compared. Random Forest showed equal or higher success rates, lower misclassification
rates and smaller number of required test traces than Template Attacks using Gaussian only,
non-Gaussian only and mixed data.
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Table 1.1: Summary of research contributions relative to prior work.
Linear Regression Attacks
Technical Area Previous Work Current Work
Addressed Ref # Addressed Ref #
Train/Attack:
Same Device X [34, 50, 115] X+ [92]
Train/Attack:
Different Devices X [92]
Validate Regression
Conditions X [92]
Analyze Performance Under
High Noise Conditions X [34] X [92]
Analyze Performance Under
Small Training Set Conditions X [50] X [92]
SCA Profiling Attacks
Gaussian Noise Assumption X [24, 84, 103] X+ [91]
Non-Parametric Classifiers X [51, 55, 66] X+ [91]
Different Training/Test Devices X [84] X+ [91]
Large Number of Dimensions X [91]
RF-DNA Fingerprinting
MDA/ML, GRLVQI X [25, 46, 47, 107] X [93, 94]
RndF, MCA X [93, 94]
Dimensional Reduction
Analysis (DRA) X [47] X+ [93, 94]
ZigBee X [35, 36, 106] X+ [93–95]
Third, the advantages of using RndF with intentional RF emissions from ZigBee
devices is examined [93, 94]. RF-DNA fingerprinting has shown success over a wide range
of SNR for Cognitive Radio [47], WiMAX [107], and 802.11a WiFi [48] applications.
In all of these, the parametric MDA/ML classifier performed well with Gaussian features.
However, when ZigBee device emissions were collected under a variety of conditions, non-
Gaussian variables were better classified with RndF. Correct classification performance
improved over previous classifiers under all SNRs tested. In addition, network intrusion
detection of rogue devices impersonating authorized devices improved with RndF, which
consistently identified the largest number of rogue intrusion scenarios, regardless of
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the variable reduction method used, and in noisier environments than previously used
classifiers. Finally, RndF was used with ZigBee emissions collected from high-cost and
low-cost receivers and cost-benefit trade-off for classification and rogue identification was
analyzed.
Table 1.1 highlights the research contributions in each thrust area and shows their
relationship to prior related work. The symbol X+ is used to highlight areas where this
research enhances prior work.
1.3 Organization
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
information SCA, RF-DNA fingerprinting, and machine learning. Chapter 3 gives general
background in the three main research areas. Chapter 4 describes the results on LRA with
the R2a method as presented in [92]. Chapter 5 provides results on SCA profiling attack
with the RndF classifier as presented in [91], and also includes new research into the non-
Gaussian nature of the SCA collected variables. Chapter 6 details results from [93, 94]
where a comparative assessment of RndF with other classifiers is examined. Also, results
comparing high-cost and low-cost receiver performance with RndF is presented [95].
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main contributions and provides suggestions for future
research.
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II. Background
2.1 Introduction
Intentional and unintentional emissions from physical devices are used in this work
to enhance offensive and defensive cyber physical capabilities. Side Channel Analysis
(SCA) discovers and exploits unintentional information leakages from the physical
implementation of devices and specifically in this research, cryptographic algorithms.
Algorithms such as Advance Encryption Standard (AES) are publicly known and the
strength of their security depends on the secret key used to encrypt the plaintext data.
If the safety of this secret key is assumed, cryptographic algorithms such as AES are
mathematically secure and can adequately protect the sensitive plaintext information. Thus,
the weak link in cryptographically secured data is its implementation. Side channel
attacks the assumption of secret key security. It examines unintended physical information
leakages from the hardware running the cryptographic algorithms to extract the secret key.
Intentional emissions from wireless devices can differ due to hardware differences
between their analog components, such as the internal oscillator, antenna, amplifier,
frequency mixer and band-pass filter [29]. These emissions can be used to generate unique
profiles of each device, offering authentication that is prohibitively difficult to counterfeit.
This chapter provides background for the AES algorithm, followed by SCA and
associated attacks, namely simple and differential SCA attacks and profiling attacks.
Following this is background material on pattern recognition and classification methods.
Finally, background information on RF-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting
and ZigBee devices is provided.
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2.2 Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
In 2000, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) chose the
Rjindael algorithm as the Advance Encryption Standard to replace the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) [72]. AES can be implemented in 128, 192 or 256 bit versions with the
type determining the secret key length. For the AES-128 algorithm, a 128 bit block of
plaintext is represented as a 4×4 matrix of bytes known as the state matrix. The AES
algorithm is composed of several rounds which are groups of functions. In each round
the state matrix is combined with a round-key matrix of equal size for encryption. The
round key is calculated via a key schedule. The pseudo code for the AES-128 algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 AES-128 algorithm pseudo code
AddRoundKey
for i = 1→ 9 do
S ubBytes
S hi f tRows
MixColumns
AddRoundKey
end for
S ubBytes
S hi f tRows
AddRoundKey
The four main operations of the AES algorithm are AddRoundKey, SubBytes,
ShiftRows, and MixColumns. These operations are known as intermediate functions as
they are intermediate to the input plaintext and the output ciphertext. The results generated
from executing these intermediate functions are called the Intermediate Value (IV).
AddRoundKey In the AddRoundKey function, a bit-wise xor is performed with the
4×4 state matrix and the round key. This is given by,
AddRoundKey(x, k) = xor(x, k), (2.1)
where x and k are the plaintext and key of the same number of bits.
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SubBytes In the SubBytes operation, the AddRoundKey output is used as an index
into a substitution matrix known as the S-Box. The S-Box calculation for a given input byte
x is
S (x) = Ax−1 + b, (2.2)
where the matrix A and vector b definitions are given in [86]. Due to the computational
complexity of calculating the S-Box, it is often pre-calculated and stored as a matrix for
indexing into during execution.
Figure 2.1: ShiftRows operation in the AES-128 Algorithm [72]
ShiftRows The Shiftrows operation is a byte-wise circular left-shift of the contents
of the state-matrix. This means that for each row, contents are shifted left and the left most
byte is wrapped shifted to the right-most byte. The amount of shift is 1−(row number). So
for the first row, the contents are not shifted. For the second row, contents are circularly
shifted 1 position to the left. The contents of the third row are shifted left twice, and those
of the fourth row are shifted left three times. This is shown in Figure 2.1.
MixColumns The data in the columns of the state matrix are mixed in a manner
equivalent to performing a matrix multiply as shown in Figure 2.2. The SubBytes
operation provides non-linearity to AES, while ShiftRows and MixColumns diffuse round
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Figure 2.2: MixColumns operation in the AES-128 Algorithm [72]
key information. AddRoundKey adds confusion to the plaintext by obscuring it with the
xor function. Confusion and diffusion are metrics described in [116] that describe how
information is obscured and hidden by a cryptographic algorithm. The AES-128, 192
and 256 algorithms consist of 10, 12 and 14 rounds respectively to achieve sufficient
crytographic strength through diffusion and confusion properties.
Key Schedule The Key Schedule operation, also referred to as Key Expansion [28],
uses the original key to generate a unique key for each round. The Key Schedule represents
the 128-bit key as a 4×4 key matrix and processes one column at a time. It consists of three
steps:
1. RotWord: The last row of the 4×4 round key state matrix is left shifted by one
position. This is similar to the ShiftRows operation for the plaintext, but is only
executed on the last row the state matrix.
2. SubWord: In this step, the SubBytes operation is performed on column’s four bytes.
3. RCon: Perform a bitwise xor with the round constant. A bitwise xor is again
performed with the first column of the previous round key.
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Thus, the key schedule follows a systematic process to generate new round keys based on
the previous round key. This systematic process can be reversed for decryption.
2.3 Side Channel Analysis (SCA)
Side Channel Analysis is the study of observable physical phenomena such as timing,
voltage, current and EM radiation to determine its relationship to sensitive information
processed in hardware. These phenomena are called the side channels [72]. By observing
these, the attacker can gain knowledge of sensitive information within the device, such as
the secret key in a cryptographic algorithm. A brief description of power and EM side
channels is provided in the following sections.
2.3.1 Power Side Channel
The data being processed by a logic circuit can be correlated to its power usage [72].
Figure 2.3 shows the Register Transfer Logic (RTL) schematic of a CMOS inverter. The
inverter draws a fixed small amount of power when it is not switching, i.e., when the input
goes from 1→1 or 0→0. This fixed power draw when there is no switching is termed static
switching and represented by Pstat [72]. When the power switches from a logic 0→1 or
1→0, additional switching power, termed dynamic power Pdyn, is consumed [72]. Table 2.1
Figure 2.3: CMOS Inverter [72]
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shows a breakdown of these observations. Thus, when the data is changing to a new state,
there is a spike in the power usage of the inverter. If the previous state is known, then
the new state can be determined by monitoring the power. This is the essense of power
analysis.
Table 2.1: Power consumption of a CMOS inverter for different logic transition states.
Transition Type of Power Consumption
0→0 Pstat
0→1 Pstat + Pdyn
1→0 Pstat + Pdyn
1→1 Pstat
This model can be scaled to work on memory cells and data buses as well. If a memory
cell starts with an initial logic 0 state, writing a logic 1 will consume more power than
writing a logic 0, according to Table 2.1. For a buffer of one byte, memory usage will be
directly proportional to the number of logic high bits. The power model generated from this
direct relation is called the Hamming Weight (HW) power model, where the HW is simply
the total number of logic high bits. For a data bus, the power consumption due to data only
leaks when the previous state and the current state do not match. Similar to the case of the
transistor, the power consumption by the bus is proportional only to the number of 0→1
and 1→0 transitions. The total number of bits that are different between two states is called
the Hamming Distance (HD) and the power model based on HD is called the Hamming
Distance power model. If the previous state of the bus can be guessed, then combined with
the HD, the new state can be uncovered. Additionally, the HW of the two states can be
used to calculate the HD by
HD(state1, state2) = HW(state1 ⊕ state2). (2.3)
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Although these models work well for many implementations, they can sometimes fail
if there is not a direct relationship between the model and the power traces. The model
assumes that all memory cells draw the same amount of power, which may not be true due
to manufacturing differences. The model also assumed equal and negligible power draw
for 1→1 or 0→0 transitions, which may not be the case for real devices. These deviations
can lead to divergence of actual power measurements from associated HD and HW power
models.
2.3.2 Electromagnetic Side Channel
When current passes through parts of a device such as Input-Output (I/O) wires, logic
circuits and memory units, unintended EM emanations are generated. For synchronous
circuits, change of logic states occur at the change of the clock. If the circuit of interest is
synchronous, its strongest EM side channel occurs at the clock frequency.
There are two main types of unintentional EM emanations: direct emanation and
indirect emanation [2]. Direct emanation results from current draw as the circuit changes
its logic state. This type of emanation is observable over a wide band of frequencies, but
often requires miniature probes placed very close to the logic source and depackaging the
device [2, 98].
Indirect emanations occur due to EM coupling between components in the circuit
located close together. These emanations are often in the form of modulation of one
circuit’s direct emanations onto a carrier signal from another stronger source such as the
clock signal, which is the strongest signal on a synchronous circuit [21]. Then through
Amplitude Modulation (AM), the carrier signal can be removed and the leakage from the
circuit of interest can be attained. This side channel lends itself very well to longer distance
signal exploitation and usually does not require precise probe placement near the actual
logic circuit of interest or depackaging the device [2].
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2.4 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks exploit information captured from SCA to reveal protected
information such as the secret key from cryptographic algorithms. Three main attacks
are presented here, namely Simple SCA attacks, Differential SCA attacks, and profiling
attacks. First, an explanation of terms used in following sections in regards to SCA is
presented.
2.4.1 Random Variables in SCA
Side channel attacks require collecting information in the time domain. For this
research the collected EM measurements were continuous time signals that are sampled,
resulting in n random variables for observation trace xi. Thus, xi is an ensemble of n random
variables. A collection of K such observations is represented in a trace matrix format as
shown in Figure 2.4. Here, the random variable t for all traces x are stored in the same
column of this matrix. The rows represent a trace or ensemble xi. Now as each random
variable t is actually a time sample, a column of the trace matrix represents the value
collected for that instant in time for all the observations. The value of random variable ti
for trace xi is functionally represented as xi(ti). For the remainder of this document, the
term SCA data will stand for this type of sampled data represented in such a trace matrix.
Figure 2.4: Trace matrix of SCA collected data. A row represents an observation trace xi
consisting of n random variables which are sampled in time.
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2.4.2 Simple Side Channel Analysis
When the side channel measurement directly depends on the sensitive information,
this sensitive information can be recovered by visual inspection of the trace. If the side
channel of interest is power, this type of attack is referred to as Simple Power Analysis
(SPA). For example, RSA encryption performs a squaring function and a multiplication
when the key bit is a 1 and just the squaring function when the key bit is 0 [112]. The
part of the RSA algorithm highlighting this vulnerability is shown in Algorithm 2 [82]. In
Algorithm 2 RSA Algorithm Pseudo-code
Input: X,N, E
Output: Z = XEmodN
Z = 1
for i = key bit do
Z = Z × Z mod N ←squaring function (S)
if biti = 1 then
Z = Z × X mod N ←multiplication (M)
end if
end for
Algorithm 2an extra multiplication step (M) is performed only if the key bit value is a 1,
while the squaring step (S) occurs regardless of the bit value. This equates to a different
power consumption when a key bit value 1 is processed. Figure 2.5 shows the power
consumption trace for an RSA encryption on an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).
The multiplication step is clearly visible and hence the key can be determined directly
via observation. Usually with SPA, many traces can be averaged to remove the effect of
noise on the power consumption and make the key dependent power consumption more
easily visible. Simple SCA with the EM side channel is called Simple Electro-Magnetic
Attack (SEMA).
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Figure 2.5: SPA on RSA algorithm for an FPGA [82]
2.4.3 Differential Side Channel Analysis
For algorithms that do not directly influence the device side channels, more
sophisticated attacks are required. An example is the AES algorithm. As described in
Section 2.2, the first step of the algorithm is a bit-wise xor of the plaintext with the
secret key. If the result is stored in memory, the information leakage through the power
consumption will be dependent on the resulting value, not on secret key. Thus, the secret
key cannot be directly determined by examining the power consumption of a trace as in
SPA. In addition, as different plaintext is being combined with the key for each trace, the
first AddRoundKey step will produce different results for each trace. Thus, averaging traces
as in simple SCA attacks will minimize the information leakage. In such circumstances, a
stronger attacks based on differntial SCA are used.
The first differential SCA attack was developed in [61] using the power side channel
and named Differential Power Analysis (DPA). A sub-category of differential SCA uses
correlation to determine information about an algorithm running on a device. In the case
of the AES algorithm, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) can be used to recover the
secret key from a microcontroller [19, 72] by collecting a large number of power traces
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while the device runs the encryption algorithm. For electromagnetic traces, a similar
attack Correlation Electro-Magnetic Attack (CEMA) is used [2]. It assumes that the
power consumption of the microcontroller follows the HW power model [72]. Correlation
is calculated between the theoretical power consumption represented as the HW of an
intermediate value of the encryption and the actual power measurement. As there is a
one-to-one mapping between the key and the intermediate value, the key corresponding to
the highest correlation is guessed as the correct key. The methodology for CEMA on a
microcontroller running AES-128 consists of 5 steps [72]:
1. Choosing an intermediate result of the algorithm: CEMA uses a divide-and-
conquer approach, attacking a large key by segmenting it down into smaller sections.
For example, a 128 bit AES key can be attacked by breaking it up into 16 one-
byte sub-keys and attacking each sub-key individually. So the first step in CEMA
against AES is to determine which intermediate function and sub-key to attack. This
intermediate function can be represented by φ(x, k) where x is known, non-constant
data such as plaintext or ciphertext, and k is the sub-key.
2. Measuring the Side Channel: Traces can be captured via a current or Electro-
Magnetic (EM) probe using an oscilloscope with storage for post-processing.
3. Calculate hypothetical intermediate values: For an 8 bit sub-key, there are 256
possible values. An attacker would use each of the possible k ∈ {0, . . . , 255} values
with D different plaintexts of known values of x ∈ {0, . . . , 255} to determine what the
hypothetical values φ(x, k) for each key guess would be.
4. Mapping intermediate values to leakage model values: These hypothetical values
are mapped to a leakage model such as the Hamming Weight model to estimate the
side channel leakage for the component for each key value.
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5. Compare hypothetical values to side channel values: The estimated leakage values
are now compared to the real side channel measurement values in the traces. If the
side channel follows the leakage model, the hypothetical leakage for the correct 8-bit
sub-key will have the highest correlation with the collected traces. When the value
of the correct key byte is unknown comparing correlation with the leakage model
for each possible key byte reveals both the correct key value and samples that are
correlated with the intermediate value being targeted.
Figure 2.6a shows the maximum correlation of the actual power consumption to the
hypothetical power consumption of AddRoundKey1 with the 256 possible sub-key values.
The experiment was conducted using a 16 bit microcontroller. Sub-key guess 43 has the
maximum correlation and therefore most likely to be the correct key guess for the first
key byte. Plotting the maximum correlation over time as shown in Figure 2.6b shows the
points in time where the maximum leakage occurs. The advantage of CEMA is that it does
not require profiling and is not computationally expensive. A major disadvantage is that
CEMA performance is dependent on the power model being accurate, which is often not
the case for different hardware. In addition, CEMA often requires many more traces on the
target device than profiling attacks.
2.4.4 Profiling Attacks
The most powerful class of side channel attacks used today is the Profiling Attack.
If an assumption can be made that the side channel leakage between devices are similar,
then knowledge gained by studying one device can be used to attack another. When the
target hardware and encryption implementation is known, the side channel leakage during
encryption can be modeled on separate hardware that is of the same or similar type using
known secret keys. This similar hardware is termed the training hardware. With the known
plaintext and key used in the training device, the Intermediate Value (IV) values φ(x, k)
can be calculated for each trace. Next the side channel leakage for each IV value is
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.6: Maximum correlation values versus key guess (a), and trace time (b).
modeled with the training traces. Once the model is generated, it can be applied to the
target hardware, also known as the test hardware to determine the unknown IV value for
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each trace. This process is shown in the block diagram in Figure 2.7. As there is a one-to-
one relationship between the guessed IV and the key for a known plaintext, the IV guess
can be used to determine the key using the inverse intermediate function φ−1(x, k) given
by the decryption algorithm. thus, the profiling attack can be thought of as a classification
problem with side channel leakage variables and IV values as the classes. In a bit-wise
profiling attack, the side channel leakage of one bit of the IV is modeled at a time, yielding
a 2-class classification problem. In a byte-wise profiling attack with 256 possible IV values
for a byte, the profiling attack is a 256-class classification problem. Although profiling
attacks require many training traces, they usually require fewer test traces than CPA to
determine the correct key.
Figure 2.7: Profiling attack methodology
2.5 Classifier Description
Two main categories of classifiers are used in this work: parametric classifiers and
non-parametric classifiers. Bishop defines parametric distributions as those “governed
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by a small number of adaptive parameters, such as the mean and variance in the case
of a Gaussian (distribution)” [14]. Parametric classifiers, by extension, are those that
classify observations by assuming class parametric distributions and estimating their
distribution parameters. Non-parametric classifiers, in contrast, do not assume an
underlying distribution to the features of the data and therefore classify observations
solely from the observed values in the training set. Parametric classifiers are able to
estimate decision boundaries for regions in the variable space not covered by the training
observations, provided the data follows a parametric distribution and specifically the
distribution assumed. Non-parametric classifiers are able to estimate decision boundaries
for data that does not follow a known distribution, but like mis-specified parmetric
classifiers, boundary decisions can be inaccurate for regions in the variable space not
included in the training set.
2.5.1 Parametric Classifiers
Several parametric classifiers were used or referenced in this work. Their descriptions
are included here.
2.5.1.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)
MDA/ML is a parametric classification process consisting of a transformation (MDA)
followed by a parametric classification decision (ML). MDA is the multi-class form of
Fishers Linear Discriminant Analysis [40] that seeks the direction w∈RM×Rc−1 for a c-
classes that is a linear transformation of x∈RM shown in [125]
y = wT x . (2.4)
The within-class scatter is defined by
S w =
c∑
i=1
p(i)Σi , (2.5)
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where p(i) is the prior probability for class i, and Σi is the class covariance matrix estimated
from the training data. The between-class scatter is defined as
S b =
c∑
i=1
= p(i)(µi − µ0)(µi − µ0)T , (2.6)
where µ0 is the global mean vector from the training data given by
µ0 =
c∑
i=1
p(i)µi . (2.7)
The optimal direction is obtained by maximizing the Fisher’s Discriminant Ratio (FDR)
given by [67]
FDR(w) =
wT S bw
wT S ww
. (2.8)
FDR(w) is also called the Rayleigh coefficient [67] and is maximized by solving the
generalized eigenvalue problem
S bw = λS ww . (2.9)
The projection matrix w is the resulting matrix of eigenvectors corresponding to the
(c − 1) largest eigenvalues of S −1w S b. The projection matrix tries to find the subspace that
maximizes inter-class mean distance while reducing intra-class variation and improving
overall class separability. This transformation also effectively reduces the NF-dimensional
input data to an (c − 1) dimensional space. Given that MDA uses linear eigenvector
decomposition to generate transformed features, and assuming Gaussian input features,
the transformed features are Gaussian as well. However, if non-Gaussian input is provided
the transformed features are not guaranteed to be Gaussian.
The MDA transformed features are classified via a ML decision assuming a
multivariate Gaussian distribution of projected data. A mean vector µi is estimated for
each class, along with a pooled covariance matrix Σ that is used for all classes. Likelihood
estimation is calculated for a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by [59]
p(x|i) = 1
(2pi)NF/2|Σi|1/2 exp
{
−1
2
(x − µi)Σ−1i(x − µi)T
}
, (2.10)
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where the superscripted T denotes transpose. A sample from the input testing set is
projected via MDA and class likelihood values are assigned using Bayesian decision theory,
where the conditional posterior probability is given by
p(i|x) = p(x|i)p(i)
p(x)
. (2.11)
The final class estimate of a test observation is assigned to the class i with highest
probability, or
p(i|x) > p( j|x), ∀i , j . (2.12)
The class yielding highest probability is assigned as the class estimate for the unknown
testing input. As large dimensional distributions can have very small probabilities [59],
log-likelihood is used here. Given a known distribution, ML provides optimal classification
performance [125].
2.5.1.2 Naive Bayes
If N training observations are required to accurately estimate the probability p(x|i)
Bayes classification for one variable, and if x is a vector made up of l variables such that
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xl]T , then at least N l data points would be required to fully estimate the
multivariate distribution of the training data. To reduce computational complexity, if the l
dimensions are assumed to be statistically independent, the following holds [125]
p(x|i) =
l∏
j=1
p(x j|i), i = 1, 2, . . ., c . (2.13)
This equation states that the multidimensional distribution p(x|i) can be represented as l
one-dimensional distributions. Assuming mutual independence of the variables, their joint
probability can be determined simply by multiplying the individual l probabilities. This can
be used in Bayes classification per (2.11) and is known as the Naive Bayes (NB) classifier.
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2.5.2 Non-Parametric Classifiers
Random Forest (RndF) is the main non-parametric classifier used in this research.
However, others are also referenced and compared to RndF and their descriptions are
included in this section.
2.5.2.1 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a classifier that attempts to find the optimal split
between two classes, as shown in Figure 2.8 where a two variable (i.e. in R2, two class
problem is presented. The SVM provides a linear discriminant to separate the two classes
with the maximum possible margin. Hence, SVMs are often referred to as Max Margin
Classifiers. Generalization is the property of a classifier to correctly classify a given
Figure 2.8: Support Vector Machine in 2-variable space for a 2-class separable
problem [77]. Bold line represents the optimal separating hyperplane, and corresponding
parallel dotted lines represent support vectors.
unknown measurement that is not part of the training set. Since SVMs attempt to maximize
the separable space between classes, they have very good generalization properties. For an
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l-dimensional problem, the SVM generates an l− 1 dimensional hyperplane to separate the
two classes.
For the case when the two classes are not separable, the SVM still generates a
hyperplane that separates the two classes as much as possible while minimizing the number
of observations that incorrectly lie on the wrong side of the hyperplane as shown in
Figure 2.9a.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.9: (a) Support Vector Machine in 2 variable space for a 2 class non-separable
problem , and (b)a LS-SVM non-linear boundary decision from 2-component SCA data to
differentiate 1 bit (2-classes) non-separable power leakage [55].
An alternate method if classes cannot be separated by a linear hyperplane is to use a
kernel method with the aid of one of many kernel functions. This method called the kernel
trick implicitly maps the original dataset to a higher dimensional space in a computationally
efficient manner. If the classes can be separated by SVM in this higher dimensional space,
then the decision boundary hyperplane in that higher dimensional space can be mapped
back to the original feature space to give a non-linear decision boundary to separate the
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classes. In [55], the Least Squares SVM (LS-SVM) was used with a kernel function
called the Radial Basis Function (RBF) for non-linear classification by converting the
original SCA power leakage data set to higher dimensional space. Figure 2.9b shows the
two-variable space and the decision regions defined by the LS-SVM with RBF. Red dots
represent a 0 value for the bit under attack in the training set, and blue dots represent a 1
value. The yellow and green regions represent the class regions identified by the classifier
based on the training data. Although the kernel method provides a means to develop non-
linear decision boundaries, it requires derivation of parameters and does not guarantee
separability. SVMs are inherently two-class classifiers but can be extended to multi-class
classification by one-vs-all or pair-wise classification [51].
2.5.2.2 Perceptron and Neural Networks
A linear classifier is defined in [125] as an algorithm that separates classes c1 and c2 in
l-dimensional space by a hyperplane defined as g(x) = wT x + w0. Figure 2.10 shows one of
the simplest non-linear classification problems representing 2-bit xor data. With this data,
it is not possible to introduce a linear classifier that can achieve less than a 50% miss rate.
In such circumstances, a non-linear classifier is needed. A logical approach to this problem
is to divide the space using two linear separators as shown in Figure 2.11a. The associated
Figure 2.10: Non-linear xor classification problem.
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system of equations to these discriminants is
y1 = x1 + x2 − 1/2 = 0 (2.14)
y2 = x1 + x2 − 3/2 = 0
g(y) = y1 + y2 − 1/2 = 0 .
These equations can be graphically represented as in Figure 2.11b as a two-layer
(a) (b)
Figure 2.11: (a) xor problem solved with two discriminants, and (b) the associated
perceptron to this solution
perceptron. This type of structure is also referred to as a feedfoward neural network as the
data process goes in the forward direction only from the input to the output [125]. The first
column of nodes represented by x1 and x2 are called the input layer. Nodes that are not in
the input layer are referred to as neurons. Thus, this layer can be as large as the dimensions
of the problem. The middle layer is also called the hidden layer where the data is mapped to
an intermediate decision space, and then finally an output decision is reached at the output
node. For a multi-class problem, the perceptron can have more than one output nodes,
allowing them to easily account for multi-class datasets. In addition, for more complex
decision spaces, more than one hidden layer may be required. Hidden layers attempt
to account for interactions between variables or groups of variables. One disadvantage
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of neural networks is their high computational time which grows exponentially with the
number of variables.
2.5.2.3 GRLVQI
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) is a neural
learning algorithm that iteratively adjusts prototype vectors to define class boundaries [63].
Initially, the classifier LVQ was developed as a system of K prototype vectors arbitrarily
chosen for the data set. Weight vectors are assigned to a first layer of neurons with each
neuron representing one class. The weight vector of a class neuron is iteratively updated
(learned) to reduce the training data distance of that class in a manner similar to supervised
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) processing. LVQ was generalized to GRLVQ in [114] using
gradient descent to minimize drifting of the prototype vectors from their optimal locations.
Hammer modified the algorithm to incorporate variable relevance ranking [44] which was
key to successful implementation of feature Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) work
in [106]. GRLVQI was successfully used for RF-DNA fingerprinting work in [47] involving
identification and verification of WiFi and WiMAX devices. In addition to vector class
labels, GRLVQI produces a distance metric that provides a measure of confidence in the
class estimate. Device ID verification performance was improved in [106] by modifying
the confidence measure to account for prototype vector angle as well as distance.
2.5.2.4 K-Nearest Neighbors
KNN is a very simple yet powerful non-parametric classifier that is frequently used
and scales very well to multi-class problems. The basic KNN algorithm is defined as
follows:
1. For an unknown vector x, find the k nearest training data observations in the M-
dimensional space, regardless of their class.
2. The class with the maximum number of observations out of k is given as the class of
x.
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This algorithm works well for data that is separable within the variable space. It
has been shown theoretically that as the number of training observations grows without
bound, the error probability becomes bounded [37]. For k-nearest neighbors, as k→ ∞,
the classification error approaches the optimal error and would do well for large training
sets. However, the computational complexity and memory burden becomes great for very
large number of observations as a large search space needs to be navigated to find the
KNN. In addition, this model requires the full training set to asses the test set, which can
be cumbersome for algorithm deployment [125].
2.5.2.5 Decision Trees
Binary decision trees are low-bias classifiers capable of accepting high-dimensional
data. The tree is grown by asking several two-response questions, each question being
called a node. The node is split into left and right child nodes each splitting the training
data into smaller groups. The particular response to the question brings the algorithm
down the next branch and the process is repeated until a class is determined. The recursive
algorithm for growing a tree is shown in Algorithm 3. For each variable, each possible
Algorithm 3 Decision Tree Node Splitting Recursive Algorithm
SplitNode (Data, Impurity)
if Impurity == minimum Impurity then
return
else
for each variable xi do
for each possible value t do
xi.leftChild = Data>t
xi.rightChild = Data≤t
Calculate xi.leftChild impurity iL
Calculate xi.rightChild impurity iR
Calculate impurity reduction for (xi, t)
end for
end for
BestNode = max( Impurity reduction for all variables and all thresholds)
SplitNode( BestNode.leftChild, BestNode.iL )
SplitNode( BestNode.rightChild, BestNode.iR )
end if
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observable value is examined as a threshold. Data is split into two groups called the
le f tChild and rightChild based on each threshold examined. After the split, a metric called
impurity is calculated for the split in which the impurity of the classification for each of the
resulting children (leftChild and rightChild) is computed. Impurity can be calculated based
on entropy reduction or information gain from the split [15], Gini impurity reduction [100]
and acAUC [39]. The entropy reduction method is presented below.
Shannon’s Entropy Impurity For a c-class problem, the probability of class i at node
a is represented as pa(i) and is efficiently estimated by counting the number of observations
(frequency count) for class i in a group of data. Then the impurity at node a can be
calculated by finding the Shannon Entropy from information theory in
I(a) = −
∑c
i=1
pa(i)log2 pa(i) . (2.15)
I(a) takes on the maximum value when all probabilities are equal to 1/c and is 0 when all
the observations belong to only one class.
Impurity Reduction After choosing a method of calculating impurity of node a, the
decrease in impurity after the split is calculated. Suppose after the split, Nl is the number of
data points in the left child node, Nr the number in the right child node, and Na the number
in the parent node a. Then the impurity reduction at node a for threshold t is
∆It(a) = It(a) − NlNa It(le f tChild) −
Nr
Na
It(rightChild) , (2.16)
where It(le f tChild) and It(rightChild) are the impurities of the left and right child nodes
respectively for a given threshold t. To grow a node, this process is repeated for m variables.
The variable and threshold combination (v∗, t∗) that reduces the impurity the most after the
split from parent to child nodes is chosen to be included in the model. This process is
described by
(t∗, v∗) = arg max
t,v
∆It,v(a) . (2.17)
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Stop Splitting Rule The tree will stop growing when a pre-defined minimum
impurity is met by a node. This terminal node is called a leaf. The majority class in
that node then becomes the leaf class label. Choosing a smaller minimum impurity leads
to larger trees as the nodes keep splitting until the threshold is met. There is a temptation
to grow the tree until the leaf node is pure, i.e. until there is only one class in the final
leaf. However, this often leads to overtraining where the error in the training set is reduced
to zero, but the error in an unknown separate test set grows. Allowing a certain level of
impurity in the leaf nodes gives greater generalization power to the classifier in order to
classify unknown data, separate from the training set, more accurately [15, 125].
Decision trees benefit from being able to divide the decision space into irregular
shape subsets. Figure 2.12 shows the Fisher Iris dataset, which Fisher used to develop
the Linear Discriminant Model [40]. Class labels are the names of iris flowers used in the
dataset. Figure 2.12a shows the two-variable space partitioned with the ML classifier for
an estimated multivariate Gaussian distribution. Similarly, Figure 2.12b shows how the
decision tree would partition the same space. Figure 2.12c shows the graphical view of the
decision tree. By using a number of nodes, the tree algorithm is able to partition the space
to a greater level of refinement than ML. However, outliers can negatively affect the tree
performance, especially if the tree is overtrained, resulting in overly partitioned data.
Decision trees are capable of handling multi-class problems in high-dimensional
datasets and have low bias in their estimations. A disadvantage of decision trees is that
they are also high-variance classifiers [125]. Small changes in the data can lead to different
ways of growing trees, which can then lead to a greater variation in their predictions. To
overcome this, a number of decision trees can be combined through classifier ensemble
methods such as Boosting and Random Forests.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2.12: Classification regions for Fisher Iris Data with linear discriminants (a) and
for a binary decision tree (b). Colored regions represent the class decision for the variable
space made by the respective classifier. Colored dots represent the training data used to
train the classifier. The binary decision tree structure is shown in (c).
2.5.2.6 Boosting Approach to Combining Classifiers
Boosting attempts to evolve a weak learning algorithm, termed a weak learner, into
a strong one with good error performance [125]. For a boosting algorithm, a sequence
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of classifiers is iteratively designed using a base weak learner. In each iteration of
classification, a subset of the training data is supplied with a distribution that assigns the
most misclassified data a higher weight. Thus, observations that were misclassified in the
previous iteration are more likely to be used to develop the classifier in the next iteration.
For an example, the AdaBoost algorithm is described here [133]. Suppose there is a two-
class problem such that for N observations, the corresponding class labels are yi∈{−1, 1},
for i∈{1, 2, . . . ,N}. Let T ( j) : X→{−1, 1} be the classification assigned by the weak learner
T ( j) to the input variable xi and initial distribution of the training samples is uniform. The
AdaBoost algorithm is given by Algorithm 4 [133]. I is the identity function, which is 1
Algorithm 4 Two-Class AdaBoost algorithm for growing a strong learner
Initialize N observation weights to wi = 1/N.
for j=1,. . . ,J do
(a) Fit a classifier T ( j) to the training data using weights wi.
(b) Compute err( j) =
n∑
i=1
wi·I
(
ci,T ( j)(xi)
)
/
n∑
i=1
wi.
(c) Compute α( j) = log1−err
( j)
err( j) .
(d) Set wi ← wi·exp
(
α( j) · I
(
ci,T ( j)(xi)
))
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N.
(e) Re-normalize wi.
end for
Output: C(x) = argmax
k
J∑
j=1
α( j) · I
(
T ( j)(x) = k
)
.
when its conditions are true and 0 otherwise. α( j) is chosen through a cost function that
penalizes misclassifications much more than correct ones. Thus, harder training traces are
given more weight than easier ones, leading to higher probability of them being chosen in
the next iteration. After J boosting iterations, C(x) is the final strong learner.
A main advantage of boosting has been its immunity to overfitting [17, 125]. Even
when the classification error on the training set goes to 0, the error on the test set
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continues to decrease until some asymptotic value is reached. Breiman [17] believed
that classification ensembles perform better when individual classifiers are uncorrelated.
He stated that Adaboost might work well because at each step the algorithm attempts
to decouple the next classifier from the current one. Amit et al [6] show that Adaboost
attempts to keep covariance between classifiers low.
Adaboost is designed specifically for a two-class problem. The multi-class Adaboost
algorithm named SAMME was successfully introduced in [133] by adding a log(K−1) term
to step (b) for a K-class problem.
Boosting algorithms like Adaboost are sequential algorithms and require significant
computational time as ensemble growth cannot be parallelized. In [128, 131], an alternate
method to Adaboost is proposed where multiple base classifiers are trained in parallel on
different features. At each iteration of the boosting algorithm, the classifiers are combined.
This has a close relationship to another ensemble algorithm called Random Forest.
2.5.2.7 Random Forest
Decision trees provide an unbiased classifier at the cost of high variance, i.e. slight
changes in the input training data can cause the tree to be grown differently. In addition,
trees are susceptible to noise in the test data, leading to misclassification. A widely used
method to minimize these effects is the Random Forest classifier. Ensemble classifier
performance primarily depends on two factors: strength of the individual weak classifiers
s, and the correlation between the classifiers ρ [17].
To reduce correlation in the Random Forest, trees are grown using a random sampling
of variables m<M at each node, where M is the total number of variables. The sampling
is performed with replacement, so it is possible that a variable is reused for various nodes.
As in decision trees, entropy reduction or information gain from the split [15] to decide
how to split the node. Additionally, each tree is grown on a unique random sampling of
observations chosen with replacement and termed in-bag observations. Thus, each tree
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gets a unique “view” of the decision space based on the in-bag variables used to grow it, as
shown in Figures 2.13a and 2.13b.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2.13: Boundary decisions by three different random decision trees on the same
training data in (a) and (b), and (c) the boundary decisions of a forest of 50 trees. Shown is
the entropy from the classification, with higher entropy decisons in darker shaded regions.
To reduce bias and between-tree correlation, trees are grown to full length, i.e., they
are grown until each terminal leaf node is pure. In the test phase, an observation is classified
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by each trained tree to reach a classification decision. Final class decision of the forest is
reached by majority vote among the ensemble. As Random Forest determines a test class
by voting among the trees of the forest, the probability of each class can be calculated by
p(ci|x) = vci/Nt where vci are the number of votes for class ci and Nt are the total number
of trees in the forest (i.e. total number of votes). Figure 2.13c shows the entropy of the
decisions of a 50 tree forest on a two-variable space, with darker shaded regions indicating
higher entropy (regions where multiple trees disagree in their class estimates). In [88],
Random Forest was found to provide good posterior probability results when compared to
SVM, Logistic Regression, KNN, Artificial Neural Networks and Naive Bayes classifiers.
In [17], Adaboost was compared with Random Forest and was found to have comparable
performance. Also, the Random Forest algorithm produced a 3% test error rate which was
very close to the optimal Bayes error rate of 1% [17].
Random Forest enjoys the inherent multi-class capability of decision trees. It can
effectively handle high dimensional data sets such as those of SCA data without needing
to transform the data space. The classifier also includes a built-in variable importance
metric. For each node of each tree in the Random Forest, the reduction in entropy from
the splitting of parent to children over a variable is recorded. The entropy reduction for
each variable xi is averaged over all nodes and all trees to give an entropy based variable
importance metric for each variable. The Random Forest Entropy Importance method will
be abbreviated as RFEI from here on. As with AdaBoost, Random Forest also shows
immunity to overtraining. Figure 2.14 shows that training correct classification rate rises
to 100% with as few as Nt =12 trees, because trees are grown to full length. However,
the classifier is not overfitted as more trees are added and test correct classification rate
continues to rise until a steady state is reached after Nt =600 trees.
Random Forest has gained popularity due to its non-parametric and non-linear
properties, high performance in high dimensional data sets and ease of implementation. It’s
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Figure 2.14: Training and test errors for Random Forest as the number of trees Nt increases.
application can be found in classifications of genes [31], spectral data [74], geographical
landmarks [85] and agriculture [89] to name a few. In empirical studies, Random Forest
has outperformed SVM, KNN and Boosted Decision Trees in large dimensional data
sets [85, 89, 109]. In [88], Random Forest was found to provide good posterior probability
results when compared to SVM, Logistic Regression, KNN, Artificial Neural Networks
and Naive Bayes classifiers.
Although the true convergence theory behind Random Forest remains an area of active
research [13, 70], a few conclusions may be derived directly from its implementation. First,
each tree is grown on a different data set, thereby reducing the influence of data outliers.
Next, a random sampling of variables is analyzed at each node of each tree in the forest.
From each sampling, the variable most useful in classification is used for partitioning the
data further. This variable filtering reduces the influence of non-data dependent variables
and ensures that more useful variables are used in the classification, as mathematically
proven in [12]. The Random Forest determines decision regions strictly from the data
alone without any assumption of an underlying distribution. In addition, as the decision
space is split at each node, non-linear decision regions can be determined.
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2.5.3 Comparison of Classifiers
An empirical comparison of the classifiers listed here was conducted in [22] which
included boosted trees, SVMs, neural nets, Random Forest and KNN. Results showed that
for low-dimensional data up to 4000 dimensions, boosted decision trees performed the best
with Random Forest performing next best with respect to correct classification. Above 4000
dimensions, the Random Forest performed the best. In [89], SVMs narrowly outperformed
Random Forest (less than 1% better) and neural networks for satellite imagery of crop
data when 3 or more images were used for classification. All three easily outperform
the Naive Bayes Maximum Likelihood method. In [85], the Random Forest is compared
to single decision tree and maximum likelihood geographical data. It is not known how
the probability distribution of the training data is estimated for the maximum likelihood
algorithm or what assumptions on data probability distribution type were made. However
the Random Forest performed the best here, with overall accuracy of 90.96%, while single
decision tree accuracy was 89.16% and maximum likelihood was 83.58%. Interestingly,
when the training set size was reduced by 25%, the Random Forest performance only
decreased by 11%, compared to 13.8% with single decision tree and 26% with maximum
likelihood as, shown in Figure 2.15a. In addition, when noise was added to the training
set, it was found that all three classifiers were highly affected, but that the Random Forest
degraded the slowest as shown in Figure 2.15b.
2.5.4 Machine Learning and SCA
Few efforts to date have focused on using classifiers other than Maximum Likelihood
with Bayes rule in template attacks. In [55], the Least Squares Support Vector Machine
(LSSVM) is compared to standard Template Attacks using maximum likelihood with
multivariate Gaussian distribution for the estimates of p(x|i), where i is the class defined
by the intermediate value in the AES algorithm. Only two experiments were conducted
for two-class problems that revealed very little information. The first attempted to classify
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.15: Comparison of ML (MLC), single decision tree (CART) and RndF (RF)
from [85] showing (a) decreasing in performance when the training set size was reduced,
and (b) performance degradation when noise was added to the training set.
those traces where the 4th least significant bit was either a 0 or 1. The second experiment
classified traces based on even or odd Hamming Weights of the intermediate value i. Thus,
both of these experiments provided limited data and did not reveal the actual key value.
The LSSVM was found to perform either in-line or below Template Attacks.
The second, more substantial research effort was conducted in [66]. Here, Random
Forests, Template Attacks, SVM and Self Organizing Maps were compared using SCA
data on a FPGA device. The encryption was 3DES which uses 3 64-bit keys. The data was
classified bit-wise, where a different classifier was trained for each bit of the key. Thus,
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for a 128-bit AES key, 128 separate classifiers were grown for classification. Results show
that although some bits had as high as 96% correct classification rate, others were as low
as 50% and many were somewhere in between. In addition, in some scenarios authors
rounded lower errors up to 50% as they claim that 50% is as good as random guessing.
This inflates their performance results as the error rate of lower performing classifiers are
not truly depicted. Overall, Random Forest with PCA performed the best, and authors claim
an improvement in key recovery over Template Attacks from 5.80% to 15.33%. However,
template attack misclassification rates were not provided for comparison. In addition, the
test data success was not measured by the commonly used classification rate which is the
ratio of the correctly classified observations over the total number of observations. Instead,
authors use an enhanced brute force attack, where if the key is incorrect, the most difficult
to predict bit value is flipped. This is repeated until the key is recovered. If it cannot
be recovered, it is considered a miss. Thus, multiple attempts are allowed until a miss is
classified. On average, Template Attacks with enhanced brute force required 11 attempts,
while Random Forest with PCA required 21 attempts.
Finally, SVM was used most recently in [51] for HW-based pair-wise classification.
Models were generated in a one-versus-one strategy with each HW pair-wise combination
being modeled separately. For L HWs, (L − 1)L/2 models were trained and combined
to jointly provide a multi-class classifier. Success was achieved with lower guessing
entropy [119] using smaller training sets than Template Attack under moderate to high
noise conditions.
2.6 RF-DNA Fingerprinting
Distributed networks such as WiFi, ZigBee and WiMax allow for network creation and
sustainment with little human interaction required. These networks are designed to allow
their hardware to be remotely located, leaving vulnerabilities for eavesdropping and cloning
attacks. With access to a network key, an attacker can enter these networks with a rogue
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device and gain access to transmitted data. RF-fingerprinting provides a means to exploit
physical layer characteristics of devices to enhance network security. As the physical
characteristics between devices are randomly generated through the manufacturing process,
they are very difficult to reverse engineer, thus, providing a useful hardware authentication
tool. RF-DNA fingerprinting is the subset of RF-fingerprinting that is used in this research.
Figure 2.16 shows the signal collection and RF-DNA fingerprint generation method-
ology [129]. A statistical RF-DNA fingerprint (F) is derived from the signals instantaneous
amplitude (a), phase (φ) and/or frequency ( f ) responses as described in [102]. The corre-
sponding response sequences a[n], φ[n] and f [n] are generated from the NS complex I-Q
signal samples s[n] = sl[n] + jsQ[n] within the region of interest by,
a[n] =
√
s2l [n] + s
2
Q[n] , (2.18)
φ[n] = tan−1
[
sQ[n]
sl[n]
]
for sl[n] , 0 , (2.19)
f [n] =
1
2pi
[
dφ[n]
dt
]
, (2.20)
where n = 1, 2, . . . ,NS . These sequences are centered (zero mean) and normalized (divide
by maximum value) prior to calculating statistical RF-DNA features of standard deviation
(σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ) and/or kurtosis (κ) within selected signal region(s) of
interest. The regional fingerprint markers for the signal are generated by 1) dividing
each response sequence into NR contiguous equal length sub-sequences, 2) calculating NS
statistical metrics for each sub-sequence, plus the entire region as a whole for NR + 1 total
regions, and 3) arranging the metrics in a vector of the form
FRi = [σ2Ri γRi κRi]1×3, (2.21)
42
Figure 2.16: RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation Process [129]
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,NR + 1.
σ =
√
1
N
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)2 , (2.22)
σ2 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)2 , (2.23)
γ =
1
Nσ3
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)3 , (2.24)
κ =
1
Nσ4
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)4 , (2.25)
where x[n] is the nth feature vector element and N is the total number of samples in each
subsequence used to calculate the statistic.
2.6.1 Machine Learning and RF-Fingerprinting
RF-DNA fingerprinting has shown success over a number of RF devices with multiple
classifiers, including using MDA/ML with Cognitive Radio networks [47], WiMAX [107],
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and 802.11a WiFi [48]. GRLVQI was successfully used in [106] to improve classification
performance on ZigBee devices using RF emissions collected in multiple environments.
In [94], RF-DNA fingerprints for this dataset were shown to be highly non-Gaussian, and
RndF was shown to improve performance over the parametric MDA/ML classifier.
RF-DNA fingerprinting is a subset of a larger group of research called RF-
fingerprinting which includes various methods to exploit signal differences to classify RF
devices. In [29], the transient part of the 802.15.4 signal from CC2420 radio transceivers
were used with Mahalanobis matching and MDA to achieve an Equal Error Rate of
0.24%. In [30], 100 IEEE 802.11 Network Interface Cards were tested with the KNN
classifier and achieved a success rate of greater than 99%. In [132], SVM with the
Radial Basis Function (RBF) was used with IEEE 802.16-2009 devices to detect network
intrusion attacks, yielding a False Positive Rate (FPR)=0.67% and a False Negative Rate
(FNR)=2.15%. Thus, a variety of classifiers have been successfully applied in the field of
RF-fingerprinting to enhance security protection for a number of RF devices.
2.7 802.15.4 ZigBee
ZigBee devices based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [10] have gained popularity in a
variety of applications as devices of choice for low-cost, low-power and low-complexity
communication applications [60]. Per the IEEE standard, ZigBee devices operate as
either Full Function Devices (FFD) capable of functioning as a network coordinator, or
as Reduced Function Devices (RFD) capable of communicating only with an FFD. ZigBee
networks can operate as decentralized mesh networks [68] such as Star, Peer-to-Peer or
Cluster Tree Topology, allowing new devices to be discovered and incorporated easily into
an existing network. ZigBee devices represent a 100× lower-power alternative to Bluetooth
communications for short message burst communications [9, 60]. The low-cost, low-power
attributes of ZigBee have greatly increased their popularity and they have been widely
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adopted for monitoring and control in industrial and building [38], healthcare [58], and
security system applications [126].
(a) (b)
Figure 2.17: (a) Theoretical QPSK constellation and the effect of frequency and phase
error, and (b) constellation plot in [30] showing variation in QPSK symbol location.
Per the IEEE 802.14.5 MAC Physical Layer Specifications manual [56], ZigBee
devices can support several modulation methods for RF communications, including Offset
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (O-QPSK), Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
(OFDM ) and Frequency Shift Keying (FSK). For this work we will examine O-QPSK as
it is used in the Atmel RZUSBstick [8] and the TI CC2420 [124], which are the ZigBee
devices under test. QPSK, which is the basis for O-QPSK, is a 4 level (4-ary) phase shift
keying modulation where NS = 4 symbols can be expressed as
si(t) =
√
2E
Ts
cos
(
ω0t − (2i − 1)piNS
)
0 ≤ t ≤ Ts, i = 1, . . . ,NS , (2.26)
where E is the received energy over symbol duration Ts, and ω0 is the carrier
frequency [117]. Ideally, these four symbols would be placed at the 45, 135, 225 and
315 degree locations on the circle shown in Figure 2.17a. However, slight manufacturing
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defects in hardware can cause errors in the amplitude, phase and frequency of the emitted
signal. These errors are small enough to assure that the specified bit-error rate can still be
achieved, and are therefore deemed by the manufacturer to be tolerable. Figure 2.17b
shows the actual constellation points for received QPSK symbols from 802.11 WiFi
signals. The variation in amplitude, phase, and frequency that cause this distribution of
constellation points can be exploited by methods such as RF-DNA fingerprinting for device
classification [93].
2.8 Summary
This research addresses two main areas: SCA with unintentional emissions, and
RF-DNA fingerprinting with intentional emissions. SCA on cryptographic devices
involves collecting unintended information to determine otherwise unobtainable sensitive
information. For the AES algorithm, this information is in the form of the secret key stored
in the device memory. By examining the EM, power, timing and other side channels,
various methods such as CPA and profiling attacks can be used to determine the key value.
Profiling attacks offer the best known performance at finding the correct key with the
fewest number of test traces at the cost of requiring a much larger number of training
traces. However, once the test device is known, a similar or same model device can be
obtained afterward and trained at the attacker’s leisure. Once sufficient training has been
accomplished, the attacker can collect a smaller set of test traces from the target device to
determine the correct key.
In this chapter, two main groups of classifiers were discussed: parametric classifiers
and non-parametric classifiers. Parametric classifiers such as MDA/ML assume class
parametric distributions and estimating their parameters through the training data. Non-
parametric classifiers by contrast do not assume an underlying distribution, but instead
estimate class boundaries strictly from the training set observations for a given variable
space. Side channel collection of the entire encryption operation, sampled at multiples of
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the Nyquist sampling rate, consist of observations with large numbers of samples. This
results in very high dimenisonal data. A comparison of various classifiers shows that
the Random Forest provides the best combination of computational efficiency and high
performance datasets [22], which characterizes SCA data.
For intentional RF emissions, slight hardware differences in RF devices lead to
corresponding variation in the emitted signal’s frequency, phase and amplitude. This
variation is used by RF-DNA fingerprinting to enhance the security of distributed networks
by providing a physical layer authentication method that is nearly impossible to duplicate.
It has been shown to be effective over a range of SNRs and for a variety of RF devices
using parametric and non-parametric classifiers. ZigBee devices are gaining popularity
in a large variety of sensitive applications. RF-DNA fingerprinting can be used to
reliably authenticate authorized ZigBee devices to prevent network intrusion from rogue
devices [93].
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III. Methodology
This chapter describes the research methodology used for Random Forest (RndF),
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) and RF-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting.
First, data collection methods are specified for SCA unintentional EM emissions and
ZigBee intentional emissions. This is followed by the general methodology used for Linear
Regression Attack (LRA), RndF and Multi-Class AdaBoost (MCA) profiling attacks and
RF-DNA fingerprinting with RndF. Methodology specific to each research contribution is
further explained in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
3.1 Data Collection Methodology
Data collection methods differed for unintentional and intentional emissions. SCA
unintentional emissions were collected from Microchip Peripheral Interface Controller
(PIC) microcontrollers during AES encryption in [91, 92]. ZigBee intentional emissions
were collected and converted to RF-DNA fingerprints using statistical methods in [93–95].
3.1.1 Unintentional PIC Microcontroller EM Data Collections
Unintended EM emissions were collected from four families of 16-bit PIC microcon-
trollers from Microchip Technology Inc. Figure 3.1a shows the functional diagram of the
SCA collection method. Figure 3.1b shows the hardware setup using the Riscure EM probe
station [111]. The EM measurements during the AES-128 encryption operation were the
side channel of interest for all experiments. The encryption operation was controlled by
first sending the plaintext and key to the PIC from a workstation over a serial connection.
The microcontroller then executed the AES encryption and the EM emissions were cap-
tured by a Riscure broadband EM probe. Probe responses were sampled by an oscilloscope
and the sampled observation sent back to the workstation for storage. The collected traces
were temporally aligned using a trigger signal that was sent by the microcontroller before
48
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1: (a) Functional diagram of the SCA collection setup with the PIC microcon-
troller, and (b) hardware setup using a Riscure EM probe station [111].
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the start of the encryption, which triggered the oscilloscope to start collection. The different
microcontrollers were spatially aligned using a custom designed test jig that can be fixed to
the microcontroller board relative to the probe. Post-processing cross-correlation was used
to ensure that the collected traces were well temporally aligned.
To minimize noise from external sources during collection, only the AES algorithm
is running on the microcontroller. Serial communication with the collection computer is
halted during the encryption process. The best location on the chip for EM collection is
determined by performing a spatial X-Y scan, where the surface of the chip is divided into a
grid of multiple sub-regions and a trace is collected at each region. The region yielding the
highest spectral intensity within a DC-30 MHz band is chosen as the best location for data
collection. This region is fixed for all devices used in this work, unless otherwise specified.
3.1.2 Intentional ZigBee EM Data Collections
Two datasets were adopted from prior research and used in this research including
1) a the ZigBee Cross-Environment (XEnv) dataset [93, 94] and 2) a the ZigBee Cross-
Receiver (XRx) dataset [95]. Analyzing multiple datasets enables generalization of research
results and reveals the usefulness of RndF to improve ZigBee classification and verification
for different devices collected by different receivers. Test setup differences between the
two datasets provide insight unique to each perspective such as RndF performance on
collections from a single environment (XRx dataset) versus multiple environments (XRx
dataset). Table 3.1 summarizes the test setup for the two ZigBee datasets. Data collection
methods for each dataset are described in the following sections.
3.1.2.1 ZigBee Cross-Environment Data Collection
The ZigBee XEnv dataset was collected in support of research conducted by Ramsey
et al. [101] using an Agilent E3238S-based receiver [1]. Data was collected in three
environments for all authorized devices, including 1) Line-Of-Sight (LOS) where there is
a direct unobstructed LOS between the receiver and ZigBee device; 2) an obstructed Wall
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Table 3.1: Test setup conditions for Cross-Environment (XEnv) and Cross-Receiver (XRx)
datasets.
XEnv XRx
Number of
Authorized Devices 4 3
Number of Rogue
Devices 9 3
Number of Training
Observations per
Authorized Device
1500 300
Number of Test
Observations per
Authorized Device
1500 300
Receiver Agilent E3238S
NI PXIe,
NI USRP
Collection
Environment
LOS
Wall
Cage
LOS
environment where there is an office wall separating the receiver and the device; and 3) a
Cage environment where the device and receiver are in an anechoic chamber. A total of
1000 observations were collected for each authorized device per environment, giving 3000
total observations per device. These are divided evenly into test and training sets of 1500
observations each per device.
3.1.2.2 ZigBee Cross-Receiver Data Collection
The ZigBee XRx dataset was originally collected in support of research conducted by
Stubbs et al. in [121]. The high-cost receiver used for data collection was the National
Instruments (NI) PXIe-1085 system and the low cost receiver was the NI USRP-2921. Six
Atmel RZUSBsticks were used as the transmitters. To provide a meaningful comparison, as
many parameters as possible were fixed during signal collection. Both receivers collected
observations simultaneously and were at an equal distance from the transmitter. Transmit
power was set to 1 mW and a common receiver antenna was used for both receivers. A
total of 600 transmission preambles were collected from each RZUSBstick along a direct
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LOS to the receivers and were divided evenly into training and test sets of 300 observations
per device.
3.2 Linear Regression Attack Methodology
This section describes the general methodology used for experiments in [92] involving
linear regression attacks using unintentional EM SCA emissions from PIC microcontrollers
during AES encryption. The attack used here was first described in [115] and subsequently
adopted in related research [34, 50, 92].
Suppose the side channel of interest is the power measurement of the device when
performing an encryption operation. An s-bit subkey is represented by k ∈ {0, 1}s and
corresponding known p-bit plaintext by x ∈ {0, 1}p. The power measurement at time t is
then represented by
It(x, k) = ht(x, k) + t , (3.1)
where It(x, k) and ht(x, k), respectively, are the total power measurement and deterministic
power measurement for the encryption operation segment that depends on x and k at time
t. The non-deterministic part of the power measurement t does not depend on x or k. For
an estimate hˆt(x, k) of the deterministic power measurement, the minimum
min
hˆt:{0,1}s×{0,1}p→R
N1∑
i=1
((
It(x, k) − hˆt(x, k)
)2)
(3.2)
is attained when hˆt=ht. In other words, the best deterministic power estimate is the one
yielding the smallest Sum of Squares Error (SSE). The result of subtracting the measured
value It(x, k) from the estimate hˆt(x, k) is the residual Rt at time t given by
Rt = It(x, k) − hˆt(x, k) . (3.3)
Now let Fu,t ⊂ Ft := {hˆt : {0, 1}p× {0, 1}s→R} be a subspace of the full function space
Ft, and is spanned by u known linear basis functions gi,t(x, k) and i = 1, . . . , u, then the
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deterministic power consumption for this subspace can be estimated by
hˆt(x, k) = b0t·1 +
∑u
i=1
bit · gi(x, k) . (3.4)
The basis functions gi(x, k) can be constructed with a chosen intermediate value function
φ(x, k) by the function composition gi(x, k) = g¯i(φ(x, k)). For example, gi(x, k) can
give the ith bit of the result of the intermediate value function φ(x, k). How φ(x, k)
and correspondingly gi(x, k) are chosen is dependent on the attacker’s knowledge of the
cryptographic algorithm and device architecture. For example, if the attacker knows that
the encryption algorithm is AES, he can choose φ(x, k) to be the SubBytes function for the
first byte of the first encryption round, and g¯i(x, k) extracts the ith bit of that byte value.
A desired property is that the expectation E(Rt) = 0 over x and k, i.e., on average
the estimate will be correct. The least squares estimator is used to estimate the model
parameters bt = [b0,t, . . . , bu,t] as it meets this condition and provides a solution that
minimizes the SSE. As a result, it produces the best estimator hˆ∗t for a given choice of
basis functions. In the profiling phase, the least squares estimator is generated by
b∗t = (A
T A)−1AT It(x, k) , (3.5)
where
A =

1 g1,t(x1, k) . . . gu−1,t(x1, k)
...
...
. . .
...
1 g1,t(xN1 , k) . . . gu−1,t(xN1 , k)
 , (3.6)
for N1 observations, and It(x, k) is the set of measurements at time t for N1 observations,
each with a different plaintext xi. Substituting 3.5 in 3.4,
hˆt(x, k) = (AT A)−1AT It(x, k) × g(x, k)T , (3.7)
where g0(x, k) = 1 for all realizations of x. Then, hˆ∗t is used to estimate the deterministic
power consumption for a second set of N2 observations and the residuals Rt are generated
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for each time sample t. The expanded derivation of the Least Squares Estimator is provided
in Appendix A.
The probability density function f (R) for the residuals {R1, . . . ,Rm} is estimated with
an m-variable multivariate Normal distribution. For a good estimate, only m time samples
with maximum information leakage should be used. Methods in [34, 50, 92, 115] follow
the same basic strategy to this point. They differ in their approach to determine the
time samples where there is high information leakage, which are subsequently used for
determining the correct m dimensions for Rt. Once these time samples are chosen, the
regression residuals Rt from the training data at these m points in time are then used
to estimate a covariance matrix C, effectively building a template for the multivariate
estimation residual R for a correct key guess. As there is a zero mean for the residuals
given by the E[Rt] = 0 requirement of the least squares method, C alone is needed to build
an m-dimensional normal density function,
f (R) = 1√
(2pi)m
exp
(
−1
2
RTC−1R
)
. (3.8)
By assuming that the subspace Fu,t contained in Ft is spanned by the u known linear basis
functions, only this single template for Rt is required.
For the key extraction phase, N3 test measurements are used that have an unknown
fixed key and random plaintext. The ML method is applied on the N3 test traces as follows
α(x1, . . . , xN3; k
′) =
∏N3
j=1
f˜k′(R) , (3.9)
for all sub-keys k′∈{0, 1}s, R=(i(x j, k) − h˜∗(x j, k′)) for time instants t1, . . . , tm. The value of
k′ that gives the maximum probability is chosen as the sub-key hypothesis. As multivariate
densities often produce very low probabilities, especially as m grows, an alternate method
is to use the log-likelihood method and sum the exponents in (3.8) by
α(x1, . . . , xN3; k
′) = −
∑N3
j=1
(RTC−1R) . (3.10)
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3.3 RndF Profiling Attack Methodology
The general methodology of experiments presented in [91] for RndF profiling attacks
on PIC microcontrollers is described in this section.
3.3.1 Attacking PIC Microcontrollers
Unintentional EM emissions from PIC microcontrollers were sampled by the
oscilloscope and transferred to the workstation for post-processing. Each observation
was sampled over time with common time samples across observations representing input
variables. The collected observations are stored in a matrix format with each observation
stored in a row and the columns representing the classification variables. RndF uses these
variables for classification in a profiling attack. Byte-wise profiling attacks are considered,
where one byte of an AES Intermediate Value (IV) is extracted. The IV of interest is the
result of the AES SubBytes function for the first round. A single IV byte yields 28 = 256
possible values, making the byte-wise profiling attack of the first SubBytes output a 256-
class classification problem. With a training set, the EM side channel measurements for
each of the byte values are profiled to create a RndF model for that byte. In the testing
phase, the trained model is used to determine the IV byte value of a device with an unknown
key. It is assumed that the attacker has access to the plaintext. Once the IV is guessed by
the RndF model, the inverse SubBytes function (provided in the AES decryption functions)
is used with the known ciphertext to determine the key.
Prior to applying RndF processing on PIC data, the traces are analyzed to gauge
normality in the variables. In the following section, the variable analysis method using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test is described.
3.3.2 Input Variable Analysis
Classical SCA theory states that side channel leakage for a particular IV is constant
and the measurement noise is multivariate Gaussian spanning multiple time samples [24,
72]. Histograms of several variables from the PIC data collections however were found
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Figure 3.2: 1-D (top) and 2-D (bottom) distributions for an arbitrarily chosen sample set of
two PIC data variables. KS-test for normality revealed 32,102 out of 50,000 total variables
exhibited similar distribution shape.
to contain distinctly non-Gaussian shapes as shown in Figure 3.2. The figure also shows
2-variable distribution plots of p(x) exhibiting distinct multivariate non-Gaussian shapes.
Many more variables were found to show this binomial distribution; only these arbitrarily
chosen variables are shown here for clarity.
A one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test (KS-test) for normality was used to
determine how closely variables resembled a standard normal distribution. This test’s null
hypothesis is that a variable is normally distributed for a given significance level α. The
test is performed by calculating the Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF)
S N(X) of N samples by first sorting the sample values from lowest to highest in the order
{X1, X2, . . . , XN} and then using
S N(X) = n(i)/N, (3.11)
where n(i) is the number of points greater than sample value Xi [27]. This is compared to the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) F(X) of a normal distribution with mean µ = X¯,
56
the sample mean, and varianceσ = s, the sample variance [69]. If D = max(|S N(X)−F(X)|)
is larger than the critical value at a given significance level, then the null hypothesis of
normality is rejected. Figure 3.3a shows a comparison of a sample ECDF from a PIC
microcontroller variable compared to the CDF of a normal distribution. This variable
rejected the null hypothesis at α=1e-20. Figure 3.3b shows the associated histogram of
the variable. This type of test is referred to as a one-sample KS-test. In other research, the
two-sample test can be used which compares the ECDF of one variable with the ECDF of
another variable.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: (a) Sample ECDF of a variable from a PIC microcontroller data collection
compared to the standard normal CDF. This sample variable rejected the null hypothesis of
normality at α =1e-20, and (b) the associated histogram of the variable.
A very low α=1e-20 was chosen to identify those variables that were clearly not
normally distributed. It was found that this low α value when used with the KS-test,
reliably distinguishes variables housing non-Gaussian distribution such as those seen in
Figure 3.2. This method was used in subsequent tests here to distinguish Gaussian and
non-Gaussian variables. Analysis revealed that 32,102 of 50,000 total variables rejected the
null hypothesis of normality at this α level, and clearly have a non-Gaussian distribution.
57
Figure 3.4 shows an arbitrarily chosen 2-variable space for key byte values of 1 and
7. Only two variables and two classes are shown for clarity. The figure shows the bimodal
nature of variables in Figure 3.2 is also clearly present for p(x|Byte1) and p(x|Byte7). This
behavior has been verified to exist with each of the 256 classes in the byte-wise attack
considered here, as well as with other variables. Circle and triangle shaped dots in bold
are the locations of the training data used to generate the models. Light and dark shaded
regions in the 2-variable space show the classification regions assigned by each respective
classifier, i.e., they show how the classifier would partition the 2-variable space given the
training set. These non-Gaussian properties were observed for the collections of 40 PIC
microcontrollers, demonstrating that non-Gaussian noise can exist in side channel collected
data.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: Arbitrarily chosen two variable decision space for two IV byte values as
determined by (a) Template Attack, and (b) RndF. Light and dark shaded regions represent
the decision regions determined by each classifier, and bold shapes represent the training
observations used to determine the decision regions.
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3.4 RndF RF-DNA Fingerprinting Methodology
RF-DNA fingerprint experiments were conducted with two data sets for ZigBee
devices: the ZigBee XEnv dataset, and the ZigBee XRx dataset. In each case, device
classification and verification experiments were conducted using the methodology for each
described below.
3.4.1 RF-DNA Fingerprinting Device Classification
EM emissions from ZigBee devices were collected and RF-DNA instantaneous and
statistical features generated for each authorized device. These features were input
to different classifiers, including MDA/ML, RndF, MCA, and GRVLQI to develop
classification models for authorized devices. These models were then tested with a separate
reserved test set of observations. The correct classification rate %C was used as the metric
to determine classification performance. White Gaussian Noise (WGN) was generated,
filtered and added to collected observations to achieve various Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)
levels. Data at various SNR was used in the model building and classification process
to gauge classifier performance under various noisy environments. An arbitrarily chosen
%C = 90% benchmark and corresponding SNR assess classifier performance. This is
useful in comparing classifiers, as it reveals how much or little noise a classifier can tolerate
to maintain this level of correct classification for authorized devices.
3.4.2 RF-DNA Fingerprinting Device ID Verification
Once a given classifier has been trained on authorized network devices, it can be
used to identify unauthorized rogue devices attempting to gain network access. In this
case, rogue devices impersonate authorized devices by presenting false bit level credentials
matching those of an authorized device (a common approach for spoofing attacks). Rogue
detection and rejection presents considerable challenge given their emissions were not
available during classifier training. This was successfully addressed in [25, 35] using a
biometric-based verification process with a similarity measure (test metric) reflecting how
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much a given rogue device “looks like” each of the authorized devices. Test metrics provide
a level of confidence in the classifiers decision and are generated for each rogue device. For
MDA/ML and RndF assessment, the test metrics include posterior probability estimates
for each rogue device. For the GRLVQI assessment, the combined angle-distance metric
in [106] is used.
Each of the Nr rogue devices are presented as having a claimed bit-level identity
matching each of the Na authorized devices, for a total of Na×Nr rogue assessment
scenarios. For each rogue-authorized device pair, 1000 bin histograms were generated
using test metrics reflecting 1) how much the rogue device “looks like” the authorized
device (Rog:Auth), and 2) how much the authorized device “looks like” itself (Auth:Auth).
A representative rogue-authorized histogram pair is shown in Figure 3.5a where the span
of histogram bin values is determined by the authorized device test metric values.
Histograms such as that shown in Figure 3.5a are used to generate Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves by varying a threshold (left-to-right) across the
distributions and calculating True Verification Rate (TVR) and False Verification Rate
(FVR). Figure 3.5b shows the associated ROC curve generated from the histograms in
Figure 3.5b. TVR reflects a correct decision whereby an authorized device is present
and correctly granted network access. FVR corresponds to Rogue Accept Rate (RAR)
and reflects an incorrect decision whereby a rogue device is present and errantly granted
network access. The resultant ROC curve for a given rogue-authorized device pair is simply
generated by plotting FVR vs. TVR, with higher TVR and lower FVR points reflecting
better performance. ROC curve assessments here are based on an arbitrary benchmark
performance range defined by TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1. For rogue-authorized scenarios
that do not meet these criteria, the rogue is deemed to have successfully “spoofed” the
network.
60
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.5: (a) Representative histograms of MDA/ML posterior probability test metrics
for a rogue-authorized device pair at S NR = 12.0 dB, and (b) the associated ROC curve.
3.4.3 RF-DNA Fingerprinting: ZigBee XEnv Dataset
The experimental methodology from [93, 94] is presented here for completeness. The
ZigBee XEnv dataset included observations from ND = 4 devices, with 1000 observations
from three different collection environments (LOS, Wall, Cage), divided evenly between
test and training sets. Experiments were conducted initially with Variable Importance (VI)
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analysis and RndF classification on the 5760 instantaneous amplitude (a[n]), phase (φ[n])
and frequency ( f [n]) variables (1920 from each domain). This dataset is denoted herein
as the XEnv Inst dataset. Subsequent analysis focused on 729 RF-DNA statistical features
extracted from these variables (time samples); this dataset is denoted herein as the XEnv
Stat dataset. With the models built during classification of authorized devices, the 9
rogue devices are tested for network intrusion detection scenarios where they attempt to
impersonate each of the 4 authorized devices. The number of rogue devices correctly
rejected by the model is the metric used to compare different classifiers’ verification
performance.
3.4.4 RF-DNA Fingerprinting: ZigBee XRx Dataset
The XRx dataset consists of observations captured simultaneously from two NI
receivers including 1) a high-cost PXIe receiver and 2) a low-cost USRP receiver [95].
A total of 300 observations each was used for training and test sets for each authorized
device in the LOS collection environment. Receiver classification performance with RndF
was assessed for RF-DNA statistical amplitude, phase and frequency features individually.
Three devices were randomly chosen from a pool of 6 for classification purposes. Each
such combination of 6C3 authorized devices is tested for their classification performance to
gain insight into the average classification performance using emissions each receiver. A
classification study of all 6 devices was also conducted for both receivers. Following this,
network intrusion detection via verification experiments was conducted for each choice of
3 authorized devices. Verification performance was compared between receivers to gauge
performance trade-off from using a low-cost USRP receiver over the more costly PXIe
receiver. Results from these experiments are in Chapter 7.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, data collection methodology for SCA and RF-DNA applications was
described. This was followed by general methodology for Linear Regression Attack,
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RndF profiling attack and RF-DNA fingerprinting. RF-DNA classification and verification
methods were described in addition to a summary of the two ZigBee datasets. In the
following chapters, specific contributions to the fields of SCA and RF-DNA fingerprinting
will be presented.
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IV. Results: Linear Regression Attack
This chapter contains research results from the article ‘Statistical Analysis and
Comparison of Linear Regression Attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard’ accepted
to appear in the International Journal of Information Communication Technologies [92].
4.1 Introduction
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) attempt to exploit unintended information leakage
to derive sensitive information otherwise unobtainable by an adversary. Of particular
interest is the secret key used during an encryption operation. Various SCA methods
have successfully extracted the secret key from a variety of cryptographic hardware
devices [61, 71, 72]. The stochastic attack, which we group under a larger class of Linear
Regression Attacks, is shown to improve attack efficiency [115] by estimating the data
dependent side channel leakage function for cryptographic hardware instead of assuming a
fixed leakage function such as that used in the Hamming Weight model. By assuming a set
of linear basis functions that span a function subspace of the overall leakage function, the
requirement for the theoretical minimum number of training traces for adequate profiling
is much reduced. By estimating the leakage function using actual training data, Linear
Regression Attacks offer much more flexibility to attack hardware whose side channel
leakage does not follow fixed models such the Hamming Weight model, either due to
differences in manufacturing tolerance, chip layout or other causes.
Several methods have been developed that advance the state of the art in Linear
Regression Attacks. In this research, four methods from literature and one new method are
examined and compared. These methods use R2, R2a, CPA, ||b|| and symmetry to estimate
the distribution of the non-data dependent leakage by choosing the best time samples to use
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in profiling the training data. Several practical experiments are then conducted to gauge the
envelope of performance of Linear Regression Attacks.
The rest of this work is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a background on
SCA and CPA, Linear Regression, Stochastic Attack, and recent work in Linear Regression
Attacks. Section 4.3 describes the hardware setup. Analyses of the linear regression
models is conducted in Section 4.4 , followed by a comparison of methods in Section 4.5.
Finally, results of practical experiments with Linear Regression Attacks are described in
Section 4.6.
4.2 Background
In this section, a brief review of SCA and CPA is provided, followed by background
on linear regression and the stochastic approach from [115], and finally a description of
similar work in Linear Regression Attacks.
4.2.1 SCA and Correlation Attack
SCA obtains information about the internal operation of a device by observing
unintentional information leakage from the device. Depending on the technology, a
transistor may consume more power to output a high state than to output a low state. By
monitoring the power consumption, or the ‘power side channel’ of the transistor, one can
deduce the output state without directly monitoring the transistor output. This same effect
occurs in devices composed of many transistors such as a microcontroller [72]. Analyzing
the SCA power consumption of a microcontroller in operation can reveal the attributes of
signals internal to the device otherwise inaccessible to the user. A significant advantage of
SCA is that invasive procedures such as depackaging the device is often not required.
CPA is a subclass of SCA which uses statistical methods to determine information
about an algorithm running on a device [19]. It assumes that the power consumption of
the microcontroller follows the Hamming Weight (HW) power model [72]. Correlation
is calculated between the theoretical power consumption represented as the HW of an
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intermediate value of the encryption and the actual power measurement. As there is a
one-to-one mapping between the key and the intermediate value, the key corresponding to
the highest correlation is guessed as the correct key.
4.2.2 Linear Regression and Error Analysis
For an independent variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} and a variable Y dependent on X we
seek a function relationship of the form by Y=f(X). Linear regression can be used to build
a linear model to represent the linear function f of the form
f (X) = β0 +
∑n
i=1
βi · gi(xi, k). (4.1)
For a multivariate linear regression, estimates {b0, . . ., bn} for the true model parameters
{β0, . . . , βn} are determined. The residual error R , or simply the ‘residual’, is the difference
between the regression estimate and the measured value. Certain conditions are required
for linear regression to provide accurate estimation:
• There is a linear relation between independent variables xi and the dependent
variable Y .
• R ∼ N(0, σ2). This is referred to as the normality assumption.
• The variance σ2 of the residuals R is constant over all observations. This is referred
to as the homoscedasticity assumption.
• R is uncorrelated for all observations, i.e. σ2{Ri,R j} = 0 for all i, j; i, j
The coefficient of determination R2 and adjusted coefficient of determination R2a measure
the proportionate reduction in total variation in Y associated with the use of x1, x2, . . ., xu [65,
80] and are given by
R2 = 1 − S S E
S S TO
(4.2)
R2a = 1 −
(
n − 1
n − p
)
S S E
S S TO
(4.3)
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where SSE and SSTO are the sum of squares error and sum of squares total, respectively.
These are given by
S S E =
∑(
Yi − Yˆi
)2
(4.4)
S S TO =
∑(
Yi − Y¯
)2
(4.5)
where Yˆi is the estimate of the ith observation from the regression model and Y¯ is the
observed mean.
A weakness of the R2 metric is that it will monotonically increase as independent terms
are added. Thus adding independent terms that only marginally decrease the variance in
Y will still raise the R2 value. R2a, however, may decrease by adding an independent term
that does not offset the loss of a degree of freedom caused by adding it to the regression,
thereby demonstrating an increase in unexplained variation.
4.2.3 Stochastic Model for SCA
In this section, the stochastic model of [115] with the AES algorithm is described.
Suppose the side channel of interest is the power measurement of the device when
performing an encryption operation. An s-bit subkey is represented by k ∈ {0, 1}s and
corresponding known p-bit plaintext by x ∈ {0, 1}p. The power measurement at time t is
then represented by
It(x, k) = ht(x, k) + t , (4.6)
where It(x, k) and ht(x, k), respectively, are the total power measurement and deterministic
power measurement for the encryption operation segment that depends on x and k at time
t. The non-deterministic part of the power measurment t does not depend on x or k. For
an estimate hˆt(x, k) of the deterministic power measurement, the minimum
min
hˆ:{0,1}s×{0,1}p→R
N1∑
i=1
((
It(x, k) − hˆt(x, k)
)2)
(4.7)
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is attained when hˆ=ht. In other words, the best deterministic power estimate is the one
yielding the smallest residual Rt at time t given by
Rt = It(x, k) − hˆt(x, k) . (4.8)
Now let Fu,t ⊂ Ft := {hˆt : {0, 1}p× {0, 1}s→R} be a subspace of the full function space
Ft, and is spanned by u known linear basis functions gi,t(x, k) and i = 1, . . . , u, then the
deterministic power consumption for this subspace can be estimated by
hˆt(x, k) = b0t·1 +
∑u
i=1
bit · gi(x, k) . (4.9)
The basis functions gi(x, k) can be constructed with a chosen intermediate value function
φ(x, k) by the function composition gi(x, k) = g¯i(φ(x, k)). For example, gi(x, k) can
give the ith bit of the result of the intermediate value function φ(x, k). How φ(x, k)
and correspondingly gi(x, k) are chosen is dependent on the attacker’s knowledge of the
cryptographic algorithm and device architecture. For example, if the attacker knows that
the encryption algorithm is AES, he can choose φ(x, k) to be the SubBytes function for the
first byte of the first encryption round, and g¯i(x, k) extracts the ith bit of that byte value.
A desired property is that the expectation E(Rt) = 0 over x and k, i.e., on average
the estimate will be correct. The least squares estimator is used to estimate the model
parameters bt = [b0,t, . . . , bu,t] as it meets this condition and provides a solution that
minimizes the Sum of Squares Error (SSE). As a result, it produces the best estimator
hˆ∗t for a given choice of basis functions. In the profiling phase, the least squares estimator
is generated by
b∗t = (A
T A)−1AT It(x, k) , (4.10)
where
A =

1 g1,t(x1, k) . . . gu−1,t(x1, k)
...
...
. . .
...
1 g1,t(xN1 , k) . . . gu−1,t(xN1 , k)
 , (4.11)
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for N1 observations, and It(x, k) is the set of measurements at time t for N1 observations,
each with a different plaintext xi. Substituting 4.10 in 4.9,
hˆt(x, k) = (AT A)−1AT It(x, k) × g(x, k)T , (4.12)
where g0(x, k) = 1 for all realizations of x. Then, hˆ∗t is used to estimate the deterministic
power consumption for a second set of N2 observations and the residuals Rt are generated
for each time sample t. The expanded derivation of the Least Squares Estimator is provided
in Appendix A.
The probability density function f (R) for the residuals {R1, . . . ,Rm} is estimated with
an m-variable multivariate Normal distribution. For a good estimate, only m time samples
with maximum information leakage should be used. Methods in [34, 50, 92, 115] follow
the same basic strategy to this point. They differ in their approach to determine the
time samples where there is high information leakage, which are subsequently used for
determining the correct m dimensions for Rt. Once these time samples are chosen, the
regression residuals Rt from the training data at these m points in time are then used
to estimate a covariance matrix C, effectively building a template for the multivariate
estimation residual R for a correct key guess. As there is a zero mean for the residuals
given by the E[Rt] = 0 requirement of the least squares method, C alone is needed to build
an m-dimensional normal density function,
f (R) = 1√
(2pi)m
exp
(
−1
2
RTC−1R
)
. (4.13)
By assuming that the subspace Fu,t contained in Ft is spanned by the u known linear basis
functions, only this single template for Rt is required.
In the second phase, known as the key extraction phase, N3 test measurements are used
that have an unknown fixed key and random plaintext. The Maximum Likelihood method
is applied on the N3 test traces as follows
α(x1, . . . , xN3; k
′) =
∏N3
j=1
f˜k′(R) (4.14)
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for all sub-keys k′∈{0, 1}s, R=(i(x j, k)− h˜∗(x j, k′)) for time instants t1, . . . , tm. The choice of
k′ that gives the maximum probability is chosen as the sub-key hypothesis. As multivariate
densities often produce very small probabilities, especially as m grows, an alternate method
is to use the log-likelihood method and sum the exponents in (4.13) by
α(x1, . . . , xN3; k
′) = −
∑N3
j=1
(RTC−1R). (4.15)
4.2.4 Related Work
After the initial work in [115] more recent research developments have advanced the
state of the art of Linear Regression Attacks. In [50], a new symmetry metric is introduced
to compare leakage models for stochastic attacks. A leakage model with good symmetry
will have the property
β j,t,k′(y) = β j,t, for all k
′
(y) ∈ {0, 1}u, (4.16)
meaning that the model parameters β for the yth byte of the key are equal for all subkey
values for that byte. The target cryptographic functions are modified to allow for 0 mean
and orthonormal bases. For example, the function
S −1(x(y) ⊕ k(y)) j (4.17)
for the value of the xor of the 9th AES round output with the 10th round key is modified to
2((S −1(x(y) ⊕ k(y))) j − 0.5) for j = 1, . . . , 8 (4.18)
A degree of symmetry metric is defined for a 8-bit subkey as
2
√∑8
j=1(b j,t,k′ − b j,t,k′′)2√∑8
j=1b j,t,k′ +
√∑8
j=1b j,t,k′′
, (4.19)
where k′ and k′′ are different subkey values. Values from (4.19) are lower for leakage
models with better symmetry (inverse relation). Leakage models with good symmetry
were found to perform better in stochastic attacks than those with poor symmetry. The
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definition of symmetry has a close tie to the Equal Images under different Subkeys (EIS)
property defined in [115] for stochastic attacks. Choosing functions with good symmetry
and EIS will allow any subkey value to be used for profiling, and the regression model
estimated therefrom can be used to attack any subkey value. An important consequence
of the symmetry calculation shown in [50] is that points in time with good symmetry
coincide with times of high information leakage. Also shown is that these points in time
had the highest maximum estimated model parameter values |bt| if only {b1,t, . . . , bu,t} are
considered.
The coefficient of determination is introduced in [34] as a metric for goodness of fit
for Linear Regression Attacks such as the stochastic attack. The formula for R2 for the
linear regression modelled with key guess k′ is provided as
R2(k′) =
E((h˜∗t (x, k) − ht(x, k)2)
var(ht(x, k)2)
. (4.20)
This equation can be further broken down to
R2(k′) =
S S E
S S TO
, (4.21)
which is inversely related to the classical definition in (4.2) [65, 80]. Although [34]
compares non-profiled attacks, the definition of R2 is still applicable for profiled Linear
Regression Attacks. Points with the highest R2 were chosen for Linear Regression Attack
and found to be superior to CPA in terms of minimal number of traces required for a correct
key guess [34].
In all of these approaches, the statistical significance of the linear regression is not
considered. That is, the linear regression is not analysed to determine if the regression
model is valid nor whether the model satisfies the assumptions of linear regression. This
work fills this void by examining the byte-wise linear regression model using the methods
described in this section as well as R2a and CPA to determine time samples of interest.
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4.3 Hardware Setup
The data collection methodology is described in this section. Majority of the
experiments were conducted on a PIC-24FJ64GA002 microcontroller running an AES-128
algorithm. This microcontroller is called Yellow1. For later hardware comparison tests,
an additional microcontroller from the same Part Number (PN) as Yellow1 was used and
called Yellow2. In addition Red1 from PN PIC-24FJ48GA002 and Blue1 from PN PIC-
24FJ64GA102 were used. The Yellow and Red microcontroller families differed only in
the amount of on-board memory. The Blue microcontroller family differed the most from
the other microcontrollers as its hardware peripherals and on-board memory were different.
The EM measurements during the AES-128 encryption operation are the side channel
of interest for all experiments. Traces were initially collected at a 2.5GHz sampling rate
and then low-pass filtered and downsampled to 104 MHz. This is roughly 4 times the PIC
clock frequency of 27 MHz, thus meeting Nyquist sampling criteria. Matlab, JMP and
SPSS statistical software were used to perform all regression analysis.
The intermediate value function S (x ⊕ k) in the first round of AES is the calculation
of interest in all cases. In [50], it is shown that leakage models with good symmetry
perform better for Linear Regression Attacks such as stochastic attack. Good symmetry
can be determined by points in time t with large |b1,t, . . . , b8,t|, excluding the intercept b0,t.
Figure 4.1 plots the maximum |b j,t| for the estimator using the S (x ⊕ k) function. There
are localized large peaks surrounded by low values at the remaining points which are an
indicator of a good leakage model [50]. So this function is used in our leakage model for
testing Linear Regression Attacks in this research.
4.4 Linear Regression Analysis
In this section, the linear regression is analysed for a time instant with maximum
information leakage as proposed by the following five methods:
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Figure 4.1: Maximum |b1,t, . . . , b8,t| values from the estimator h∗t (x, k) using intermediate
value function S (x ⊕ k) for t = {1, 2, . . . , 2000}
1. Method||b||: Time instants with high L2-norm value for the model parameters defined
in [115].
2. Methodsym: Time instants with high |b| corresponding to the best symmetry defined
in [50].
3. MethodCPA: Time instants with high correlation from a CPA attack [19].
4. MethodR2: Time instants with high coefficient of determination R2 defined in [34].
5. MethodR2a: Time instant with high adjusted coefficient of determination R
2
a defined
in Section 4.2.
These methods will be referred to by these titles for the remainder of this research. These
methods differ in their choosing the correct time samples (variables) to build the template
for C. The estimation of h∗t (x, k) and key-extraction phases are the same for all methods.
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4.4.1 Analysis of Regression Assumptions for MethodR2a
In this section, the linear regression assumptions described in Section 4.2.2 are
analysed for MethodR2a . Deviations from these assumptions can lead to poor prediction
performance of the linear regression, and hence it is important they are checked and
not assumed. To our knowledge, this is the first research where this analysis has been
performed. The byte-wise linear regression in (4.9) is performed for each time instant of
the training traces collected for the first sub-byte. A strong linear regression results in a high
value for its coefficient of determination R2. For multiple regression such as in this case,
the adjusted coefficient of determination R2a can be used to give higher weight to linear
models where all independent variables are contributing significantly. Linear regression
assumptions are now analysed for the time instant t with maximum information leakage as
determined using MethodR2awith N1=5000 training traces.
Linearity Assumption: The linearity assumption can be tested by examining the plot
of residuals Rt [65], as shown in Figure 4.2a. The plot shows a uniform shape for the
residuals, thus indicating a linear relation between independent and dependent variables.
If the relation were non-linear, the shape would take on non-linear shapes such as curves,
sinusoids, etc., an simulated example of which is shown in Figure 4.2b.
Table 4.1: SSE after Box-Cox transformation Y ′ = Yλ.
λ SSE
-2 11931.68
-1 11337.56
0 10975.98
1 10821.03
2 10858.37
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.2: (a) Plot of residuals Rt training traces showing a linear shape, and (b) simulated
example of residuals for a non-linear regression.
As a further test for linearity, a Box-Cox transformation on the data was performed [65].
This method chooses different values of λ to transform the data to
Y ′ = Yλ, (4.22)
except for λ = 0, where the transformation is Y ′ = ln(Y). If the SSE is significantly reduced
by choosing λ much different than λ = 1 (no transformation), then it can be concluded that
there is a problem with the linearity assumption in the linear regression. Table 4.1 shows
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the SSE after several non-linear transformations and indicates that λ = 1 gives the lowest
SSE. Thus no transformation is required and the linearity assumption of the data holds.
Homoscedasticity Assumption: The homoscedasticity or constant variance assump-
tion can also be tested by examining the residual plot in Figure 4.2a. The uniform ‘bar’
shape of the residuals over time is an indicator of constant variance. If the variance were
non-constant, the residual plot would take on a different shape such as a cone shape.
Normality Assumption: The assumption Rt∼N(0, σ2) can be tested by plotting the
residuals in a quantile-quantile (QQ) plot shown on the right in Figure 4.3. The residuals
are plotted along the normal distribution line on the right. In this figure, residuals fall close
to the normal distribution line, thus upholding the normality assumption. Also plotted on
the left is the distribution of the data, which follows the red normal distribution line well.
Figure 4.3: QQ plot of residuals with distribution.
Independence Assumption: The residuals Rt are collected from traces processing
fixed key k and uniformly random plaintext x and are thus assumed to be independent
of each other. In order to test this assumption, the Durbin-Watson (DW) test for
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autocorrelation is applied [65]. It uses the following hypothesis test for autocorrelation
parameter ρ:
H0 : ρ = 0
H1 : ρ > 0. (4.23)
If the DW test statistic D is greater than the upper bound du which can be obtained in pre-
computed tables [80], then the null hypothesis H0 is accepted, thus showing no problem
with independence in the data. For this regression, du = 1.91 and D = 2.02 at the 99%
confidence level, thus showing uncorrelated residuals. In addition, the autocorrelation for
the data set was found to be -0.0116, which is nearly 0. Thus the independence assumption
holds.
Test for Outliers: Outliers in the data set can skew the linear regression by moving
the fitted line toward them. They can be determined by examining the standardized
residuals from the regression calculated by
Rt,std = Rt√
MSE
, (4.24)
where MSE is the Mean Square Error computed by SSE/(N−p observations). Observations
with standardized residuals greater than 4 are potential outliers in the data. Figure 4.4
shows 10 observations with standardized residuals greater than 4. With N1=5000 training
traces, the effect of these 10 outliers was not significant enough to skew the regression line
significantly. Removing these observations from the data did not significantly impact the
R2a value of the regression and hence were left in the training data set. However, for smaller
training sets outliers can have significant impact leading to erroneous prediction.
4.4.2 Linear Regression Analysis of Other Methods
Method||b||described in [115] was used to find time instant with highest ||b||. The data at
this time instant was analyzed in a similar method as in Section 4.4.1. No linear regression
assumptions were violated. The R2a value was 9.6e-2 indicating a poor linear regression.
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Figure 4.4: Plot of standardized residuals
Figure 4.5 shows the actual versus predicted values of the training observations for the
linear regressions chosen with Method||b||and MethodR2a . Figure 4.5a shows almost no
correlation between the actual measured values at that time instant and the predicted values
by the linear regression model. In addition, Sum of Squared Lack of Fit (SSLF) [65] from
the model using Method||b||was a very high 1.12e5 compared with the relatively low SSLF
of 5.61e2 with the model using MethodR2a , indicating serious issues with lack of fit for this
regression. We stress the correct key guess can still be attained even using estimators at
time instants with low prediction accuracy when predictions over multiple test traces are
accumulated as in (4.14). However, the number of required test traces is expected to be
higher for poorer predictors.
No outliers were observed as determined by examining the standardized residuals.
Methodsymidentified the same best time instant as the Method||b||. MethodCPAand
MethodR2identified the same best time instant as the MethodR2a . Thus the analyses of
the regressions found using MethodR2aand Method||b||are applicable to the remaining three
methods. It is thus concluded that five methods produced models that did not violate any
linear regression assumptions.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.5: (a) Plot of actual vs predicted values of the training traces using the best time
sample with Method||b||, and (b) plot of actual vs predicted using the best time sample with
MethodR2a .
4.4.3 Linear Regression with Intercept
In this section, the importance of using the intercept in the linear regression is
analysed. The intercept b0 for a byte-wise Linear Regression Attack is ∼60 times larger
than the remaining model parameters and represents the power drawn from the chip that
is not directly caused by the data, such as power drawn from operations on the remaining
bytes, other electronic devices, environment, etc. In order to assess the importance of
including the intercept in the regression, two models were tested one with an intercept and
one without.
Figure 4.6 shows the R2a values for the linear regression models with and without the
intercept. From the equation for R2a in (4.3), negative values indicate a larger Sum of Square
Error (S S E) than Sum of Square Total (S S TO), indicating that the model estimate is worse
than simply using the observation mean, and is thus a poor fit. It is clear from the figure
that including the intercept in the model yields a much stronger regression.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.6: (a) R2a values for linear regression models with intercept, and (b) without
intercept.
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Recent work in [49] shows an improvement in Stochastic Attack (SA) performance
when using a a model known as Stochastic Attack Offset Tolerant Method (SA-OTM)
which does not include an intercept. However, in SA-OTM, the difference of traces is used
to build the linear regression instead of the traces themselves. As a result, much of the non-
data dependent information is removed, thus partially negating the need for an intercept. In
addition, the profiling and key extraction phases are significantly changed in SA-OTM, all
of which jointly contribute to the improved performance and it is not apparent how much
improvement was from removing the intercept alone. Thus, although SA-OTM advances
the state of the art of Linear Regression Attacks, its success comes from a number of factors
and not simply from the removal of the intercept. Thus it cannot be concluded from [49]
that removal of the intercept alone improves performance in Linear Regression Attacks.
4.4.4 Interaction Terms
As the PIC microcontrollers used in this research are 16-bit, processing two bytes at a
time, it is possible that there can be an interaction between bits of adjacent bytes. In order to
test this theory, the first two bytes of the intermediate function x⊕ k are examined together.
AES SubBytes table lookup for this microcontroller was restricted to 1 byte at a time so
multi-byte analysis with S (x ⊕ k) function was not possible. A step-wise linear regression
performs an investigation of all proposed model terms by systematically removing and
adding terms to determine their benefit in improving the linear regression. This was
performed with all 2-way interaction terms gi(x, k) × g j(x, k) for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}16 where
× indicated multiplication, and each was examined for its importance to the prediction
performance. The linear model with all interaction terms is estimated by
h˜∗t (x, k) = b0t +
∑u
i=1
bit.gi(x, k)+ (4.25)∑u
i=1
∑u
j=1
bi jt.
(
gi(x, k) × g j(x, k)
)
,
and terms that are not useful toward prediction are removed by the step-wise process.
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Several interaction terms were found that provided slight performance improvement,
showing that information from one bit leaks into another. However, the benefit is minimal.
Table 4.2 shows the SSE accounted for by g1(x, k) as well as several interaction terms. It is
evident that the interaction terms do not account for nearly as much of variance reduction
as the single term g1(x, k). Not including them does not significantly impact the linear
regression prediction performance. Thus they are left out of the regression model and the
original model in (4.9) is used for all subsequent experiments.
Table 4.2: SSE accounted for by gi(x, k) and interaction terms gi(x, k) × g j(x, k)
Model term SSE
g1(x, k) 274.37
g3(x, k) × g1(x, k) 0.92
g2(x, k) × g7(x, k) 11.62
g4(x, k) × g16(x, k) 0.04
g5(x, k) × g17(x, k) 12.10
4.5 Comparison of Linear Regression Methods
Performance in the key-extraction phase is directly tied to accurately building the
covariance matrix template. The five methods in Section 4.4 were used with the estimated
leakage function (4.9) to determine their ability in accurately estimating the covariance
matrix of the residuals. These methods identify the m time samples in the traces where
there is information leakage. The residuals Rt where t∈{1, 2, . . . ,m} from the training
data at these m time instants is used to build the multivariate distribution of R defined
in (4.13). A good selection of these m variables will give a closer approximation of f (R)
and consequently give better key prediction performance.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: Intensity plot of variable importance by using five different methods with 5000
training traces (a) , and with 100 training traces (b)
Using N1=5000 training traces, the results of the variable importance methods are
plotted in the intensity plot Figure 4.7a. For plotting purposes in Figure 4.7 only, in
order to provide a fair comparison, variable importance results from the five methods
were normalized to a range of 0 to 1 by dividing each by their respective maximum
values. Figure 4.7a shows that although some points are identified as important by all five
methods, MethodR2aand MethodR2show better noise suppression evidenced by regions of
very low values (solid blue) between spikes, as compared to the Method||b||, MethodCPAand
Methodsym. This can be advantageous when attacking data sets with large amounts of non-
data dependent noise.
Table 4.3 shows the results of the key extraction phase using the training data at times
identified by the 5 different methods. Key extraction was performed using the sum of
exponents in (4.15). Training sets came from the Yellow1 microcontroller while test sets
came from the Yellow2 microcontroller, which is from the same part number, but different
physical chips. The success rate for i = 100 iterations is simply the percentage of correctly
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Table 4.3: Success Rate for 100 iterations using training and test traces from Yellow1 and
Yellow2 microcontrollers, respectively. The number of training and test traces and the
dimensionality m is varied between experiments.
Test setup Method||b|| Methodsym MethodCPA MethodR2 MethodR2a
100 Train 0.0506 0.0175 0.0887 0.0925 0.0925
10 test, m=1
100 Train 0.0519 0.0281 0.0988 0.0988 0.0988
100 test, m=1
100 Train 0.8912 0.8119 0.9806 0.9719 0.9719
100 test, m=20
500 Train 0.0838 0.0719 0.0919 0.0944 0.0944
10 test, m=1
500 Train 0.8331 0.7250 0.8850 0.8894 0.8894
100 test, m=1
500 Train 0.9975 0.9900 0.9956 0.9981 0.9981
100 test, m=20
5000 Train 0.1019 0.0969 0.1019 0.1019 0.1019
10 test, m=1
5000 Train 0.8862 0.8363 0.9206 0.9206 0.9206
100 test, m=1
5000 Train 0.9981 1.0000 0.9962 0.9994 0.9994
100 test, m=20
guessed sub-keys out of 16 over 100 iterations1. For each iteration, a random selection of
1AES-128 uses a 16 byte key
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test and training traces is used out of 5000 trace pools. Thus these results show the 100-
fold validation results for these experiments. Best results are highlighted in bold. For all
experiments in this section, N1 = N2 for training traces.
Results show that performance is improved the most by raising the number of time
samples m, effectively raising the dimensionality of the multivariate distribution. For
example, with 100 training traces and 100 test traces, raising m from 1 to 20 improves
success rate by almost an order of magnitude in MethodR2afrom 0.0925 to 0.9719. Similar
performance improvement is also seen for 500 and 5000 training trace cases. These results
show that a multivariate distribution is more successful in Linear Regression Attacks than
univariate. The probability distribution f (R) estimated in the training phase in (4.13) is
dependent on the covariance alone, as Rt has a zero mean for each t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Raising
the dimensionality m provides greater definition to the covariance matrix allowing the
probability estimate to better classify the correct sub-key from incorrect ones. It should
be noted that even with as few as 100 training and test traces, with adequate number of
dimensions m, the attack can still attain a success rate as high as 0.9806 (or 98.06%). As
the linear basis functions are assumed to be known to the attacker and the function h′t(x, k)
is estimated instead of the function values of h′t(x, k), only one template of f (R) is required
to be estimated. So successful attack is possible using a template generated with as few as
100 training traces in our experiments, which is fewer than the number of unique elements
in the image of φ(x, k).
The next highest performance benefit is obtained by increasing the number of test
traces. For 100, 500 and 5000 training traces with m = 1, raising the number of test traces
in each case from 10 to 100 for each case improves performance by 17.63%, 969.96% and
990.13% respectively. This suggests that for these data sets linear regression classifier is
not strong enough to correctly guess the correct sub-key for individual traces. In fact, if the
attack is performed on N3=5000 traces from the same test set with MethodR2a , the correct
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key was guessed for only 35 test traces or 0.70% correct classification rate. Only when
information gain is accumulated over many test traces with the product of probabilities in
(4.14), or sum of exponents in (4.15), does the attack classify the correct sub-key.
Finally performance benefit is also realized by raising the number of training traces.
With 10 test traces and m = 1, raising the number of training traces from 100 to 500 and 100
to 5000 improves average success rate by 76.84% and 118.06% respectively. Increasing the
number of training traces leads to a better estimate of ht(x, k) and f (R), thereby improving
prediction performance.
Overall, best performance in the majority of cases was shown for MethodCPA,
MethodR2a , and MethodR2 . MethodR2and MethodR2ahave identical performance in all cases.
The R2a metric rewards distributions where all independent variables gi(x, k) contribute
meaningfully to the regression. In the byte-wise linear regression, each variable was found
to contribute significantly to the α< 0.0001 or with greater than 99.9999% confidence
level. This is to be expected as each gi(x, k) represents a bit of the sub-byte of the leakage
model, all of which contribute to the data dependent power measurement h(x, k). As each
independent variable is important to the regression, n >> p, and n and p are fixed for
an attack, R2≈R2a, which can be seen in the identical variable importance intensity plots
for MethodR2and MethodR2ain Figure 4.7a. It is expected, however, that MethodR2aand
MethodR2will show different results when these conditions are not met. Equation (4.3)
as a function of n is a monotically increasing function, where R2a→R2 as the difference
between n and p increases. In addition, from equation (4.3) we see the R2a as a function
of the error term e = S S ES S TO is monotonically decreasing. Combined these two functions
indicate that for small training sets as n→p, the rate of decrease in R2a is less for larger e. If
R2a is used as a variable importance metric, variables of high importance with large R
2
a will
decrease at a slower rate than variables of low importance as n decreases (or conversely,
as p increases). For small n (or large p), variables of high importance will stand out more
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with R2a than R
2 and this is proven in Figure 4.7b where important variables are easier to
identify using R2a than R
2. Thus for smaller training data sets, MethodR2awould prove more
useful at identifying important points than MethodR2 .
MethodCPAshows similarity in success rates to that from MethodR2and MethodR2aand
is most likely a consequence from the fact that the Pearson coefficient of correlation is
the signed square root of the coefficient of determination R2 (for positive R2a values).
Hence both metrics find similar peaks when measuring variable importance, as shown in
Figure 4.7a.
Table 4.4: Mean and variance of model parameter values b for time samples chosen by
different methods.
Mean Variance
Method||b|| 0.9152 0.0090
Methodsym 0.8857 0.0120
MethodCPA 0.8374 0.0026
MethodR2 0.8187 0.0035
MethodR2a 0.8187 0.0035
Method||b||and Methodsymperformed best when dimensionality m was increased and
when training set size increased but otherwise fell behind the other methods. These two
methods contend that larger linear model parameters lead to a better regression. In a
linear regression, if a model parameter is close to 0, this indicates that this parameter is
not contributing to the regression. So linear models where parameters are all non-zero
are stronger than those with models with zero-value parameters. However, in the case
of Linear Regression Attack on a PIC microcontroller, if the standard HW power model
is assumed which gives an equal weight for every bit, then estimated model parameters
|b1,t, . . . , b8,t| for the byte-wise linear regression at time t should ideally be equal. The
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strength of this assumption for the PIC is verified by the good performance of MethodCPAin
Table 4.3 which uses the HW leakage model for CPA attack. With the HW assumption the
|bt| = |b1,t, . . . , b8,t| values greater than the common weight w would generate inaccurate
predictions with the severity of performance degradation increasing as estimates of |bt|
increase beyond w. In addition, the HW model gives equal weight to each bit and so linear
models with less variation between model parameters adhere better to the HW model.
Table 4.4 shows the mean and variance of the |bt| values for linear regressions from the
best time sample chosen by the 5 methods. None of the methods has a perfect 0 variance.
Two explanations are available, and the true cause is likely a combination of the two: 1)
the HW model does not exactly fit the real hardware, and 2) model parameters bt are not
perfectly estimated with the training data due to the presence of noise unaccounted for by
the regression model. Of further note, the variance in model parameters from MethodCPA,
MethodR2and MethodR2aare between 3 and 4 times smaller than that for the other two
methods. This divergence of the model parameter estimates bt from the HW model of
0 variance results in slightly poorer performance of Method||b||and Methodsymcompared to
the other methods. Figure 4.8 shows the Global Success Rate (GSR) as defined in [118]
for the Linear Regression Attacks using the five methods to determine the m=20 variate
distribution f (R). 100 training traces each were used for generating h∗t (x, k) and the
distribution estimate for R. MethodCPA, MethodR2and MethodR2abest identified the time
samples that best approximated f (R), resulting in improved prediction performance.
4.6 Practical Performance Characterization of Linear Regression Attacks
In this section, several experiments are conducted to gain a better understanding
of the performance of Linear Regression Attacks in various practical scenarios. These
experiments reveal attack performance when training and target microcontrollers and
collection equipment differ, as well as performance in noisy environments.
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Figure 4.8: Global Success Rate with 100 training traces. Performance curves of MethodR2a ,
MethodR2and MethodCPAoverlap.
4.6.1 Profiling and Testing with Different ICs
The main purpose of profiling attacks such as Linear Regression Attack is to develop
the ability to profile a microcontroller and attack a similar but not identical microcontroller.
To test this, MethodCPAand MethodR2awere applied for profiling and key extraction on four
microcontrollers: Yellow1, Yellow2, Blue1 and Red1 as described in Section 4.3. With
the hardware differences between the microcontroller models, it was hypothesized that
Blue1 would be the most difficult to attack as differences in the times when operations are
executed are not expected to align well between Blue and other families. However, if the
number of chosen time instants is increased, similarities in hardware architectures may turn
up time instants that both architectures have in common and allow for meaningful profiling
between hardware architectures. If enough common time instants are found, successful key
guess is possible after profiling.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.9: Attack results for the first byte of S (x ⊕ k) with MethodCPAusing 50 test traces,
and m = (a) 5, (b) 15, and (c) 35. Successful attack is shown in white.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.10: Attack results for the first byte of S (x ⊕ k) with MethodCPAusing 500 test
traces, and m = (a) 5, (b) 15, and (c) 35. Successful attack is shown in white.
Each microcontroller was used to train and test all remaining chips for the first
byte of the S (x ⊕ k) function. There was also a unique key used for encryptions on
each microcontroller. Results with MethodCPAfor 50 and 500 test traces are shown in
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 respectively and those for MethodR2aare shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12
respectively. A light square indicates a correct key guess while a dark square is an incorrect
guess. The test cases are shown when m=5, 15 and 35 time samples are used in the
distribution estimate. N1,N2=4000 training traces were used for all tests. Figures show
failures when Blue1 was used against other microcontrollers, which are overcome to some
extent when m increases. Thus linear regression based attacks are sensitive to differences
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in hardware configurations but this can be overcome by including more time samples of
interest in the training data.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.11: Attack results for the first byte of S (x ⊕ k) with MethodR2ausing 50 test traces,
and m = (a) 5, (b) 15, and (c) 35. Successful attack is shown in white.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.12: Attack results for the first byte of S (x⊕k) with MethodR2ausing 500 test traces,
and m = (a) 5, (b) 15, and (c) 35. Successful attack is shown in white.
In general, increasing the number of time samples m resulted in better performance.
This is because more time samples were found that were in common between hardware
architectures. This has been shown to be true for template attacks as well [84]. Table 4.5
shows the number of time samples in common between microcontrollers by choosing time
samples identified by MethodCPAfrom each. 4000 training traces for profiling and m=35
were used in each case. Blue1 has the least number of time samples in common with the
other microcontrollers while Yellow1 and Yellow2 have the most. This directly corresponds
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to the results where Blue1 was the hardest to attack by profiling other microcontrollers,
while Yellow1 and Yellow2 were easiest to attack with each other.
Table 4.5: Number of common time samples between different microcontrollers with m=35
and 4000 training traces.
Yellow1 Yellow2 Blue1 Red1
Yellow1 35 28 10 20
Yellow2 28 35 7 21
Blue1 10 7 35 8
Red1 20 21 8 35
In certain cases, simply increasing the number of points does not always guarantee
a better guess. In Figure 4.9, when m is increased from m=5 to 15 with MethodCPA,
performance actually decreases as indicated by a decrease in the number of light success
squares. This is because as m increases, more time samples that are not in common between
the test and training microcontroller are being included in the distribution estimate for the
test microcontroller which degrades key prediction performance.
4.6.2 Profiling and Testing with Different Probes
To define the envelope of success for the the Linear Regression Attack, it was tested
against data collected with two different probes: a RISCURE near-field EM probe [110]
and a Rohde & Schwarz RS H 50-1 ring-type near-field EM probe [113]. Data from each
probe was used to train and attack test traces collected from the other probe, using the same
microcontroller. MethodR2awas used in each case and the first byte of S (x⊕k) is investigated.
Results were based on the 500 test traces and N1,N2 =4000 training traces for key-byte 2.
Figure 4.13 shows the mean absolute value of the exponent of 256 possible hypotheses
of the first key-byte from (4.15). The best key guess would show as the maximum value.
The correct key value, highlighted by arrows is clearly the maximum value in the plot and
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.13: (a) Attack results with MethodR2ausing loop probe training data against Riscure
probe test data, and (b) results using Riscure probe training data against loop probe test
data. Key byte guess highlighted by arrow is correct in both cases.
thus is correct. These results show the versatility of this attack, where the profiling of the
probability distribution with the training data is accurate enough to be effective even when
the equipment used to collect the test data is different.
4.6.3 Linear Regression Attack with MethodR2ain Noisy Environments
In Section 4.5, it is noted that the coefficient of determination R2 is the square of the
Pearson coefficient of correlation used in CPA. As a result, the intensity plot of variable
importance in Figure 4.7a shows many similar time samples with high importance for both
of these metrics. We have shown that R2a will suppress less important variables more than
more important ones. This suggests that R2a might perform better with noisy data than
traditional CPA. To test this hypothesis, White Gaussian Noise (WGN) was added to the
test data to achieve a desired Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR); the Linear Regression Attack
was performed on this data using MethodCPAand MethodR2a to choose time instances of
N1,N2 =4000 training traces and 500 test traces with m=15. Results in Table 4.6 show
that the attack on key-byte 1 using MethodR2aperforms better in general for test data with
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WGN, succeeding with fewer test traces and more noise than the attack with MethodCPAon
the same data.
Table 4.6: Performance of Linear Regression Attack when selecting points using
MethodCPAand MethodR2aon 500 test traces with WGN
SNR (dB) Attack 100 Test 50 Test 30 Test 15 Test
Type Traces Traces Traces Traces
100 MethodCPA Success Success Fail Fail
100 MethodR2a Success Success Success Success
25 MethodCPA Success Success Fail Fail
25 MethodR2a Success Success Success Fail
20 MethodCPA Success Fail Fail Fail
20 MethodR2a Success Success Fail Fail
15 MethodCPA Fail Fail Fail Fail
15 MethodR2a Success Success Fail Fail
5 MethodCPA Fail Fail Fail Fail
5 MethodR2a Fail Fail Fail Fail
4.7 Conclusions
Linear Regression Attacks allow the leakage function to be estimated rather than
assumed, and this allows for a more tailored attack on a device that might not strictly follow
leakage models such as the HW model. This work provides two main areas of contribution:
statistical analysis of linear regression estimators, and practical experiments using Linear
Regression Attack including a comparison between methods.
Statistical analysis of the linear regression is conducted in the training phase, where
four different methods from literature and one new method were used to choose important
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time instants where there is information leakage. Analysis revealed that including the
intercept greatly improved prediction capability. In addition, it was shown that poor
predictors could still guess the correct key but at a cost of larger required training and
test sets.
In the comparison of attack performance with these five methods, MethodCPA,
MethodR2aand MethodR2were found to outperform Methodsymand Method||b||in most cases,
with the difference in performance decreasing as number of training traces increased.
Increasing the dimensionality of the probability distribution in the training phase from m=1
to m=20 resulted in an order of magnitude improvement in performance. Comparison of
variable importance determined by the five methods show good overlap, with MethodCPA,
MethodR2aand MethodR2giving higher weighting to time instants with better regression, as
determined by their R2a metric. In practical experiments, attack performance was better on
hardware families with more time instants in common. Linear Regression Attacks were
successful even when test and training traces were attained with different data collection
hardware. Finally, MethodR2aperformed better than MethodCPAin noisy environments, and
was able to successfully guess the correct key-byte with as little as 50 test traces and
SNR=15 dB.
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V. Results: Random Forest SCA Application
This chapter presents the first application of the Random Forest classifier to the
field of SCA. Research results are presented from the article in ‘Random Forest Profiling
Attack on Advanced Encryption Standard’ as accepted to appear in the International
Journal of Applied Cryptography [91]. The background section is shortened here to reduce
redundancy with the other chapters in this document. This is followed by an investigation
into the nature of the non-Gaussian distributed variables captured from a PIC device and
their effects on CEMA attacks.
5.1 Introduction
Modern cryptographic algorithms such as the AES protect data using a mathematically
rigorous process that effectively encrypts the sensitive plaintext information. The security
of encryption algorithms like AES lie in their secret key which is usually stored within
the cryptographic black box hardware which itself is assumed to be secure. Side Channel
Analysis (SCA) is the study of physical characteristics of the algorithm implementation
that tests this assumption. By monitoring various side-channels during the encryption
or decryption process, side-channel attacks can effectively deduce the secret key without
the need for invasive procedures such as chip depackaging to image and read device
memory [2, 54, 75].
Profiling attacks on AES model the side-channel on a known training device when it
is executing a key-dependent Intermediate Value (IV) calculation. The trained model can
be used against devices of the same or similar model type to classify the unknown IV of
a test device and thereby derive the corresponding unknown cryptographic key, assuming
the leakage function is the same between devices.
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The most popular profiling attack used today is the Template Attack which character-
izes a training device using Bayesian Maximum Likelihood (ML) for a multivariate Gaus-
sian distribution. This is an optimal classification assuming the distribution is in fact Gaus-
sian and that the distribution function can be exactly derived with the training data [125].
In practice, the exact distribution of the side-channel is not known and uncertainty exists
about its true dimensionality. In addition, the noise is the side-channel is not always Gaus-
sian. Regardless, the assumption of a multivariate Gaussian distribution has served SCA
well. Template Attacks have been shown to be effective against Atmel [103] and PIC [84]
microcontrollers, ASIC circuits [72], and FPGAs [52]. In addition to Template Attacks,
Stochastic Attacks [115] have used the multivariate Gaussian noise distribution assump-
tion to successfully profile and attack microcontrollers. Although not a profiling attack,
Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) is studied in [97] with the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) on a 8 bit smart card as well as on a SecMat V3/2 ASIC testbed [43]. MIA was
found to be successful with few traces using a parametric estimation.
In all of these works, a Gaussian distribution of the side-channel for a chosen IV is
assumed and estimated from the collected data. In addition, the actual side-channel leakage
of the IV (signal) is assumed to be fixed and the only randomness in the measurements
entirely due to the noise. However, if this noise is non-Gaussian, then non-parametric
classifiers would perform better in these situations. Recent work has sought alternative
classifiers to ML used in Template Attacks. In [66], Random Forest, Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and Self Organizing Maps (SOM) attack individual bit values in the Triple
Data Encryption Standard (3DES) algorithm on an FPGA. Authors show varying levels
of success per bit ranging from 50% to 97% correct classification rate. When attacking
the individual bits of a single byte, the correct classification rates using Random Forest
with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) were found to be between 5.80% to 15.33%
more successful than using Template Attack with the minimum Redundancy maximum
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Relevance (mRMR) filter. In [55], the Least Squares SVM (LS-SVM) was used with
a Radial Basis Function (RBF) for non-linear classification by converting the original
data set to higher dimensional space. Two-class problems were investigated consisting of
detecting singular Hamming Weight (HW) and particular bit values. Three feature selection
methods were used: Pearson Correlation, Sum Of Squared pairwise t-differences (SOST)
and PCA. In all cases Template Attack either matched or outperformed LS-SVM. Better
results were achieved in [51], where the Hamming Weight was classified successfully with
SVM, requiring fewer attack traces with moderate to high noise.
These results lead to some obvious questions in this research. First, for a trace
collected over a full encryption only a small time segment signal actually contains the
leakage information for an IV. Furthermore since the time samples are the input variables
to a classifier and the exact dimensions of data-dependent distribution are not known,
can a successful attack still be accomplished? Random Forest is shown to be more
tolerant to the “curse of dimensionality” than Template Attack, allowing greater success
for very large dimensional data sets [22]. Second, how can the dimensions be correctly
identified to enhance classification performance? SOST has been shown to significantly
improve Template Attack performance by identifying time samples where information
leakage occurs. Random Forest offers an alternative variable importance metric that allows
identification of dimensions with the most discriminatory information for classification.
These methods are tested in this research in dimensionality reduction experiments. Third,
even given a close approximation of the correct dimensions, is the underlying distribution
of the side-channel noise Gaussian for a chosen IV? And finally, if the distribution of the
side-channel noise is Gaussian, do parametric attacks provide better results?
5.2 Background
In this section, background information is provided on side-channel leakage, Template
Attack, Random Forest and SOST method of variable selection.
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5.2.1 Side Channel Leakage
Side-channel leakage is any unintentionally emitted information from a physical
device which is dependent on the data being processed by that device. For the case of
a microcontroller running an encryption operation, side-channel leakage can be observed
via frequency [41], time [62], Electro-Magnetic (EM) emanations [2] and the power
consumption [61] of the device during an operation. All side-channel collected data can be
modeled as
X = d + n, (5.1)
where d is the data dependent part generated by the device performing an operation (signal)
and n is the non-data dependent part generated either intrinsically or by ambient conditions
(noise) [24]. This research considers a microcontroller running an AES-128 encryption and
the EM side-channel as the side-channel of interest.
5.2.2 Template Attack
Template Attacks profile the side-channel of a device as it is performing a key-
dependent operation φ [24, 42]. For AES, φ can be any intermediate value calculation
during the encryption process. Let S be the image of possible intermediate values generated
by function φ. Profiling attacks such as Template Attack learn the leakage models for
each value of S ={S 1, . . . , S c}, given a set of input vectors, thus converting the attack to
a c-class classification problem. Commonly used methods for profiling attacks include
learning the leakage models for the individual byte values (c=256) [24, 42, 84], Hamming
Weight or Hamming Distance (c=9) [51], or bit values (c = 2) [55, 66] of S . For this
research, byte-wise attacks are considered, which profile the side-channel leakage for each
byte value of S , resulting in c=256 distinct values of S . If the M-dimensional input vector
x is collected while the microcontroller is calculating S j∈S , then the parametric Template
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Attack assumes a multivariate Gaussian distribution for p(x|S j) or
p
(
x|S j
)
=
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M
2 |ΣS j | 12
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{
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Σ−1S j
(
x − µS j
)}
. (5.2)
The M-dimensional covariance matrix ΣS j and mean vector µS j for each class S j are
estimated from the training data. Thus, 256 such templates of ΣS j and µS j are built for
byte-wise Template Attacks with the traces from the training device. One limitation of this
method is that to invert ΣS j , the number of dimensions M must be less than or equal to the
number of observations nS j in class S j. To overcome this limitation, a pooled covariance
assumption can be made where all classes share the same covariance matrix, which is the
method used in this research, unless stated otherwise.
For the test device, the test traces x∗ are used with the templates to determine the
intermediate value S ∗j of the unknown key k
∗ using the Bayes rule
S ∗j = arg max
S j∈S
p(x∗|S j)P(S j)
p(x∗)
, (5.3)
where P(S j) is the prior probability of the intermediate value S j and p(x∗) is given by
p(x∗) =
∑256
j=1
p(x∗|S j)P(S j). (5.4)
The class with the highest probability using the estimated template distributions from
the training phase becomes the class guess S ∗j . Since S
∗
j for a known plaintext p has a one-
to-one relationship to a unique key value k∗j , the unknown key value k
∗ can be recovered by
inverting φ which is provided through the AES decryption functions. In this way p(x∗|k∗j)
can be recovered from p(x∗|S ∗j). For the test data, a valid assumption is that the unknown
key k∗ is constant for all test traces. Probabilities over n traces can then be combined using
maximum likelihood principle [72]
p(k∗j |x∗) = arg max
k j
∏n
j=1 p(x∗|k j) P(k j)∑256
i=1
(∏n
j=1 p(x∗|k j)
)
P(k j)
. (5.5)
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5.2.3 Random Forest
The method of Bayes classification with equal prior probabilities, which is used
in Template Attack, is optimal for classification provided the probability distributions
p(x|S ),∀(S ) are exactly known [125]. Also, there is the strong assumption that these
probability distributions are Gaussian. This must be true for optimality to hold for Template
Attack. When these conditions are not met, non-parametric classifiers such as Random
Forest can be advantageous. Random Forest is an ensemble classifier introduced in [17],
consisting of a group of decision trees which recursively partition a M-variable space. Each
node of the decision tree splits a set of observations into two child nodes based on several
possible criteria such as entropy reduction or information gain from the split [15], Gini
impurity reduction [100] and Area-Under the Curve (AUC) [39]. We use entropy reduction
for computational efficiency and high performance. At each node in a decision tree, a
subset of m≤M randomly selected variables is investigated and for each a threshold is
found that divides the data into two child nodes. For a c-class problem, the probability of
class i∈{1, . . . , c} at node a is represented as p(i|a) and is efficiently calculated by counting
the number of observations for class i in a group of data. Then the impurity at node a can
be calculated by finding the Shannon Entropy [125] in
H(a) = −
∑c
i=1
p(i|a)log2 p(i|a). (5.6)
The best variable and best threshold are determined as the variable-threshold combination
(v, t) that gives the highest information gain or
I(a; (v, t)) = H(a) − H(leftChild|(v, t)) − H(rightChild|(v, t)), (5.7)
where a is the parent node, and rightChild and leftChild are the child nodes. With this
definition of impurity, a pure node is one with minimum entropy with all observations
from a single class.
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The recursive algorithm for growing a tree is shown in Algorithm 5. Assume training
set Data of N observations, each of M−dimensionals.
Algorithm 5 Decision Tree Node Splitting Recursive Algorithm
SplitNode (Data, Impurity)
if Impurity == minimum Impurity then
return
else
Calculate parent impurity H(a)
for each variable vi do
for each possible value t j do
vi.leftChild = {Data > t j}
vi.rightChild = {Data ≤ t j}
Calculate vi.leftChild impurity H(leftChild|(vi, t j))
Calculate vi.rightChild impurity H(rightChild|(vi, t j))
Calculate impurity reduction for (vi, t j)
end for
end for
BestNode = max( Impurity reduction for all variables and all thresholds )
SplitNode( BestNode.leftChild, BestNode, H(leftChild) )
SplitNode( BestNode.rightChild, BestNode, H(leftChild) )
end if
Decision Trees are grown on different randomly chosen data sets to decorrelate them
from each other. In this way, each decision tree is grown on a slightly different data set,
giving each a unique view of the variable space. Trees are grown to full length where
all terminal leaves are pure, in order to minimize both bias and between-tree correlation.
In the test phase, an observation is classified by each trained tree to reach a classification
decision. Final class decision of the forest is reached by majority vote among the ensemble.
As Random Forest determines a test class by voting among the trees of the forest, the
probability of each class can be calculated by p(x|S j) = vS j/Nt where vS j are the number
of votes for class S j and Nt are the total number of trees in the forest (i.e. total number of
votes). Then (5.5) can combine probabilities from multiple test traces in a similar manner
to Template Attacks.
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The Random Forest classifier includes a built-in variable importance metric. For each
node of each tree in the Random Forest, the reduction in entropy from the splitting of
parent to children over a variable is recorded. The entropy reduction for each variable xi is
averaged over all nodes and all trees to give an entropy based variable importance metric
for each variable. The Random Forest Entropy Importance method is abbreviated as RFEI
from here on.
The number of trees is a key parameter in the Random Forest classifier. As trees are
grown to minimize correlation, variation is expected in the tree class votes and a large
enough forest is required to ensure the majority vote for the correct class can be attained. A
forest that is too large increases computation time but is generally not harmful as Random
Forests are largely immune to overtraining [125]. Traces from a PIC microcontroller were
analyzed on a Random Forest of varying size to determine the proper forest size for this
data. Test and training data were taken from the same device and the best 25 features
as determined by RFEI were used. Figure 5.1 shows that training correct classification
rate rises to 100% in as few as 12 trees, because trees are grown to full length. However,
the classifier is not overfitted as more trees are added and test correct classification rate
continues to rise until a steady state is reached after 600 trees. As results are expected to
be more difficult when the training and test devices are different, a forest size of 1000 trees
was chosen for all experiments.
Random Forest has gained popularity due to its non-parametric and non-linear
properties, high performance in high dimensional data sets and ease of implementation.
It has found application in classifications of genes [31], spectral data [74], geographical
landmarks [85] and agriculture [89]. In empirical studies Random Forest has outperformed
Support Vector Machines (SVM), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Boosted Decision
Trees in large dimensional data sets [85, 89, 109]. In [88], Random Forest was found
103
Figure 5.1: Training and test errors for Random Forest as size increases. Template Attack
performance is plotted for reference.
to provide good posterior probability results when compared to SVM, Logistic Regression,
KNN, Artificial Neural Networks and Naive Bayes classifiers.
Although the true convergence theory behind Random Forest is a subject of active
research [13, 70], a few conclusions may be derived directly from its implementation. First,
each tree is grown on a different data set, thereby reducing the influence of data outliers.
Next, a random sampling of variables is analyzed at each node of each tree in the forest.
From each sampling the variable most useful in classification is used for partitioning the
data further. This variable filtering reduces the influence of non-data dependent variables
and ensures that more useful variables are used in the classification, as mathematically
proven in [12]. Random Forest determines decision regions strictly from the data alone
without any assumption of an underlying distribution. In addition, as the decision space is
split at each node, non-linear decision regions can be determined.
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5.2.4 Sum-Of-Squared pairwise T-difference
Gierlichs et al. in [42] first used SOST as a means of identifying points in time where
there is information leakage to aid in Template Attacks. For data from two sets (i, j), the
t-Test takes into account their mean (mi,m j) and their variance (σ2i , σ
2
j) in relation to the
number of observations from each set (ni, n j). Authors modified the t-Test implementation
to provide the sum of squared pairwise t-differences, which was termed SOST, and given
by [42]
∑K
i, j=1

mi − m j√
σ2i
ni
+
σ2j
n j

2
for i≥ j. (5.8)
In this way, the SOST is calculated for each pairwise combination of classes. Regions of
interest with high SOST values indicate where there is information leakage. SOST was
found to greatly aid Template Attack in [42], where success rate improved from 23% to
100% when using SOST to identify important variables with 5000 training traces.
5.3 Data Collection and Analysis
5.3.1 Data Collection
Table 5.1: PIC device families and their part numbers.
Family Device Numbers Part Number
A A1-A10 PIC24FJ64GA102 I/SP
B B1-B10 PIC24FJ64GA002 I/SP
C C1-C10 PIC24FJ48GA002 I/SP
D D1-D10 PIC24FJ32GA002 I/SP
Experiments were conducted on four families of PIC microcontrollers from Microchip
Technology Inc. Their model numbers along with our naming convention is shown in
Table 5.1. Ten chips from each family were used for experiments. Devices from family A
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differ from the remaining device families by including a number of on-board peripherals
not present on the other device families. Families A and B have 64 KB of program memory,
while families C and D have 48 KB and 32 KB respectively. A study of the variance of
traces collected from each family in [84] showed that family A differed significantly from
the remaining families and resulted in poorer cross-device Template Attack performance
when using family A to attack devices from the remaining families and vice versa.
The EM measurements during the AES-128 encryption operation are the side-channel
of interest for all experiments. Traces were initially collected at a 2.5GHz sampling
rate with a 1 GHz in-line low pass filter on a Lecroy 104-Xi-A digital oscilloscope
with a Riscure broadband EM probe [110]. Traces were then filtered with a 100 MHz
8th order Chebychev digital filter and downsampled to 250 MHz, and normalized [84].
This new equivalent sampling frequency is still well above the PIC instruction clock
frequency of 14.74 MHz, thus meeting Nyquist sampling criteria. This yielded the highest
correlation values in a correlation attack and outperformed direct sampling at 250 MHz. An
Agilent E3631A power supply was used to minimize power fluctuations to the EM probe.
Normalizing each time sample to a zero mean and unit variance was shown to provide
superior results for cross device attacks in [84].
The different microcontrollers on the test board are spatially aligned by using a
custom designed jig that can be fixed to the microcontroller board relative to the probe.
The collected traces are temporally aligned by using a trigger signal that is sent by
the microcontroller before the start of the encryption, which triggers the oscilloscope
collection. Post-processing cross-correlation is used to ensure that the collected traces are
well aligned. In order to minimize noise from external sources, at the time of collection,
only the AES algorithm is running on the microcontroller. Serial communication with the
collection computer is halted during the encryption process. 5000 training traces and 500
test traces were collected from each device. The best location on the chip for the EM
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collection was determined by performing an X-Y scan, where the surface of the chip was
divided into a grid of multiple sub-regions and a trace was collected at each region. The
region with the highest intensity in the spectral band from DC-30 MHz was chosen to be
the best location for data collection. This region was fixed for all devices used in this work.
5.3.2 Data Analysis
The collected traces are in the time domain, and as such the variables input to the
classifier are the data collected at the given time samples. For IV operations that span
multiple time samples, the side-channel leakage should theoretically be the same and so the
variance between these variables will be entirely due to the noise. If the noise during the
encryption process spans multiple time samples, then it can be modeled with a multivariate
distribution. Template Attack hypothesizes that this multivariate distribution is Gaussian.
However, distribution analysis p(xi) of the variables in our data shows multiple variables
exhibiting bimodal distribution shapes as shown in Figure 5.2. The figure also shows 2-
variable distribution plots of p(xi, j) exhibiting distinct multivariate non-Gaussian shapes.
Many more variables were found to show this bimodal distribution; only these arbitrarily
chosen variables are shown here for clarity. A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test (KS-test)
for normality was used to determine how closely variables resembled a standard normal
distribution. This test has the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed for a
given significance level α. A very low α value of 1e − 20 was chosen to identify those
variables that were clearly not normally distributed. It was found that this low α value
when used with the KS-test distinguished those variables that clearly displayed the bimodal
distribution seen in Figure 5.2. This method will be used in subsequent tests in this work
to distinguish Gaussian and non-Gaussian variables. 32,102 of a total 50,000 variables
rejected the null hypothesis of normality at this α level, and clearly showed a bimodal
distribution. Classical profiling attack theory assumes that the side-channel leakage of the
data-dependent signal dS j in (5.1) is constant when processing data S j, and that variation
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Figure 5.2: 1-D and 2-D distributions for an arbitrarily chosen sample set of two PIC data
variables. KS-test for normality revealed 32,102 out of 50,000 total variables exhibited
similar distribution shape.
in measurement for a class S j comes from multivariate Gaussian noise centered at dS j [72].
However, we show here that in certain cases such as ours, this noise can be non-Gaussian.
Figure 5.3 shows the arbitrarily chosen 2-variable space of two key byte values 1 and
7. Only two variables and two classes are shown for clarity. The figure shows the bimodal
nature of variables in Figure 5.2 is also clearly present for p(x|Byte1) and p(x|Byte7). This
behavior has been verified to exist with each of the 256 classes in our byte-wise attack, as
well as with other variables. Larger shaped dots in bold are the locations of the training
data used to generate the models. Light and dark shaded regions in the 2-variable space
show the classification regions assigned by each respective classifier, i.e., they show how
the classifier would partition the 2-variable space given the training set. At the time of
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Arbitrarily chosen two variable decision space for two IV byte values as
determined by (a) Template Attack, and (b) Random Forest. Light and dark shaded regions
represent the decision regions determined by each classifier, and bold shapes represent the
training observations used to determine the decision regions.
collection, no other functions are running concurrently with AES, and so the cause of
the non-Gaussian noise is not certain. Regardless, these non-Gaussian properties were
witnessed for the collections of 40 PIC microcontrollers, demonstrating that non-Gaussian
noise can exist in side-channel collected data.
5.3.3 Variable Importance and Dimensionality Reduction
In this research the large number of time samples collected for each trace lead to
the daunting task of identifying variables of interest. A common challenge with SCA
is not knowing the true dimensions of the distribution, i.e., the time samples where the
sensitive information leakage occurs. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, Random Forest has
a built-in variable filtering feature that uses only the best of an m variable subsample
at each decision tree node. It has shown good performance even when the number of
dimensions is much higher than the number of observations. Assuming no prior knowledge
of the underlying encryption algorithm implementation, Random Forest was used with full
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: Global Success Rate with Random Forest using full 50,000 variable traces with
no variable reduction: (a): same training and test device, (b) different training and test
device, but from the same family.
dimensional traces without variable reduction. When training and test traces were from the
same device all 16 AES key bytes were correctly identified. When training and test devices
were different but from the same family (cross-device attack), 15/16 AES key bytes were
successfully found. Global Success Rate (GSR) as defined in [120] is used in Figure 5.4
to show performance as a function of number of test traces required for successful attack.
Random Forest performance has been found to improve when less important variables are
removed from the training set [5], and so dimensionality reduction should be investigated.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) has been used successfully as means for feature
selection and reducing redundant information and has shown good success with side-
channel attacks [7, 11, 84]. Another commonly used method is to use CPA with a power
model such as HW, i.e. HW-CPA [72, 84, 92]. Variables useful in profiling attacks have
relatively high correlation using CPA, provided the device follows the leakage model.
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(b)
Figure 5.5: Variable importance as determined by two methods: (a) SOST, and (b) RFEI.
In this work, the use of RFEI and SOST was examined to identify variables of
interest. Random Forests have widely been used with variable importance metrics with
good performance [17, 32]. Similarly, Template Attack has shown improvement with
SOST identified variables in [42]. Figure 5.5a shows the SOST Importance for variables
500-3200, and Figure 5.5b shows the RFEI value for these variables. Magnitude of the
variables on the y-axes are different, but can be ignored as these plots are meant to show
relative variable importance, i.e. how important variables are in context to each other. Both
methods identify similar variables as important, but differ in the importance they assign to
the variables. In particular, RFEI assigns significantly higher importance than SOST to the
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Table 5.2: Average success rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for Random
Forest and Template Attack for the first 3200 variables.
Train Test Device
Device A B C D
A 100.00 53.13 54.13 51.37
B 31.50 99.94 100.00 100.00
C 37.44 100.00 99.94 100.00
D 36.56 100.00 100.00 100.00
variables around time samples 650, 1300 and 2800. Thus the top ranked variables identified
by each method will differ and have a corresponding effect on attack performance. For this
work, the top ranked RFEI and SOST variables will be used for dimensionality reduction.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Profiling Attack Performance Without Variable Reduction
Less than 1% of the time samples collected from the AES leakage traces are useful
in classifying the output of the SBox for the first round for any given key-byte, which is
the operation chosen to attack. In many practical scenarios, the attacker may not have
the luxury of knowing the exact encryption algorithm implementation used by a device.
Therefore, even if the general leakage time-frame can be guessed, a key challenge for
the attacker is knowing the exact time when the operation of interest is taking place.
For Template Attack using probability estimation, high-dimensional classification is only
possible by significantly increasing the number of training traces to keep the covariance
matrix in (5.2) non-singular.
In Section 5.3.3, Random Forest successfully classified AES key bytes without any
variable reduction. Further expanding the testing to larger cross-device experiments, an
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.6: Average results over 100 iterations from Random Forest profiling attack on
AES-128 for the first 3200 variables with no variable reduction. (a) shows the number of
correctly classified key bytes, (b) shows the minimum number of test traces required for
the correctly guessed key bytes to achieve 90% posterior probability.
assumption was made that the SBox output of the first round for all bytes was generated
in the first 3200 time samples. This is the largest number of dimensions that could
practically be used for probability estimation with 5000 training traces even assuming a
pooled covariance matrix for the variables. Experiments were conducted by training each
of 40 PIC microcontrollers from 4 different families and attacking the remaining devices.
Thirty test traces were drawn randomly from a pool of 500 and used to determine a key
guess. This sampling was repeated 100 times to gain confidence in the results. A key-guess
was considered a success if the posterior probability of the true class was greater than 90%
after 30 test traces. Figure 5.6a shows an intensity plot of the number of correctly guessed
key bytes out of 16 for each combination of test and training device. The first 10 devices are
from device family A, followed by 10 devices each from families B, C and D. As stated in
Section 5.3.1, device family A differs the most in hardware peripherals than the remaining
families. As a result, classification is poorer when devices from family A are used against
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those from other families. Table 5.2 shows the average number of correctly guessed key
bytes out of 16 for each device family combination. Figure 5.6b shows minimum number of
test traces required for the correctly guessed key bytes. For cases where no key-bytes were
successfully guessed, minimum number of test traces is set to 30 which is the sample size.
It is apparent that for Test-Training device combinations with high numbers of correctly
guessed key-bytes, very few test traces are required. We note that these results are with a
very high 3200-dimensional input space.
Template Attack with probability estimation was not able to correctly identify any key
guesses for any combination of devices and hence results are not presented here.
5.4.2 Profiling Attack Performance With RFEI Variable Reduction
Results improve for both Template Attack and Random Forest when selecting only
those variables where there is information leakage, shown in Figure 5.7. The best 25
variables were chosen for each training microcontroller with RFEI. The cross-device attack
with both classifiers was repeated on these reduced sets of variables. Again, 30 test traces
were chosen randomly from a set of 500 traces to attack a key byte, and this was repeated
with replacement 100 times to gain confidence. Table 5.4 shows the average success rate
of correctly guessed key bytes out of 16 for each training and test family combination. The
results show near-perfect performance for both Template Attack and Random Forest when
families B, C and D were used against each other, similar to Figure 5.6. Similar correct
key success rate is achieved by Random Forest and Template Attack when devices from
families B, C and D (train) are used to attack devices from family A (test). Differences in
performance are much more apparent when devices from family A are used against families
B, C and D, where nearly two-fold performance improvement with Random Forest over
Template Attack. This high level of success shows that Random Forest is generalizing well
even for devices that differ in their hardware specifications.
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The similarity in performance between the two classifiers despite non-Gaussian data
is further explored. The 25 variables were investigated with the KS-test for normality
described in Section 5.3.2, with α=1×10−20 for device A1. Of the 25 variables, 10 were
found to be clearly non-Gaussian and exhibiting a bimodal distribution, while 15 did
not reject the null hypothesis for normality at that alpha value. Visual inspection on
these 15 variables showed approximately Gaussian shape to their distribution with 5000
training traces. Table 5.5 shows the minimum number of traces required to achieve the
corresponding success rate in Table 5.4. Results show Random Forest requiring fewer
traces to achieve the same success rate as Template Attack with this 25 variable set for
majority of the cases. So for example, even if both attacks correctly extract all 16 bytes
from a particular training-test device pair, Random Forest requires fewer test traces than
Template Attack. Template Attack uses the Gaussian variables and to some extent the
non-Gaussian variables to successfully attack the PIC microcontroller. However, Random
Forest fully utilizes its non-linear properties for all variables and achieves the same success
rate with fewer test traces.
5.4.3 Profiling Attack Performance With SOST Variable Reduction
It is possible that Random Forest generated RFEI variables can benefit Random Forest
more than Template Attack. Therefore, an experiment is conducted using SOST as an
alternative method for variable selection. Results are presented in Table 5.6. Random
Forest performance is only slightly improved when compared with RFEI selected variables
in Table 5.4, but improvement is much more significant for Template Attack. For example,
average success rate improves from 40.88% to 69.14% when devices from family A are
used to attack devices from family B. The number of the top 25 variables identified by
SOST that were non-Gaussian averaged over 40 training devices for 16 key-bytes was
found to be a very low 0.0031. Thus, almost all of the top 25 variables identified by SOST
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Figure 5.7: Number of correctly classified key bytes over 16 bytes of AES-128 with RFEI
variable reduction on 40 PIC microcontrollers using (a)Random Forest, and (b) Template
Attack.
are Gaussian (by our relaxed definition) for any device and any key byte, which helps to
improve Template Attack performance.
5.4.4 Performance with Gaussian Noise
Results shown in the previous sections indicate that the non-parametric classifier
Random Forest can outperform the parametric Template Attack in the presence of non-
Gaussian noise. In this section the effect of increasing Gaussian noise nGaussian on Random
Forest and Template Attack performance is discussed.
If the side-channel collected data X in (5.1) is truly non-Gaussian, non-parametric
classifiers such as Random Forest perform well. The caveat is that the non-Gaussian noise
nnon−Gaussain from the device should be high enough that the overall measuredX still remains
non-Gaussian in the presence of Gaussian noise nGaussian. As the Gaussian noise power of
nGaussian increases, Random Forest performance logically drops to the same level or below
that of parametric classifiers such as Template Attack. This is shown in the following
experiment. 5000 training traces and 500 test traces were collected from a PIC device and
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designated as the signal. The output of SBoxround1,byte1 is targeted here. Dimensionality
reduction was performed to use the best 25 RFEI variables. Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) was added to achieve a desired Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). The correct
classification rate for each attack method is shown in Figure 5.8a. As SNR decreases with
higher power AWGN, in addition to the expected performance drop for both classifiers, the
difference in correct classification rate between both attack methods also decreases.
Results seen in these simulations were verified in Figure 5.8b with real Gaussian noise
generated by increasing the distance from the EM probe to the PIC surface. As distance
increases, the power of the Gaussian noise nGaussian from the environment increases while
relative signal power d, as well as non-Gaussian noise generated from the chip, decreases.
This leads to a similar trend in performance drop as seen with the simulated AWGN.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.8: Correct classification rate for collected leakage signal with (a) simulated
AWGN, and (b) for real noise added by increasing probe distance from PIC surface.
Further tests are conducted with the larger population of devices to determine the effect
of Gaussian and non-Gaussian variables in classification. Of the two variable importance
methods, SOST requires the use of class parameters mi (mean) and σ2i (variance). RFEI
on the other hand determines importance based on the reduction in entropy from using a
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variable, and thus behaves in a more non-parametric fashion than SOST. Investigating the
top 100 variables identified by SOST for the 40 training devices, the average number of
non-Gaussian variables are shown in Table 5.3. The table shows that RFEI is more likely
to rank non-Gaussian variables higher than Gaussian. Therefore, for further investigation,
RFEI is chosen to identify two new sets of variables: a) the top 25 Gaussian variables
RFEI-25G and b) the top 25 non-Gaussian variables RFEI-25NG. These variables were
then used with both Template Attack and Random Forest to train and test the population of
40 devices.
Table 5.3: Number of Non-Gaussian variables in the top RFEI and SOST 100 variables,
averaged over 16 bytes and 40 devices.
Device Family
Importance Method A B C D
SOST 32.54 3.51 5.31 6.28
RFEI 48.89 21.89 22.83 24.97
Success rates are shown in Table 5.7 for RFEI-25G variables and Table 5.8 for RFEI-
25NG variables. They are similar for both classifiers with Gaussian variables as from the
top 25 SOST variables in Table 5.6, confirming earlier analysis that SOST gives higher
weighting to Gaussian variables. There is significant improvement in Template Attack
performance with Gaussian variables versus using mixed RFEI variables in Table 5.4. For
non-Gaussian variables, the opposite is true. Success rate significantly decreases for both
classifiers with RFEI-25NG variables, with Random Forest performing slightly better than
Template Attack. These results show that non-Gaussian variables were not as useful to
classification as Gaussian variables.
Surprisingly Template Attack for certain scenarios performs very well with RFEI-
25NG variables. For example, the average success rate with devices from family D
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for training and devices from family B for test is 97.38%. Table 5.10 shows the
misclassification rates for each classifier for RFEI-25NG variables. Misclassification rate
is the number test traces whose key bytes were correctly identified by the classifier. In
this way, results from each trace are independent which differs from the success rate using
(5.5), where results are an accumulation over many traces. Tables 5.8 and 5.10 show that
Random Forest typically has lower misclassification rates than Template Attack, but similar
success rates. Misclassification rates for RFEI-25G variables are also provided in Table 5.9
for completeness. Template Attack is able to consistently show a high posterior probability
for the correct key byte over multiple test traces, even if it is not the highest posterior
probability. This effect accumulates when calculating the key guess with (5.5) to provide
a high success rate, even with non-Gaussian variables. This shows that Template Attack
is robust against non-normality and given sufficient test traces, can guess the correct secret
key with high degree of success.
Finally, in all experiments to this point, a pooled covariance matrix is used with
Template Attack which is necessitated by the need to provide an invertible matrix to (5.2)
with just 5000 training traces and dimensions of sizes 3200 or 25. With 5000 traces
and 256 classes, there are an average of 19.53 observations per class assuming a uniform
distribution. If the number of dimensions is reduced to less than 19 then standard Template
Attack can be used where the covariance matrix is estimated for each class. We reduce
the number of dimensions to 5, choosing the best Gaussian variables as chosen by SOST
(SOST-5G). This provides the most favorable conditions possible for Template Attack for
our given data set. Results of classification testing are shown in Table 5.11. They show
that Template Attack performance now more closely matches that of Random Forest, often
beating Random Forest for certain cases. Values in bold show cases when Template Attack
outperformed Random Forest.
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Thus, non-parametric classifier performance approaches that of parametric classifiers
in the presence of increasing Gaussian noise and Gaussian variables were more useful
to classification than non-Gaussian. Both classifiers were able to achieve high success
rates even with non-Gaussian data, and this particularly highlights Template Attacks
robustness against non-Gaussianity. Further, given a reduced variable set, Template Attack
with templates using individual class estimates for mean and covariance approach the
performance of Random Forest.
5.5 Conclusion
In this work, a case where side-channel data was found to have many non-Gaussian
variables was shown. For this data set and these conditions, the non-parametric classifier
Random Forest outperformed the parametric classifier Template Attack. Random Forest
can solve the common challenge of not knowing exactly when the information is being
leaked. Using the side-channel measurement of the full encryption operation with 50,000
variables, Random Forest was able to successfully find all 16 key-bytes when the training
and test device was the same, and 15/16 key-bytes when they were different. Expanded
cross-device attacks with a smaller 3200 variable set allowed Random Forest to achieve
success rates as high as 100% while Template Attack was not able to find any key bytes
correctly. With RFEI and SOST variable reduction methods, Random Forest and Template
Attack performance improved. Random Forest for both cases was better at generalizing
during training to be able to attack devices that are more physically dissimilar to each other,
achieving as high as two-fold performance improvement over Template Attack. SOST
variables were found to improve Template Attack performance more than Random Forest
performance, mostly due to the SOST preference for Gaussian variables. Template Attack
performance was also found to be robust when only non-Gaussian variables were used
for classification, achieving success rates as high as 98.31% despite having corresponding
misclassification rates as high as 99.41%.
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Table 5.4: Average success rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for Random
Forest and Template Attack with RFEI variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 100.00 77.19 80.87 73.19 100.00 40.88 47.75 39.50
B 41.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 45.06 100.00 100.00 100.00
C 49.50 100.00 100.00 99.88 43.56 100.00 100.00 100.00
D 42.12 100.00 100.00 100.00 43.44 99.94 100.00 100.00
Table 5.5: Average number of traces required to achieve 90% success rate for Random
Forest and Template Attack with RFEI variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 2.52 9.15 9.06 8.97 4.64 8.83 8.97 8.64
B 7.19 4.05 4.10 4.29 9.33 6.22 7.03 7.20
C 7.46 4.49 3.94 4.82 8.66 6.54 6.25 7.34
D 7.16 4.20 4.28 3.78 8.91 6.52 7.35 6.55
5.6 Subsequent Research
In [91], the 40 PIC microcontroller data set collected by Cobb et al. in [25] was
analyzed. For a particular device, 32,102 out of 50,000 total variables were found to
exhibit non-Gaussian distribution, as measured by the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff
hypothesis test for normality with α=1e−20. The remaining 39 devices also showed similar
numbers of non-Gaussian variables. A new study was performed to understand the spatial
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Table 5.6: Average success rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for Random
Forest and Template Attack with SOST variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 100.00 80.50 83.00 75.00 100.00 59.12 59.44 54.37
B 43.31 100.00 100.00 100.00 47.56 100.00 100.00 100.00
C 51.31 100.00 100.00 99.75 46.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
D 40.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 45.15 99.94 100.00 100.00
Table 5.7: Average success rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for Random
Forest and Template Attack with RFEI-25G variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 100.00 79.25 81.81 75.68 99.94 57.25 58.12 54.56
B 41.43 100.00 100.00 100.00 45.50 100.00 100.00 100.00
C 49.75 100.00 100.00 99.75 43.94 99.94 100.00 99.94
D 40.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 40.44 99.94 100.00 100.00
dependence on the number of non-Gaussian variables in a collection. This can provide
further information on possible sources of the non-Gaussian noise in the collection.
5.6.1 Power Model Based Side Channel Theory
In [72], it is theorized that a microcontroller follows the Hamming Weight or
Hamming Distance power models. For a microcontroller that follows the HW power model,
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Table 5.8: Average success rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for Random
Forest and Template Attack with RFEI-25NG variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 100.00 33.00 42.06 39.00 82.06 19.69 30.75 25.81
B 16.25 99.50 99.19 99.81 18.87 98.50 91.94 98.31
C 26.50 98.44 98.31 99.06 32.44 95.75 90.75 95.62
D 36.50 99.56 99.38 99.50 39.12 97.38 90.94 97.88
Table 5.9: Average misclassification rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for
Random Forest and Template Attack with RFEI-25G variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 55.37 95.92 94.69 95.38 99.34 99.59 99.58 99.59
B 95.96 74.78 78.28 77.97 99.56 99.41 99.40 99.41
C 94.84 80.42 72.49 80.27 99.57 99.39 99.41 99.40
D 95.87 78.96 79.61 71.39 99.53 99.41 99.40 99.40
authors state that the distribution of variables with high information leakage will follow a
multimodal distribution, with the modes centered around the power consumption for the
hamming weights. For the 256 possible values of an 8 bit number, the HW distribution
is not uniform. This is shown in Figure 5.9, where numbers with hamming weights 3, 4,
and 5 are more common others. In their experiment with an 8-bit microcontroller using
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Table 5.10: Average misclassification rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for
Random Forest and Template Attack with RFEI-25NG variable reduction.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 66.08 97.55 97.13 97.25 99.30 99.49 99.52 99.51
B 98.33 89.63 91.62 90.93 99.49 99.28 99.30 99.30
C 98.07 92.12 89.76 91.21 99.52 99.32 99.32 99.35
D 97.62 91.06 90.94 87.54 99.46 99.25 99.26 99.28
Table 5.11: Average success rate percentage over 16 bytes and 100 iterations for Random
Forest and Template Attack with SOST-5G variable reduction. Separate class estimates of
covariance matrices are used for Template Attack.
Test Device
Train Random Forest Template Attack
Device A B C D A B C D
A 93.69 52.94 62.00 52.25 93.69 42.38 53.69 46.31
B 20.37 88.56 90.00 90.19 21.31 91.12 89.31 91.69
C 40.06 83.87 85.00 81.31 38.06 86.12 88.31 83.06
D 25.12 81.50 79.69 90.06 23.12 78.94 76.62 86.94
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), Mangard et al. collect the power emitted during an
8-bit register look-up operation. The histogram of the variable at time sample 362 ns for
51,200 collected traces is shown in Figure 5.10a. Results show a multi-modal distribution
with modes claimed to be centered around the HW leakage for the byte being attacked as
theorized in Figrue 5.10b. With this theory, and the assumption of multivariate Gaussian
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Figure 5.9: Histogram of HW for 1000 random 8-bit integers
noise in the side-channel, areas on the microcontroller with high information leakage will
have more non-Gaussian variables than areas with low information leakage. We test this
theory by performing an XY scan of a PIC microcontroller and testing for non-Gaussian
variables at each location.
5.6.2 Spatial Distribution Analysis with Constant Gain Control
Cobb et al. collected the 40 PIC dataset with unintentional EM emissions over the
same location on each chip in [25]. In order to gain insight on the relevance of data
collection location on the chip towards producing non-Gaussian variables, an XY scan of a
PIC microcontroller is performed from the original set of 40, namely device C1 described in
Section 5.3.1. An XY scan uses the Riscure XY table described in [111] to systematically
place the Riscure EM probe at different locations on the device. A scanning grid of 5×25
was used, yielding 125 separate collection locations. For conciseness, the original 40 PIC
dataset collected by Cobb et al. is called the 40PIC dataset, and the new XY scan of device
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.10: (a) Measured distribution from the power measurements of an 8-bit
microcontroller at time sample 362ns for 51,200 traces [72], and (b) the theorized
underlying distributions of the HW at that time sample [72].
C1 is called the XY dataset. A PIC microcontroller of the C device family (not from the
40PIC device set) was delayered using a belt-sander power tool to determine the underlying
structure and its effect on the generation of non-Gaussian variables. Figure 5.11 shows this
device with three zoom settings. The CPU core is located in the middle of the PIC package
with bonding wires seen extending to the external pins. These wires, made of relatively
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long linear metallic structures, behave like antennae and will radiate EM signals better than
the comparitively short transistors located in the CPU core.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 5.11: PIC microcontroller delayered and shown at three zoom settings (a), (b), and
(c).
Every attempt was made to duplicate the setup by Cobb et al. [25] in the 40PIC
dataset. In addition to using chip C1 from the original collection, the same Riscure EM
high sensitivity probe (model number HS130) is used. The same AES encryption C and
assembly code are used. The same model Lecroy 104-Xi-A digital oscilloscope with the
same sampling frequency of 2.5 Gsps. The same number of traces (5000) were collected.
For post-collection data processing, the variables are low-pass filtered with a 100 MHz 8th
order Chebychev digital filter and downsampled to 250 MHz, as was done in the 40PIC
collection [25]. The Riscure voltage probe contains a metal flap around the collection
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region which can either be raised or lowered during collection. This flap is raised in this
collection to match the setting used during the 40PIC collection.
One of three PIC-16 demonstration boards that house the microcontroller are used. It
is uncertain which of the three were used by Cobb et al. in the original 40PIC collection.
However, clock frequency of the external oscillator was measured and verified to match
that listed in the datasheet [78] to the second decimal place. The Agilent power supply
was not available during the XY dataset collection, so a generic power supply is used.
However, voltage is regulated with a surge protector. Oscilloscope vertical scale is set to
1V per division. It is not certain what vertical scaling was used in the 40PIC collection.
The entire XY dataset collection setup is placed on an Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) mat to
reduce the effect of static electricity. This setup was not available during the original 40PIC
collection. As 5000 traces are collected at each of 125 locations, only 50,000 variables are
collected, which after 10x downsampling during post-processing gives 5000 final variables
per location. This is one-tenth the number of variables collected in the 40PIC dataset. The
first byte of the SubBytes output, which is the AES intermediate value under investigation,
is processed by the microcontroller within these first 5000 variables. This reduction in
variable count was necessary to complete data collection and analysis in a timely manner.
In Chapter 4, it is shown that the PIC follows the HW power model well. The
maximum correct-key correlation from a CEMA attack can provide a measure of how
much side-channel leakage is occurring at a particular location on a chip. CEMA attacks
remove the requirement for separate training and test datasets, which are required for
more powerful profiling attacks, and are therefore the fastest and most versatile attack
for the multi-location testing performed here. At each location, a known-key CEMA
was performed with 5000 traces attacking the first byte of the first round SubBytes AES
operation.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.12: (a) The maximum correlation of known key CEMA attack from an XY scan of
device C1, and (b) corresponding number of variables identified by KS-test with α=1e−20
after Matlab decimate post-processing.
Figure 5.12a shows the maximum correlation to the HW power model after a CEMA
attack. Results have been overlayed on the location of the PIC on the demonstration board.
Two locations are shown as regions of high information leakage on the chip. The area to
the right of the CPU core where wires connect it to the external pins show regions of high
information leakage. This is likely due to EM emissions from the wires connecting the
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CPU core to power pin 8 (VS S ) and clock pins 9-12 (OSCI,OSCO,SOSCI,SOSCO) shown
in Figure 5.13 [79]. The power and clock pins have been shown in literature to be good
sources of side-channel leakage for cryptographic functions The high leakage region to
the upper left of the CPU core is less clear. The external pins located here (pins 22-24 in
Figure 5.13) are standard Input-Output (IO) ports and are not used in our implementation.
Capacitor C8 is a 100 nF capacitor in-line with the power supply [78]. This suggests that it
is a power regulating circuit which could account for side-channel leakage.
Figure 5.13: Pin diagram of PIC microcontroller [79].
Shown in Figure 5.12b shows the number of non-Gaussian variables out of 5000. The
count is substantially lower than the 32,102/50,000 identified from the 40PIC dataset. The
reason for this difference could not be determined as of this time. However, the intensity
map in Figure 5.12b reveals several useful insights. The region of high information leakage
in Figure 5.12a to the right of the CPU corresponds well to the region of high non-Gaussian
variable count. Location 116 (row 4, column 16) was the location with the largest number
of non-Gaussian variables (88). This matches the existing theory that variables with large
information leakage are multi-modal and non-Gaussian.
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Surprisingly, the region on the PIC to the upper left of the CPU, near capacitor
C8, does not show many non-Gaussian variables. This is in contrast to the existing
theory [72]. The exact cause for this difference is not known. Figure 5.14a shows a
plot of the correlation from a CEMA attack against all 16 bytes of the SubBytes AES
operation. Each byte was attacked separately and the results are overlayed on each other.
This gives an indication of all the time samples where that operation was being processed
by the microcontroller. Overlayed in red are the locations where non-Gaussian variables
(NGV) were identified. Results identify several locations where there is there is a good
match between non-Gaussian variable and high CEMA correlation. Several time samples
before variable 1000 however identify non-Gaussian variables in areas where the SubBytes
operation is not identified by CEMA. However, other operations are occuring here that are
not shown in this CEMA attack, namely the AddRoundKey operation. Each non-Gaussian
variable was histogrammed and analyzed for their distribution. While some showed clearly
irregular and often multi-modal shape as in Figure 5.14b, others showed more Gaussian
shape with an extended tail, as in Figure 5.14c.
5.6.3 Spatial Distribution Analysis with Dynamic Gain Control
The one sample KS-test calculates the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
a collected variable to the CDF of the normal distribution. The collected side-channel
emissions are sampled with 8-bit resolution on the oscilloscope. For regions with very low
emitted signal at constant gain control, only a few of these bits are used, leading to a very
poor resolution collected signal for that variable. This lowered sampling resolution can lead
to the full range of a low powered signal not being captured, which can lead inaccuracies in
the KS-test. Therefore a method of dynamic gain control is used, which was developed by
Montminy in [83] and modified here. This method adjusts the vertical scale on the scope
based on the current measured signal to ensure that as much of the measurement range
as possible is being used to sample the incoming signal without signal clipping. Signal
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 5.14: (a) Correlation from a CEMA attack to the power model for SubBytes
calculation at round 1 for all 16 AES bytes. (c) Histogram of a non-Gaussian variable
showing clear irregular shape, and (b) histogram of non-Gaussian variable showing a shape
similar to a Gaussian distribution but with a longer tail.
clipping is when a signal is too large to be measured at a given vertical scale, and its value
is capped at the maximum or minimum values of the sampling resolution.
Maximum correlation after a CEMA attack at each location on the XY scan is shown
in Figure 5.12a. Results are improved over Figure 5.12a by using higher range resolution
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.15: (a) The maximum correlation of known key CEMA attack from an XY scan of
device C1 with dynamic gain control, and (b) corresponding number of variables identified
by KS-test with α=1e − 20 after Matlab decimate post-processing.
when the input signal is amplified to account for low input power. The plot of the number
of Non-Gaussian variables is shown in Figure 5.15b. Here, results remain very similar to
those in Figure 5.12b.
For cases with and without dynamic gain control, the number of non-Gaussian
variables identified are much reduced compared to those from the 40Pic dataset, and the
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multi-mode nature is not as easily identified as those in Figure 5.2 from the 40Pic dataset.
The exact cause for this is unknown at present and requires further study. Frequency
analysis around the PIC and nearby peripheral devices might lead to further insight. In
addition, the effect of this more Gaussian collection on Template Attack and Random Forest
profiling attacks could be determined in future experiments.
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VI. Results: Random Forest RF-DNA Application
This chapter presents research results on two ZigBee datasets: the ZigBee Cross-
Environment dataset, and the ZigBee Cross-Receiver dataset. Research on the Cross-
Environment dataset included in ‘Improving ZigBee Device Network Authentication
Using Ensemble Decision Tree Classifiers with RF-DNA Fingerprinting’ is accepted and
under revision in the IEEE Transactions on Reliability Special Section on Trustworthy
Computing. Thereafter, additional results are presented on the Cross-Receiver data set
submitted to Military Communications Conference MILCOM 2014. In both cases, certain
text was omitted to reduce redundancy between other chapters in this document.
6.1 Introduction
ZigBee devices based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [10] have gained popularity in a
variety of applications as devices of choice for low-cost, low-power and low-complexity
communication applications [60]. Per the IEEE standard, ZigBee devices operate as
either Full Function Devices (FFD) capable of functioning as a Network coordinator, or
as Reduced Function Devices (RFD) capable of communicating only with an FFD. ZigBee
networks can operate as decentralized mesh networks [68] such as Star, Peer-to-Peer or
Cluster Tree Topology, allowing new devices to be discovered and incorporated easily
into an existing network. ZigBee devices represent a 2 orders of magnitude lower-power
alternative to Bluetooth communications for short message burst communications [9, 60].
The low-cost, low-power attributes of ZigBee have greatly increased their popularity and
they have been widely adopted for monitoring and control in industrial and building [38],
healthcare [58], and security system [126] applications.
The increased vulnerability and growing popularity of ZigBee in critical applications
motivates research aimed at devising robust security measures. ZigBee operation is secured
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through the Advance Encryption Standard (AES) for Media Access Control (MAC) and
Network (NWK) payload encryption. Message integrity can be enabled using a Message
Integrity Code (MIC) that provides protection against simple replay attacks. However, due
to the resource constraints and distributed network topology inherent to ZigBee, several
vulnerabilities have been recently discovered [33, 99, 127]. In addition, a Python-based tool
called KillerBee was released in 2009 that increases the exposure of ZigBee and other IEEE
802.15.4-based Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN) to attack [130]. Specifically,
KillerBee simplifies sniffing and injecting traffic, packet decoding and manipulation by
rogue devices.
Several methods have been proposed to use physical characteristics of devices enhance
authentication. Mitchell and Chen [81] detect network intrusion by modeling behavior of
nodes in a Cyber Physical System and determine Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) rates of
the network for various attack scenarios. Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) provide
hardware authentication by inserting additional circuits into devices that take advantage
of the natural randomness of the manufacturing process and are nearly impossible to
duplicate [122]. Zhang, et al. [132] model network attack behavior using Support Vector
Machines with additional network modules and use these models to classify possible
network intrusion.
Similarly, RF-DNA fingerprinting has been used to enhance Physical (PHY) layer
security of wireless networks through identification and verification of wireless devices.
In contrast to other methods, RF-DNA fingerprinting is a passive technique that does
not require additional network hardware for security and authentication. For device
identification (ID), RF-DNA can be used to reliably distinguish between known network
devices, even if these devices are identical device model from the same manufacturer.
The RF-DNA verification process also enables discrimination between authorized devices
and unauthorized rogue devices attempting to gain network access to conduct spoofing
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attacks. In related work, RF-DNA fingerprinting exploited preamble features in 802.16e
WiMAX [107] and 802.11a WiFi [48] signals using a parametric Multiple Discriminant
Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifier and non-parametric Generalized
Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) and Learning From Signals
(LFS) classifiers. The MDA/ML classifier was also adopted and used in preliminary
demonstrations to 1) differentiate authorized ZigBee devices at varying SNR [102] and 2)
detect the presence of unauthorized rogue devices [35] using verification. ZigBee devices
are often employed in locations that make their RF emissions susceptible to interference
from multipath reflection and other operating devices; such conditions can induce non-
Gaussian conditions that are reflected in RF-DNA features used for device discrimination.
This effectively degrades MDA/ML performance which is inherently based on underlying
Gaussian distribution assumptions for the input features [25]. In addition, lack of built-
in variable identification methods in MDA/ML require the use of external methods for
Dimensionality Reduction Assessment (DRA).
Random Forest (RndF) and Multi-Class AdaBoost (MCA) are two robust ensemble
learning classifiers not based on assumed or known input data distributions [18, 125, 133].
They have good performance in large dimensional, multi-class problems [31, 91, 109].
In fact, non-parametric RndF and MCA ensemble decision tree classifiers enhance
device identification and verification performance using RF-DNA input features. Results
are generated here using experimentally collected ZigBee emissions and compared to
parametric MDA/ML and GRLVQI methods that have been previously shown to be
effective for RF-DNA fingerprinting applications [47]. This work builds on previous
research [94] where identification and verification of ZigBee emissions with RndF and
MCA were first investigated.
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6.2 Background
6.2.1 Signal Collection Methodology
Signal collection, RF-DNA fingerprint generation, model generation and device
testing are conducted collectively through an Air Monitor system comprising of a receiver
and computational platform. The signal collection methodology outlined in [36] is
maintained herein. All signal collections are performed with an Agilent E3238S-based
receiver [1] that down-converts signals to near-baseband, digitizes them using a 12-bit
Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) and stores the samples as complex In-phase and
Quadrature (I-Q) components. Subsequent post-collection processing is performed at
a sample frequency of fs=11.875 Msps using an 8th-order Butterworth filter having a
bandwidth of WBB=1.0 MHz. The authorized device data set used for model development
consists of Np=3000 preamble responses collected from each of ND=4 like-model CC2420
IEEE 802.15.4 compliant devices operating at 2.4 GHz. The Np=3000 responses per
device includes 1000 responses collected under each three different experimental ZigBee
Transceiver-to-collection Receiver (Tx-Rx) scenarios, including: 1) the Tx and Rx in a
Ramsey STE3000 anechoic enclosure (Cage), 2) the Tx and Rx having a clear line-of-
sight (LOS) down an indoor hallway, and 3) the Tx and Rx on opposite sides of indoor
wall (Wall). The rogue device data set consisted of an additional Np=1000 preamble
response collected from each of ND=9 devices operating under varying experimental Tx-Rx
scenarios.
An amplitude-based detection threshold of TD =6.0 dB was used to detect ZigBee
burst leading edges. This provided reliable identification and extraction of the desired
preamble region of interest. The experimentally observed preamble duration of Tp ≈
129µsec was consistent with IEEE 802.15.4 specification [56]. The average SNR of
detected bursts for each of the experimental scenarios was SNR ≈ 50.0 dB (Cage), SNR
≈ 40.0 dB (LOS), SNR ≈ 30.0 dB (Wall).
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6.2.2 Statistical RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
Figure 6.1: RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation Process [129].
Figure 6.1 shows the signal collection and RF-DNA fingerprint generation methodol-
ogy. A statistical RF-DNA fingerprint (F) is derived from the signals instantaneous ampli-
tude (a), phase (φ) and/or frequency ( f ) responses as described in [129]. The correspond-
ing response sequences a[n], φ[n] and f [n] are generated from the complex signal samples
within the region of interest. These sequences are centered (zero mean) and normalized (di-
vide by maximum value) prior to calculating statistical RF-DNA features of variance (σ2),
skewness (λ) and/or kurtosis (k) within selected signal region(s) of interest. The regional
fingerprint markers for the signal are generated by 1) dividing each response sequence into
NR contiguous equal length sub-sequences, 2) calculating NS statistical metrics for each
sub-sequence, plus the entire region as a whole for NR + 1 total regions, and 3) arranging
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the metrics in a vector of the form
FRi =
[
σ2RiλRikRi
]
1×3 , (6.1)
where i=1, 2, . . . ,NR + 1. The NR + 1 regional vectors from (1) are concatenated to form
the composite fingerprint vector given by the concatenated vectors
F =
[
FR1|FR2|FR3| . . . |FR(NR+1)
]
1×NS (NR+1) . (6.2)
For consistency with results in [102] and [36], all performance assessments conducted
here are based on a total of NR + 1=81 subregions within each of the a[n], φ[n] and f [n]
responses and NS =3 statistics for each subregion. According to (6.2), the resultant RF-
DNA fingerprints used for assessment contain NF=(3x3x81)=729 total features.
6.2.3 Classifier Description
Four different classifiers are considered for comparative assessment using RF-DNA
fingerprints extracted from experimentally collected ZigBee emissions. It is important to
note that when direct comparisons are made the results are based on identical RF-DNA
feature sets into being submitted to classifiers. A brief description of each classifier is
provided in the following sub-sections.
6.2.3.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)
MDA/ML is a parametric classification process consisting of a transformation (MDA)
followed by a parametric classification decision (ML). MDA is a multi-class form of
Fishers Linear Discriminant Analysis that seeks the linear subspace that maximizes inter-
class mean distance while reducing intra-class variation and improving overall class
separability. This transformation effectively reduces the NF dimensional input data to an
(Nc1) dimensional space where Nc is the number of classes. Given that MDA uses linear
eigenvector decomposition to generate transformed features, and assuming Gaussian input
features, the transformed features remain Gaussian as well. However, if non-Gaussian input
is provided the transformed features are not guaranteed to be Gaussian.
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The MDA transformed features are classified via a ML decision assuming a
multivariate Gaussian distribution of projected data. A mean vector µi is estimated for
each class, along with a pooled covariance matrix Σ that is used for all classes. Likelihood
estimation is calculated for a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by
P(x|i) = 1
(2pi)NF/2|Σ|1/2 exp
{
−1
2
(x − µi)Σ−1i(x − µi)T
}
, (6.3)
where T denotes transpose. A sample from the input testing set is projected via MDA and
class likelihood values are assigned using Bayesian decision theory, where the conditional
posterior probability is given by
P(i|x) = P(x|i)P(i)
P(x)
. (6.4)
Assuming equal prior probabilities p(i) for each class and equal p(x) for all classes, these
terms in (2.11) can be ignored, giving
p(i|x) ∝ p(x|i) . (6.5)
Thus, the posterior probability under these conditions is proportional to the conditional
probability p(x|i) which can be estimated during the training phase. The final class estimate
of a test observation is assigned to the class i with highest probability, or
p(i|x) > p( j|x), ∀i , j . (6.6)
The class yielding highest probability is assigned as the class estimate for the unknown
testing input. As typically large dimensional distributions can have very small probabili-
ties [59], log-likelihood is used here. Given a known distribution, ML is known to provide
optimal classification performance [125].
6.2.3.2 Generalize Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI)
GRLVQI is a neural learning algorithm that iteratively adjusts prototype vectors to
define class boundaries [63]. A system of K prototype vectors is arbitrarily chosen for
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the data set. Weight vectors are assigned to a first layer of neurons with each neuron
representing one class. The weight vector of a class neuron is iteratively updated (learned)
to reduce the training data distance of that class in a manner similar to supervised K-
Nearest Neighbor processing. LVQ was generalized to GRLVQ in [114] using gradient
descent to minimize drifting of the prototype vectors from their optimal locations. Hammer
modified the algorithm to incorporate variable relevance ranking [44] which was key to
successful implementation of feature DRA work in [106]. GRLVQI was successfully
used for RF-DNA fingerprinting work in [47] involving identification and verification of
WiFi and WiMAX devices. In addition to vector class labels, GRLVQI provides a distance
metric that provides a measure of “confidence” in the class estimate. Device ID verification
performance was improved in [106] by modifying the confidence measure to account for
prototype vector angle as well as distance.
6.2.3.3 Ensemble Learning Classifiers
Ensemble learning classifiers combine multiple weaker classifiers to reach a unified
classifier that is stronger than individual components. Early ensemble learning algorithms
trained the same classifier using different training data subsets and bootstrap aggregation or
bagging [16]. When these training subsets generated significantly different classifiers, the
accuracy was found to improve [16]. The Random Subspace method also manipulates the
training space by randomly selecting a subset of variables to train different classifiers [53].
As implemented here, RndF is a decision tree ensemble learning algorithm that combines
bagging with the random subspace method to grow de-correlated decision trees to
form the ensemble [17]. Forests of multivariate trees such as Random Forest Random
Combination [17], Oblique Random Forest [73], and Rotation Forest [64] have been
suggested for data sets with correlated input variables.
Boosting is a method for iteratively training a weak classifier on successively
challenging training observations. Initially, a weak classifier is trained using an unweighted
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subset of training observations chosen randomly with a uniform distribution. Observations
not used for training are classified and incorrect guesses are given higher weighting. The
process is repeated for successive iterations by choosing training observations from a
weighted distribution. Thus, training observations that are more challenging to classify
are given higher preference in later classifier training iterations.
Advanced methods have been developed for generating ensembles that selectively
choose models for a given training set. For example, forward stepwise selection is
used in [23] for model selection and can be optimized for performance metrics such as
accuracy, cross entropy, mean precision or area under the ROC curve. The authors in [23]
demonstrate that component models such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Artificial
Neural Network (ANN), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Decision Trees and others can be
used together in an ensemble. The bagged ensemble selection method in [23] is further
developed in [123] using bagged groups of models with ensemble selection occurring
within each bag.
In this research, RndF and MCA ensemble classifiers are chosen for demonstration.
Univariate decision trees are chosen as the weak classifiers over multivariate trees as a study
of RF-DNA fingerprint variables shows only a few have variables have high correlation;
for 530,719 unique pair-wise combinations of 729 variables (xi , x j) only 15% showed
correlation higher than 0.5. Further, as part of this research training models are constructed
at each of 16 different SNRs. Therefore, RndF and MCA methods were chosen here over
more complex ensemble selection methods to maintain manageable classifier training times
while ensuring reliable proof-of-concept demonstration.
Random Forest (RndF) RndF is a decision tree ensemble learning algorithm where
the class estimate is determined by a majority vote [17]. Decision trees are grown to full
depth, i.e., until all terminal leaves are pure (contain only one class), to minimize prediction
bias. The correlation between trees is minimized by using a different randomly selected
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training data sample (with replacement) for each decision tree; the non-selected training
observations are called the Out-Of-Bag (OOB) observations. At each decision tree node,
a random subset of m variables is used to further minimize inter-tree correlation. The
best variable from the subset of m is used to split the data into two child nodes. Various
metrics have been used to determine the best node including Shannons entropy [15], Gini
impurity [74] and Area Under the Curve (AUC) [39]. Shannons entropy was selected here
given that it yields similar performance to Gini Entropy [100] and is more computationally
efficient than the AUC method for multi-class problems. Although RndF is a non-
parametric classifier, posterior probabilities can be determined as p(x|i)=Ni/N where i is
the class label, Ni is the number of trees that voted for class i, and N is the total number of
trees in the ensemble.
The RndF classifier provides a built-in Variable Importance (VI) metric called
permutation importance. Once a forest is grown, the Out-Of-Bag Error (OOBE) is
calculated for each tree as the misclassification percentage of the OOB set. This is averaged
over all trees in the forest to give an overall baseline OOBE. Each variable in the training
data is randomly permuted and the resultant forest OOBE recalculated. The difference in
OOBE between the permuted data and the baseline OOBE is stored as the permutation
importance. More important variables yield a larger OOBE difference relative to the
baseline when they are permuted giving a relative importance ranking of variables.
Multi-Class AdaBoost (MCA) AdaBoost is a boosting algorithm designed to
iteratively train weak classifiers based on misclassifications that occur during the previous
iteration [20]. Each of the Ntr training observations starts with a weight of 1/Ntr and a weak
classifier such as a decision tree Ti is grown on an in-bag sample of the training set. The
entire training set is then classified by Ti and the weights of misclassified observations are
increased while decreasing the weights of correctly classified observations. The random
in-bag sample of observations is chosen by this weighted distribution. Thus, MCA focuses
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on harder to classify observations by giving them a higher weight and making them more
likely to be used during the next iteration classifier Ti+1. Weights of all observations for
classifier Ti are used to generate a single weight αi and a final class vote is determined
using a weighted majority vote given by
C(x) = argmax
k∈{0,1}
N∑
i=1
αi · I (Ti(x) = k) , (6.7)
where N is the total number of decision trees in the ensemble, and I is the indicator function
which takes on a value of 1 if the class vote from Ti for observation x is k and 0 otherwise.
AdaBoost was originally developed for 2-class problems and subsequently extended to
multi-class applications using a multi-class exponential loss function [133].
The RndF and MCA classifiers have been empirically shown to provide high
classification performance using high-dimensional input data sets. Good RndF and MCA
performance was demonstrated in [109] with performance measured by accuracy, Root
Mean Square Error (RMSE), AUC and average across these metrics for the datasets
IMDB (685K variables), Spam (405K variables), DSE (195K variables), and Cite (105K
variables). RndF was used in [31] with microarray datasets for Adenocarcinoma (9,868
variables), prostrate (6,033 variables), and brain (5,597 variables). RndF has also been
applied in side-channel analysis of spectral data (50K variables), with results in [91]
demonstrating successful classification of all 16 bytes of the encryption key. In addition
to their success in high-dimensional problems, the non-parametric properties of RndF and
MCA make them excellent alternatives to MDA/ML in RF-DNA fingerprinting for ZigBee
devices. For results presented here, these classifiers were coded in Mathworks Matlab
software, with the decision tree node split algorithm applied in C++ to reduce computation
time. Results of this implementation are compared to original RndF results in [17] using the
glass, breast cancer, Pima diabetes, sonar, vowel, ionosphere, zip code and letters datasets.
In each case, classification performance using the RndF and MCA implementations here
was equal to or better than prior work. In addition, the RndF and MCA implementation
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performance was comparable to that of the Weka and R versions of RndF and MCA for the
spectral dataset described in [91].
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Data Set Definitions
For this research, two primary datasets are used and designated as the Inst and
Stat datasets. The Inst dataset consists of observations with 5760 variables, made up of
1920 variables each from the instantaneous amplitude (a[n]), phase (φ[n]) and frequency
( f [n]) responses. The Stat dataset consists of observations with 729 statistical variables
derived from the Inst dataset, with 243 variables each from RF-DNA amplitude, phase and
frequency features F per (6.1), (6.2). Both Inst and Stat datasets contain 3000 observations
from each of ND=4 authorized devices for a total of 12000 observations per dataset, as
described in Section 6.2.1. Equal size training and test sets are constructed with 6000
observations each as summarized in Table 6.1. For both Inst and Stat datasets, White
Gaussian Noise (WGN) is added to achieve a desired S NR ∈ [0, 30] dB in 2dB steps.
Table 6.1: Inst and Stat dataset summaries.
Number of Test Number of Training Total Number
Observations Observations of variables
Inst 6000 6000 5760
Stat 6000 6000 729
6.3.2 Random Forest Performance Using Instantaneous Responses
As noted in Section 6.2.3.3, RndF has been shown to perform well in large
dimensional problems. Thus RndF was introduced here to directly classify authorized
ZigBee devices using instantaneous amplitude (a[n]), phase (φ[n]) and/or frequency ( f [n])
samples of collected signals. The Inst dataset samples were used as input variables to
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RndF for all S NR∈[0, 30] dB considered. Figure 6.2a shows the permutation VI values as
generated by a 1000 tree RndF from the Inst training dataset at SNR=10 dB. Larger RndF
ensembles were experimentally used for VI tests and impact on resultant classification
performance was negligible. It is evident that phase variables are the most important for
ZigBee device classification followed by frequency and lastly amplitude variables. This
coincides well with the results from [35] shown in Figure 6.2b, where KS-Test based VI
of phase statistical RF-DNA features from the Stat dataset at SNR=10 dB were found to be
dominant. The KS-test VI is the p-value from pair-wise KS-tests of observations for each
of M variables given by Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 KS-Test for VI pseudo code
for Each variable v = 1→ M do
for i = 1→ c classes do
for j = (i + 1)→ c classes do
xi = Observations from class i, variable v
x j = Observations from class j, variable v
p(variable) = p(variable) + (p-value from KS-test(xi, x j))
end for
end for
end for
Figure 6.3a shows the %C vs. SNR for ND=4 authorized ZigBee devices using the full-
dimensional Inst dataset with RndF for each response type. In agreement with VI results
of Figure 6.2a, the phase-only variable set achieves the %C=90% benchmark at the lowest
SNR=12.0 dB; the combined VI and %C results strongly indicate that φ[n] variables contain
the most discriminating information. Figure 6.3b shows classification performance with
DRA using the best 10%, 25%, 50%, and 100% of the 1920 instantaneous phase; the full-
dimensional 5760 variable results are provided for comparison. In each case, the subspace
size chosen at each node is m= greatest integer of
√
Total Number of variables. The most
important features for DRA were selected based on the 1000 tree RndF model developed
at SNR=10 dB. Most notably, Figure 6.3b results show 1) good agreement between full-
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.2: (a) RndF VI using Inst features at SNR=10 dB with higher VI indicating greater
importance and (b) corresponding KS-Test p-values for Stat features at SNR=10 dB with
lower p-value indicating greater importance.
dimensional and phase-only performance, to include statistically identical performance for
S NR ≥ 6.0 dB using one-third the variables, and 2) a reduction of approximately 5% in
%C for other phase-only DRA subsets. As a dimensional reduction to one-third of the full-
dimensional 5760 variables yields minimal %C performance degradation over the range of
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SNR considered, all subsequent RF-DNA fingerprinting results and analysis are based on
the phase-only 1920 variables.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.3: RndF correct classification performance for (a) the 1920 Inst variables from
individual amplitude a[n], phase φ[n] and f [n] responses as well as the combined 5760 full
dimensional (Full Dim) set , and (b) top-ranked 10%, 25%, and 50% DRA φ[n] subsets as
well as the total 1920 φ[n] variables. Results from the 5760 variable Full Dim set is also
shown for reference.
RF-DNA fingerprint features have been shown to successfully accumulate discriminat-
ing information from raw collected signals into smaller dimensions for classification [35,
47, 106] by calculating only 3 statistics (variance, skewness, kurtosis) over selected regions
of interest spanning several time samples. This RF-DNA feature generation method is used
with the Stat dataset in the remainder of this paper.
6.3.3 Variable Importance Comparison
The VI rankings generated by RndF processing are compared with VI rankings
provided by pre-classification KS-Test metrics in [35] and GRLVQI post-classification
feature relevance ranking methods. In each case, the training Stat dataset is used for VI
generation. The RndF, KS, and GRLVQI methods are independently used to identify
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the top-ranked 25 of NF=243 (81 subregions × 3 statistics per subregion) phase-based
statistical RF-DNA fingerprint features (variables). Collectively considering the top 25
variables identified by all three methods, there were a total of 47 unique variables identified,
18 of which were found by two or more methods. Figure 6.4 shows a Venn diagram of the
top ranked 25 variables identified by each method. Variables found by two or more methods
are shown by their respective intersecting regions. The top-ranked 25 variables identified
by each method are used for RF-DNA fingerprinting results in Section 6.3.4 using ND=4
authorized ZigBee devices.
Figure 6.4: Relationship of top-ranked 25 variables identified by RndF, KS Test, and
GRLVQI methods. Number of variables found by two or more methods are shown in
intersecting regions.
Figure 6.5a shows the normalized (divide by maximum value) top-ranked 50 variables
identified by RndF VI. Figure 6.5b and Figure 6.5c show VI values for the same variables
assigned by GRVLQI VI and (1-KS-test) VI methods; use of (1-KS-test)-VI here is a matter
of convenience for making a “larger VI is better” comparison with the other methods.
Results clearly show differences in the relative importance assigned to variables by the
three methods.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.5: (a) Normalized VI values for 50 top-ranked, sorted RndF variables and (b)
corresponding GRLVQI VI (Middle) and (c) (1-KS Test) VI (Bottom) values.
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6.3.4 RF-DNA Authentication Results
Figure 6.6 shows OOBE at SNR=0.0 dB using RndF using best 25 variables identified
by RndF. Different subspace selection sizes m are used for decision tree node training.
This low SNR was chosen as it has a high misclassification rate and performance
differences are more easily visible. Based on these results, a subspace size of m=5(√
Total Number of variables
)
was deemed sufficient for demonstration and used for all
subsequent testing.
Figure 6.6: Out-Of-Bag Error (OOBE) for RndF with top-ranked 25 RndF variables and
different subspace sizes m using Stat dataset at SNR=0.0 dB.
Figure 6.7a shows RndF and MCA test error for RF-DNA fingerprinting at SNR=0.0
dB using only the best 25 variables identified by RndF and NP = 6000 test observations.
Both curves reflect a general downward trend until approximately 900 trees where the
misclassification rate begins to level out. Based on these results, a total of NT =1000 trees
were used for subsequent RndF and Adaboost ensemble method processing. Figure 6.7b
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shows distributions for four arbitrarily selected fingerprint variables at SNR=30.0 dB.
Histograms for all 25 top-ranked variables are included in Appendix B chapter for
completeness and show that this non-Gaussian shape is prevalent in each. The dataset
at this SNR is chosen here as it contains the least amount of additive noise. The histograms
clearly illustrate the distinct non-Gaussian distribution of ZigBee features being considered.
Parametric classifiers such as MDA/ML that inherently rely on Gaussian distributions will
yield large estimation error and degraded classification performance. Non-parametric and
non-linear classifiers such as GRLVQI, RndF and MCA are expected to perform better than
MDA/ML on variables with irregular distributions such as these.
Figure 6.8 shows %C vs. SNR for ND=4 authorized ZigBee devices using MDA/ML,
RndF, Multi-Class AdaBoost (MCA) and GRLVQI classifiers using the top 25 variables
selected by each of the three VI methods described in Section 6.3.3 (KS, GRLVQI, and
RndF). While more than half of the 47 variables (29/47) were uniquely identified by
one particular VI selection method (i.e., they were not found by any other VI method),
classification results were similar for each of the four classifiers regardless of variable
selection method.
Results show that RndF and MCA ensemble methods generally outperform MDA/ML
and GLRVQI methods for all SNR considered, with MCA being slightly better than
RndF. The arbitrary %C>90% benchmark is achieved for RndF and MCA ensemble
methods at SNR=12.0 dB, while GRVLQI and MDA/ML methods require SNR=18.0
dB and SNR=30.0 dB, respectively. The benefit of ensemble methods is reflected in a
performance “gain” of approximately GS =6.0 dB (GRLVQI) and 18.0 dB (MDA/ML).
Here gain is defined as the reduction in required SNR, expressed in dB, for two methods to
achieve a given %C performance. Viewed in a manner consistent with expectations for an
operational scenario with fixed SNR conditions, the RndF and MCA %C performance is
9%-19% better than MDA/ML and 3%-20% better than GRLVQI for the range of SNR
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.7: (a) Random Forest and MCA test error performance at SNR=0.0 dB, and
(b) representative histograms for four arbitrarily selected variables showing distinct non-
Gaussian distributions.
considered. Collectively, these results suggest that ensemble methods are more robust
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means for correctly authenticating ZigBee devices on networks operating in much noisier
environments.
Figure 6.8: Percent correct classification (%C) versus SNR for all classifiers using top-
ranked 25 variables selected by each of the three VI methods as indicated. Legend A:B
indicates results for classification Method A using variables selected by Method B.
6.3.5 RF-DNA Verification Results
Once a given classifier has been trained on authorized network devices, it can
be used to identify unauthorized rogue devices attempting to gain network access. In
this case, rogue devices impersonate authorized devices by presenting false bit level
credentials matching those of an authorized device a common approach for spoofing
attacks. Rogue detection and rejection presents considerable challenge given their
emissions were not available during classifier training. This was successfully addressed
in [25, 35] using a biometric-based verification process with a similarity measure (test
metric) reflecting a given rogue device “looks like” each of the authorized devices. For
155
related experiments here, four authorized ZigBee devices are used for classifier training
according to Section 6.3.4 and nine previously unseen rogue devices are introduced to
gauge classifier verification performance. Test metrics provide a level of confidence in
the classifiers decision and are generated for each rogue device. For MDA/ML and
RndF assessment, the test metrics included posterior probability estimates for each rogue
device. For GRLVQI assessment, the combined angle-distance metric in [106] is used. The
weighted voting scheme of MCA does not support generation of a convenient test metric
and its verification performance is not assessed.
For results here, each of the nine rogue devices are presented as having a claimed
bit-level identity matching each of the four authorized devices, for a total of 36 rogue
assessment scenarios. For each rogue-authorized device pair, 1000 bin histograms were
generated using test metrics reflecting 1) how much the rogue device “looks like” the
authorized device (Rog:Auth), and 2) how much the authorized device “looks like” itself
(Auth:Auth). A representative rogue-authorized histogram pair is shown in Figure 6.9
where the span of histogram bin values is determined by the authorized device test metric
values.
Histograms such as shown in Figure 6.9 are used to generate Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves by varying a threshold (left-to-right) across the distributions
and calculating True Verification Rate (TVR) and False Verification Rate (FVR). TVR
reflects a correct decision whereby an authorized device is present and correctly granted
network access. FVR corresponds to Rogue Accept Rate (RAR) and reflects an
incorrect decision whereby a rogue device is present and errantly granted network
access. The resultant ROC curve for a given rogue-authorized device pair is simply
generated by plotting FVR vs. TVR, with higher TVR and lower FVR points reflecting
better performance. ROC curve assessments here are based on an arbitrary benchmark
performance range defined by TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1. For rogue-authorized scenarios that
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Figure 6.9: Representative histograms of MDA/ML posterior probability test metrics for a
rogue-authorized device pair at SNR=12.0 dB. Legend A:B notation indicates test statistics
reflecting how much Device A looks like Device B where Device B is the claimed ID.
do not meet these criteria, the rogue is deemed to have successfully “spoofed” the network.
Verification ROC curves are presented here using the top 25 ZigBee features selected by
GRLVQI at SNR=10.0 dB. Results for both RndF and KS-Test feature selection were also
investigated and yielded similar results.
6.3.5.1 Fixed Correct Classification Performance
The three classifiers were trained using data sets yielding equivalent benchmark
classification performance of %C=90%. Using classifiers with equal classification
performance in this way allows a normalized comparison of network intrusion detection
performance by rogue ZigBee devices. From Figure 6.8, this required using RndF trained
at SNR=12.0 dB, GRLVQI trained at SNR=18.0 dB, and MDA/ML trained at SNR=30.0
dB. The top 25 ZigBee features selected by GRLVQI at SNR=10.0 dB were used by each
classifier. Figure 6.10 shows resultant ROC verification performance for each of the three
classifiers at %C=90%. Solid lines represent rogue scenarios satisfying the TVR>0.9 and
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FVR<0.1 benchmark (spoofing thwarted) and red dashed lines represent those that did not
(spoofing successful). As shown, RndF processing correctly rejected 31 of 36 rogue access
attempts, which exceeds by MDA/ML (20 of 36) and GRLVQI (25 of 36).
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.10: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves showing verification
performance for 36 total rogue scenarios using the GRLVQI identified best 25 input
features with fixed %C=90% using (a) RndF at SNR=12.0 dB, (b) GRLVQI at SNR=18.0
dB, and (c) MDA/ML at S NR = 30.0 dB. Solid lines represent rogue assessment scenarios
satisfying the TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark (spoofing thwarted) and red dashed lines
represent scenarios that do not (spoofing successful).
Similar verification tests were run using the top 25 input features as identified by
VI methods RndF and KS-Test at SNR=10.0 dB. The number of rogue scenarios that
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were correctly detected satisfying the TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark are shown in
Table 6.2. This table shows that GRLVQI identified features provide the highest verification
performance, as determined by the highest number of rogue scenarios successfully
detected. In addition, for each VI method with equal correct classification performance,
RndF was able to identify the most number of rogue scenarios.
Recalling from Section 6.3.4 that RndF processing provides approximately GS =6.0
dB (GRLVQI) and 18.0 dB (MDA/ML) of “gain” at equivalent %C=90%, RndF provides
enhanced network intrusion detection capability of rogue ZigBee devices in a much noisier
environment; a considerable advantage in real-world RF environments where high SNR
may not be realized for ZigBee applications.
Table 6.2: Number of rogue scenarios out of 36 total that were correctly rejected based on
the arbitrary TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark for fixed %C=90% correct classification
performance
Classifier
Variable Importance Method
RndF KS-Test GRLVQI
RndF 30 29 31
GRLVQI 24 24 28
MDA/ML 20 25 25
6.3.5.2 Fixed SNR Performance
Verification performance was also investigated using a fixed SNR for all three
classifiers; this is consistent with real-world environments where receiver and background
noise power is fixed and verification is required at a given location. Figure 6.11 shows
results for fixed SNR=12.0 dB data sets using all three classifiers and the same top-ranked
25 variables from GRLVQI used for fixed %C verification results in Section 6.3.5.1. RndF
processing is again superior and correctly rejects 31 of 36 rogue spoofing attempts at the
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TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark; only 25 of 36 (GRLVQI) and 20 of 36 (MDA/ML)
rogue spoofing attempts are successfully rejected.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.11: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves showing verification
performance for 36 total rogue scenarios using the GRLVQI identified best 25 input
features with fixed SNR=12.0 dB using (a) RndF at %C=90%, (b) GRLVQI at %C=86%,
and (c) MDA/ML at %C=75%. Solid lines represent rogue assessment scenarios satisfying
the TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark (spoofing thwarted) and red dashed lines represent
scenarios that do not (spoofing successful).
As in Section 6.10, verification tests were run using the top 25 input features as
identified by VI methods RndF and KS-test at SNR=10.0 dB. The number of rogue
scenarios that were correctly detected satisfying the TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark
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are shown in Table 6.3. Similar results are seen, except the verification performance of
RndF over the other two classifiers is even more pronounced using fixed SNR conditions.
The superiority of RndF processing in this lower SNR environment is even more
significant considering average correct classification results at SNR=12.0 dB in Figure 6.8,
which includes %C ≈ 90% (RndF), %C ≈ 86% (GRLVQI), and %C ≈ 75% (MDA/ML);
once again, a considerable advantage in real-world RF environments where high SNR may
not be realized for ZigBee applications.
Table 6.3: Number of rogue scenarios out of 36 total that were correctly rejected based
on the arbitrary TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 benchmark for fixed SNR=12.0 dB channel
conditions.
Classifier
Variable Importance Method
RndF KS-Test GRLVQI
RndF 30 29 31
GRLVQI 17 18 25
MDA/ML 11 20 25
6.4 Conclusion
The proliferation of ZigBee devices in commercial and military infrastructures has
increased the urgency for improving protection. Attacks involving rogue devices that
impersonate authorized devices by presenting false bit-level credentials can be especially
devastating. Relative to traditional bit-level protection, RF-DNA fingerprinting provides
a PHY layer defensive measure that can be employed against these attacks. The
work presented here extends previous PHY fingerprinting work using 1) statistical RF-
DNA features extracted from ZigBee emissions collected under real-world conditions
and possessing non-Gaussian attributes due to multipath reflections and other device
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interference, and 2) non-parametric Random Forest (RndF) and Multi-Class AdaBoost
(MCA) ensemble classifiers that improved classification by 9%-19% over MDA/ML and
3%-20% over GRLVQI across the range of SNR considered. Furthermore, the better
trained ensemble classifiers significantly enhanced device ID verification performance
when unknown rogue devices were presented to the network. For operation at a fixed
%C=90% correct classification accuracy, RndF correctly detected 31 of 36 rogue scenarios
at SNR=12.0 dB. This exceeds GRVLQI rogue detection performance which detected 28 of
36 rogue scenarios at SNR=18.0 dB and MDA/ML which detected 25 of 36 rogue scenarios
at SNR=30.0 dB. Considering the SNR differences for fixed %C=90% operation, RndF
emerged as the superior alternative and provided a “gain” of GS =18.0 dB and GS =6.0 dB
relative to MDA/ML and GRLVQI processes, respectively. Alternately, for operation under
fixed SNR conditions, RndF ID verification processing detected 11 more rogue scenarios
than MDA/ML and 6 more rogue scenarios than GRLVQI. In real-world applications where
RF emissions crowd the 2.4 GHz spectral region, the SNR is relatively low and ensemble
methods are envisioned as providing a more robust alternative for authenticating ZigBee
device IDs and enhancing network security.
6.5 Multi-Receiver Data Set Evaluation
Experiments conducted with the ZigBee Cross-Environment datasets evaluated the
performance of RF-DNA fingerprinting to classify and verify authorized ZigBee devices
using an advanced high-cost Agilent receiver. A further evaluation was conducted to
determine the cost-performance trade-off of using a low-cost receiver instead. Presented
in the following sections is the summary of results which are under review at the Military
Communications Conference MILCOM 2014 [95]. Certain sections from [95] have been
omitted here to avoid redundancy with previous sections in this chapter.
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6.6 Introduction
ZigBee devices using the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for Wireless Personal Area
Networks (WPAN) have found wide-spread adoption in a variety of applications, from
security systems [126], to health-care [58], to industrial and building control [38]. Their
increased popularity in sensitive and high-value areas has understandably led to security
and vulnerability concerns. ZigBee security is provided through the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) for MAC, NWK and APS layers. Security researchers however have
revealed several methods to exploit vulnerabilities in the key-exchange process [33, 99,
127]. In addition, it has been proven that power consumption of an authorized wireless
sensor node can be passively monitored to determine the secret encryption key through
Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) methods [76, 108]. The ZigBee alliance has countered these
threats by adopting AES in either Counter (AES-CTR) or AES-CCM* mode which are
more resistant to SCA attacks. However, AES-CTR mode has theoretically and practically
been proven vulnerable to SCA eavesdropping attacks in [57] where the full AES-CTR
key was successfully recovered. Thus key recovery in ZigBee devices is entirely possible
which easily allows an attacker to insert rogue devices within an existing network.
RF-fingerprinting offers an intriguing PHY layer countermeasure to spoofing attacks
and rogue device identification. Physical differences between devices manifest themselves
into measurable differences in their transmitted signals. RF-fingerprinting uses machine
learning methods to exploit these differences and reliably identify wireless devices [48, 96,
102, 105, 107]. RF-fingerprinting is generally considered a robust countermeasure as it
uses random physical variations between devices for identification, which are prohibitively
complex for an attacker to duplicate.
Most RF-fingerprinting methods require the use of large, expensive receivers such
as the Agilent E3238S [94], or high-speed oscilloscopes [30, 96]. Recent research has
shown success in RF-fingerprinting through the use of low-cost USRP receivers [87, 105].
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However, a comparison between high and low cost receivers for performance trade-offs
has not been performed to date. This research bridges this information gap by comparing
performance differences in RF-fingerprinting between a high-cost receiver and a low-
cost USRP-based receiver. Six devices of the same manufacturer and model type are
used for testing. This model uniformity represents the most challenging case for device
identification, and performance will likely only improve for cases when device models
differ. The Random Forest (RndF) classifier is used to investigate amplitude, phase and
frequency features and their respective contributions toward classification. Performance is
characterized by correct classification rate (%C) for device identification, and number of
Rogue device scenarios identified for network intrusion detection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides background
information on RndF and feature generation. Section 6.7 describes the methodology
for data collection, and device authentication and verification. Section 6.8 provides
experimental results and analysis for experiments on device authentication and verification.
Finally, our conclusions from this work are detailed in Section 6.8.
6.7 Methodology
RF-DNA fingerprinting methodology for data collection, device authentication and
verification used here is similar to those used in Sections 6.2.1, 6.3.4 and 6.3.5. Differences
in methodology are presented in the following sections.
6.7.1 Data Collection and RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
The data set originally defined in [121] is used in this research. The high-cost receiver
used for data collection is the National Instruments NI PXIe-1085 system and the low
cost receiver is the NI USRP-2921. Six Atmel RZUSBsticks are used as the transmitters.
In order to provide a meaningful comparison, as many parameters as possible are kept
constant during signal collection. Both receivers collect observations simultaneously and
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.12: Classification results for S NR ∈[0,24]dB using the PXIe Receiver with (a)
amplitude, (b) phase, and (c) frequency RF-DNA statistical features.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.13: Classification results for S NR ∈[0,24]dB using the USRP Receiver with (a)
amplitude, (b) phase, and (c) frequency RF-DNA statistical features.
are at equal distance from the transmitter. Transmit power is set to 1 mW and a common
VERT2450 receiver antenna with 3dBi gain is used for both receivers.
Both systems record I/Q data as 16-bit integers, sampled at 20 Msps. 600 transmission
preambles are sampled from each RZUSBstick. Transmission detection from background
noise is accomplished through amplitude-based leading edge detection using a -6dB
threshold. As outlined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [56], the first 128 µs of each
transmission constitutes the preamble. At 20 Msps the first 2560 I/Q samples span
the preamble region of each transmission. The transmitter operating frequency is IEEE
802.15.4 channel 26 (2.480 GHz) for all collections to mitigate nearby IEEE 802.15.4
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traffic (2.401-2.473 GHz). The collected S NR is approximately S NRC ≈30 dB for PXIe
and S NRC ≈24 dB for the USRP.
Inter-device variability in USRP RF-fingerprints was previously noted in [104]. To
mitigate possible variability in collection center frequency due to clock skew, the collection
receiver center frequency was set 3 MHz below the transmission center frequency
(2.477 GHz versus 2.480 GHz). The collected transmission was then down-converted to
baseband using gradient-based frequency estimation performed with Mathworks Matlab
software. A WBB=1 MHz 8th-order Butterworth filter was used to remove background
noise outside the IEEE 802.15.4 channel, resulting in a low-noise, baseband representation
of the collected transmission. Background noise filtering was not discussed in [104], which
may have contributed to the erratic RF fingerprinting performance reported therein. Given
the relatively small WBB bandwidth, the collected signals were downsampled by one-half
to 10 Msps which satisfies Nyquist sampling criteria while reducing computational burden.
After down-sampling, 1280 preamble samples were converted into three 1280 length
sequences of instantaneous amplitude (a[n]), phase (φ[n]) and frequency ( f [n]). These
sequences were divided into NR=32 equal length sub-sequences corresponding to the 32
preamble bits. Including the original full-length sequences for fingerprint features, and
considering three RF-DNA statistical features (σ2), (γ) and (k), there were a total of
(NR + 1=33) × 3 × 3=297 RF-DNA statistical variables used for assessment.
6.7.2 Device Authentication
Device authentication is the classification of authorized devices with RF-DNA
fingerprinting variables. In order to assess authentication performance in high and low
noise environments, the collected signals were added to like-filtered Additive White
Gaussian Noise to achieve the desired SNR∈[0,24] dB in 2dB steps. All 6 devices are
classified with the Random Forest algorithm at each SNR, with 300 observations each used
for training and testing sets. Further rogue identification tests in Section 6.7.3 were based
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on random selection of three authorized devices with the remaining devices designated
as rogue devices; each possible selection of 3 devices from the population of 6 devices
(denoted as 6C3) is also evaluated for classification accuracy. Given the random nature of
RndF, 5-fold cross-validation was used to ensure statistical confidence in the results. For all
experiments in this research, the RndF consisted of an arbitrarily chosen N=1000 decision
trees.
6.7.3 Device Verification
Once a given classifier has been trained on authorized network devices, it can be used
to identify unauthorized rogue devices attempting to gain network access in a process
termed device verification. Rogue devices impersonate authorized devices by presenting
false bit-level credentials matching those of an authorized device - a common approach
for spoofing attacks. Rogue detection and rejection presents considerable challenge given
their emissions are not available during classifier training. This was successfully addressed
in [25, 35] using a biometric-based verification process with a similarity measure (test
metric) reflecting how much a given rogue device “looks like” each of the authorized
devices. For related experiments here, three ZigBee devices are randomly chosen as
authorized devices for classifier training. The remaining three unseen rogue devices are
introduced to the classifier to gauge verification performance. Test metrics provide a level
of confidence in the classifiers decision and are generated for each rogue device. For RndF
assessment, the test metrics are the posterior probability estimates for each rogue device.
Each combination of 6C3 are tested to generalize results for the entire population of devices
tested.
We define 1) how much the rogue device “looks like” the authorized device as
Rog:Auth, and 2) how much the authorized device “looks like itself as Auth:Auth. As
described in [35] test metrics generated by the classifier for an authorized device are used
to generate a 1000 bin histogram (Auth:Auth). These bins from an authorized device are
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used with the test metrics of the rogue device to generate a new histogram (Rog:Auth). With
these histograms, traditional ROC processing is used to calculate the True Verification Rate
(TVR) and False Verification Rate (FVR). Rogue devices achieving the arbitrarily chosen
thresholds of TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 on the ROC plot are designated to have been correctly
identified by the classifier. Devices that do not meet these thresholds are designated to
have successfully spoofed the network. Three rogue devices impersonating each of the
3 authorized devices give 9 unique Rog:Auth scenarios. The number of rogue scenarios
correctly identified is recorded for each case.
6.8 Results
6.8.1 Device Authentication Results
Figure 6.12 shows authentication results for the data collected with the PXIe
receiver. Results for each combination of randomly selected 3 authorized devices (6C3=20
combinations) are shown (3-class), as well as the mean for all 20 combinations. Also
shown are the authentication results for the full 6 device population (6-class). Results for
this 6-class set are lower than those for the 3-class case as more classes tend to crowd the
variable space, making classification more difficult. As each measurement is repeated for
5-fold cross-validation, 95% confidence intervals over the 5 folds are plotted for the 3-class
and 6-class mean. The variation across the 5-folds is very small causing the error bars to
be smaller than the marker size.
RF-DNA fingerprint phase variables were found to be the most useful for device
authentication, achieving a correct classification rate %C>90% on average for the 3-class
cases at SNR≥8 dB, and for the 6-class case at SNR≥10 dB.
In a similar fashion, USRP results are shown in Figure 6.13. Again, RF-DNA
fingerprint phase variables are the most useful for device authentication, reaching %C>90%
benchmark at SNR≥10 dB. For the 3-class case, USRP authentication performance differs
from PXIe performance between %C=-8.87% to 3.75% over all SNRs tested, with an
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average difference of 0.76%. Negative %C differences represent cases where classification
is more successful with USRP versus PXIe collected data at that SNR. For the 6-class case
where all ZigBee devices in the population are tested, %C differences between PXIe and
USRP collected data range from -8.46% to 6.58%, with an average %C difference across
all SNRs tested of 2.22%. Thus for both 3-class and 6-class cases, there is slightly lower
authentication performance when using the lower cost USRP-based receiver.
Figure 6.14: RFEI of PXIe and USRP variables. Results indicate phase variables are most
important for classification, with PXIe phase variables being more important than USRP
phase variables.
Random Forest Entropy Importance (RFEI) is used to determine the relative
importance of USRP and PXIe collected variables. Data from each receiver at SNR=10
dB is used, as device authentication results show that both receivers achieve >90% %C
at this SNR. The observations from each receiver at this SNR are concatenated such that
the first 297 RF-DNA variables of each observation are from the PXIe receiver and the
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last 297 RF-DNA variables are from the USRP receiver. A Random Forest of 1000 trees
is grown for the 6 classes using the full 600 observations to determine relative variable
importance, as shown in Figure 6.14. Merging the data from both receivers in this way gives
Random Forest access to both data sets simultaneously, allowing it to jointly determine
how important each receiver is toward device classification. Results show that the phase
variables for both receivers are the most important, with Random Forest favoring the PXIe
phase variables slightly more than the USRP phase variables. Judging by the number
of peak important variables greater than an arbirtrary chosen threshold of 50, Random
Forest favors the PXIe phase variables slightly more than the USRP phase variables.
Additionally, USRP frequency variables are found more useful than the PXIe frequency
variables. Finally, it is evident that for both receivers, amplitude variables are relatively
unimportant for RndF classification. Given the high relative variable importance for phase
variables, only phase variables are subsequently considered device verification tests.
6.8.2 Device Verification Results
Verification tests are conducted by randomly assigning three ZigBee devices as
authorized and the remaining three as rogue. All 6C3=20 such combinations are tested
to determine how many rogues are correctly identified by data collected by each receiver.
Data sets are chosen at the SNR at which average 3-class device authentication results
in Section 6.8.1 achieve %C>90%. Only for RF-DNA fingerprint phase variables are
considered. For the PXIe receiver, data at SNR=8 dB is used, while for the USRP data at
SNR=10 dB is used. Figure 6.15 shows the number of rogue scenarios correctly identified
with the ROC identification threshold corresponding to TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1. Results
are averaged over 5-folds to account for performance differences from the randomness in
Random Forest.
Further investigation reveals that some devices have very similar hardware properties,
making their corresponding Rog:Auth combinations difficult to differentiate. This is
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Figure 6.15: Number of rogue scenarios correctly identified out of a maximum possible
9 (averaged over 5-folds). A total of 20 rogue-authorized device combinations are tested.
Average identified rogue scenarios over all combinations for each receiver are shown in
bold.
evidenced for example in iteration 15 in Figure 6.15, where the average number of rogue
scenarios correctly identified is a low 3.6 out of a possible 9. The number of times
these Rog:Auth scenarios are correctly identified over 20 combinations is accumulated and
averaged over 5 folds for each receiver data set in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. Several Rog:Auth
combinations are found to have very low success rates. For example, the Rog:Auth
combination of Dev1:Dev4 (row 4, column 1) is not correctly identified with either the
PXIe or USRP receivers for fold. In this case, low success rate is more due to the similarity
in their hardware rather than caused by receiver accuracy or classifier performance. These
similarities are to be expected when testing the hardest case scenario where all devices
are from the same model type, as was done here. On the other hand, certain cases such
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Table 6.4: Average percentage of Auth:Rogue scenarios out over 6C3 = 20 combinations
and 5 folds that are correctly identified based on ROC TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 performance
for the NI PXIe receiver.
Rogue
Dev1 Dev2 Dev3 Dev4 Dev5 Dev6
Authorized
Dev1 * 100% 100% 0% 100% 100%
Dev2 100% * 60% 100% 70% 0%
Dev3 87% 83% * 97% 0% 83%
Dev4 0% 100% 100% * 100% 100%
Dev5 50% 50% 0% 50% * 50%
Dev6 100% 0% 70% 97% 67% *
Avg 67% 67% 66% 69% 67% 67%
Table 6.5: Average percentage of Auth:Rogue scenarios out of over 6C3=20 combinations
and 5 folds that are correctly identified based on ROC TVR>0.9 and FVR<0.1 performance
for the NI USRP receiver.
Rogue
Dev1 Dev2 Dev3 Dev4 Dev5 Dev6
Authorized
Dev1 * 100% 100% 40% 80% 100%
Dev2 100% * 0% 100% 63% 0%
Dev3 83% 0% * 83% 0% 83%
Dev4 0% 100% 97% * 20% 100%
Dev5 50% 53% 0% 13% * 50%
Dev6 100% 0% 46% 100% 50% *
Avg 67% 51% 31% 67% 43% 67%
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as Dev2:Dev1 are correctly identified in all combinations for both receivers. In this case
the Rogue devices differ greatly from the authorized devices, making rogue identification
highly successful. Again, this success is due to device hardware differences and does not
depend on the receiver accuracy.
On average, the PXIe receiver collected data correctly identified 67.11% of rogue
scenarios, versus 57.11% rogue scenarios with the data from the USRP receiver. The
95% confidence intervals are ±18.55% and ±19.33% respectively, indicating that the rogue
identification performance for the two receivers is not statistically different at this alpha
level. These verification results show in a practical sense the performance-to-cost trade-
off from using a lower cost USRP receiver at the risk of more rogue devices spoofing the
network by impersonating authorized devices.
6.9 Conclusion
This research provides a comparison of RF-DNA fingerprinting performance using
classification variables generated from high-cost PXIe and low-cost USRP receiver
collections. By testing all combinations of ZigBee devices in a given population, biased
results from favorable device selection are avoided, and results can be generalized for the
entire population. RFEI results show that the process favors RF-DNA phase variables
over amplitude or frequency variables. PXIe-collected RF-DNA phase variables are given
higher Entropy Importance relative to corresponding USRP-collected phase variables.
Device authentication results show an average %C=0.76% higher classification when using
PXIe collected RF-DNA phase variables over USRP for the 3-class case over all SNRs
tested, and %C=2.22% higher for the 6-class case. Device verification results show an
average of 10% more Rog:Auth scenarios being identified with the PXIe collected data
versus the USRP-collected data. Thus, as expected, performance is degraded when using
the lower cost receiver. However, the performance decrease is not statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level. In addition, the magnitude of performance drop is small and may
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be acceptable given the much lower cost of the USRP receiver. These experiments consider
the most-challenging case when all ZigBee devices are from the same manufacturer and
model number. Results are expected to improve for both receivers when using rogue
devices that are of a different model type than the authorized devices.
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VII. Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the key doctoral research contributions and provides several
recommendations for future research.
7.1 Research Summary
The cyber-physical realm offers unique opportunities for both offensive and defensive
measures that cannot be implemented in software-only systems. The field of Side Channel
Analysis (SCA) offers unique offensive opportunities to extract the secret key from a
microcontroller through the aid of side-channel leakage. This leakage can only be masked
but not eliminated given that it is a by-product of the physical implementation of the
cryptographic algorithm in hardware. In contrast, RF-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
fingerprinting exploits physical differences in transceiver hardware to uniquely identify
trusted RF hardware in a distributed network. These physical differences are random and
unique to each microcontroller, manifesting themselves as slight errors in their transmitted
signals. They are naturally generated and nearly impossible for an attacker to duplicate. As
such, they provide a high quality authentication method for identifying authorized devices
on distributed networks, and conversely prevent unauthorized devices from entering the
network.
This research advances the fields of SCA and RF-DNA fingerprinting through three
main contribution areas: 1) Linear Regression Attack (LRA), 2) Random Forest (RndF)
SCA Profiling Attacks, and 3) RF-DNA Fingerprinting of ZigBee devices with RndF. Main
contributions in each area are described in the following sections.
7.1.1 Linear Regression Attack
A novel method was developed that combined the Linear Regression SCA attack with
the adjusted coefficient of determination R2a [92]. By using R
2
a to determine the quality of
175
the fit of the model estimate to the collected SCA data, better estimation of the multivariate
noise distribution was achieved. This new method was compared with four others from
literature. These methods differed only in how they determined the fit of the linear model
to the measured data. Previous work used metrics that are not known to be good indicators
of a good model estimate fit to the measured data, such as the L2-norm of the model
parameters [115], and the largest absolute parameter value [50]. R2a gives an indication
of the variance unaccounted for by a linear model estimate. By using a metric that is more
relevant to measuring the fit of data to linear model estimates, greater success was attained.
A first ever assessment of linear regression conditions was conducted verifying the
conditions of linearity, homoscedasticity, normality, independence, as well as conducting
outlier assessment, effect of interaction terms and importance of using the intercept in the
model. Results revealed that the effect of outliers was diminished as the number of traces
increases. Additionally, the intercept b0 in the model is necessary for proper fit, which is in
contrast to experiments in [49] where the intercept was not used.
This method was compared with 4 others from literature under varying conditions of
test set size, training set size, and number of variables. In 8 out of 9 cases, the new method
achieved the highest success rate. Attack performance showed an order of magnitude
improvement when the dimensionality of the distribution estimated in the training phase
was increased from 1 to 20, giving greater than 98% success rate with as few as 100 training
and test traces. The attack with R2a was proven successful when training and test data were
collected with different probes and when training and attack hardware differed, showing
good performance under real-world conditions. It was also found to be more successful at
extracting key bytes from a noisier environment, achieving success with as few as 50 test
traces at Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)=15 dB. Finally, the R2a metric was theoretically and
practically shown to be the best out of those tested at identifying time samples with high
information leakage, even when the number training traces and test was very low.
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7.1.2 Random Forest SCA Profiling Attacks
Side-channel theory has historically assumed a Gaussian noise model around a fixed
data leakage value in the measurement. Through this work with 40 PIC microcontrollers,
it is shown in [91] that non-Gaussian variables can be present in EM collected traces and
these can warrant the use of non-parametric classifiers. RndF was used for the first time in a
byte-wise profiling attack and compared to the traditional parametric Template Attack [24].
The property of RndF to handle high dimensionality well was used to solve the case
when the attacker does not know when the information is being leaked by the hardware.
In this case, the full 50,000 variable set was used by RndF to extract all 16 bytes of the
AES key when the training and test devices were the same, and 15/16 when they were
different. When coarse data reduction was used with a 3200 variable set, RndF was
still able to achieve success rates as high as 100% on cross-device attacks with 40 PIC
microcontrollers. Template Attack was not able to extract any key bytes under any cross-
device combination. Random Forest Entropy Importance (RFEI) was utilized to define time
samples where there was information leakage, and this method was compared to Sum-Of-
Squared pairwise T-difference (SOST) which in literature was found to be favorable to
Template attack. Variable reduction with RFEI found many non-Gaussian variables to be
useful for classification, while SOST ranked Gaussian variables higher. RndF for both
cases was better at generalizing during training to be able to attack devices that are more
physically dissimilar to each other, achieving as high as two-fold performance improvement
over Template Attack. Template Attack performance was also found to be robust when only
non-Gaussian variables were used for clarification, achieving as high as 98.31% despite
having corresponding misclassification rates as high as 99.41%.
Further study into the effect of data collection location on the chip (probe spatial
variation) was performed by scanning the PIC microcontroller over a grid of 5×25 locations
with 5,000 traces collected at each location. The number of non-Gaussian variables was
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counted at each location. Correlation Electro-Magnetic Attack (CEMA) attack was used for
comparison to reveal the relative usefulness of each location for gathering SCA collections.
Results showed two SCA “hot-spots” for collection - one near wires connecting the CPU
die to the external pins, and another near a possible voltage regulating capacitor. However,
non-Gaussian variables were found to be present only over the wires and not over the
capacitor. Despite best efforts to duplicate the hardware setup used to collect the original
40 PIC SCA dataset, the same number of non-Gaussian variables were not discovered in
this research.
7.1.3 RF-DNA Fingerprinting on ZigBee Devices with Random Forest
ZigBee distributed networks have become increasingly popular for a wide range
of applications, from building control, to healthcare systems and critical infrastructure.
However, their remote nature requires enhanced security to protect them from rogue devices
attempting to gain unauthorized network access. In this work, RndF is combined with
RF-DNA fingerprinting to further the state of the art by improving performance in high-
noise environments for authenticating authorized devices and identifying rogue devices.
Two main bodies of work were introduced that explored data collected in two primarily
different ways, including 1) the Cross-Environment (XEnv) dataset based on emissions
collected with a Agilent E3238S receiver and 2) the Cross-Receiver (XRx) dataset based
on emission collections with a NI USRP and PXIe receivers.
The RndF and Multi-Class AdaBoost (MCA) ensemble decision classifiers were used
in [93, 94] with the XEnv dataset. This dataset models the RF-DNA fingerprints from
a device captured under multiple environments, which relaxes the contraints on the test
collections. However, this also leads to multi-modal or non-Gaussian variables, which
can be properly utilized by non-parametric RndF and MCA ensemble classifiers. RndF
and MCA improved classification by 9%-19% over MDA/ML and 3%-20% over GRLVQI
across the range of SNR considered. Furthermore, the better trained ensemble classifiers
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significantly enhanced device ID verification performance when unknown rogue devices
were presented to the network. For operation at a fixed %C=90% correct classification
accuracy, RndF correctly detected 31 of 36 rogue scenarios at SNR=12.0 dB. This
exceeds Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) rogue
detection performance which detected 28 of 36 rogue scenarios at SNR=18.0 dB and
MDA/ML which detected 25 of 36 rogue scenarios at SNR=30.0 dB. Considering the SNR
differences for fixed %C=90% operation, RndF emerged as the superior alternative and
provided an SNR “gain” GS =18.0 dB and GS = 6.0 dB relative to MDA/ML and GRLVQI
processes, respectively. Alternately, for operation under fixed SNR conditions, RndF ID
verification processing detected 11 more rogue scenarios than MDA/ML and 6 more rogue
scenarios than GRLVQI. In real-world applications where RF emissions crowd the 2.4
GHz spectral region, the SNR is relatively low and ensemble methods are envisioned as
providing a more robust alternative for authenticating ZigBee device IDs and enhancing
network security.
For the XRx ZigBee dataset, a comparison is provided of RF-DNA fingerprinting
performance using classification variables generated from high-cost PXIe and low-cost
USRP receiver collections. By testing all combinations of ZigBee devices in a given
population, biased results from favorable device selection are avoided, and results can
be generalized for the entire population. RndF Variable Importance (VI) analysis
show that the process favors RF-DNA phase variables over amplitude or frequency
variables. PXIe-collected RF-DNA phase variables are given higher importance relative
to corresponding USRP-collected phase variables. Device authentication results show
an average %C=0.76% higher classification when using PXIe collected RF-DNA phase
variables over USRP for the 3-class case over all SNRs tested, and %C=2.22% higher
for the 6-class case. Device verification results show an average of 10% more Rog:Auth
scenarios being identified with the PXIe collected data versus the USRP-collected data.
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Thus, as expected, performance is degraded when using the lower cost receiver. However,
the performance decrease is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In
addition, the magnitude of performance drop is small and may be acceptable given the
much lower cost of the USRP receiver. These experiments consider the most-challenging
case when all ZigBee devices are from the same manufacturer and model number.
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work
7.2.1 Linear Regression Attack
SCA collections typically suffer from large amounts of noise, either from the
environment (heat, cold, etc.) or other processes executing concurrently in the
microcontroller. The highest R2a for the time samples examined in this work using the 8-bit
linear regression model was only R2a=0.36. Thus there is a great deal of noise unaccounted
for in the collection. The 8-bit model was used to attack the SubBytes output of the first
round of AES as the PIC microcontroller accesses the SubBytes tables one byte at at time.
However, other operations are performed 16-bits at a time such as the AddRoundKey
operation. When a 16-bit linear regression model was based off of AddRoundKey, SSE
was kept low. Further investigation into 16-bit models is needed to determine if they
further reduce the variance that not accounted for in the model and result in a higher R2a
value. In addition, other terms can be added to the model to allow for a better fit if they are
determined to be effective.
The PIC microcontroller used here followed the Hamming Weight (HW) power model
well and as such the differences between those of a CEMA attack and LRA were minimal.
A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) often routes adjacent memory or logic elements
to different areas on the chip to meet timing and space constraints. If an AES core were
synthesized on an FPGA such that adjacent bits were spatially separated, the associated
side-channel leakage for those bytes may be different, leading to divergence from the power
model. This should be investigated to see if LRA performs significantly better than CEMA.
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7.2.2 RndF Profiling Attacks
The 40PIC dataset had training sets of 5000 observations per device. With a 256 class
byte-wise profiling attack, there are approximately 19.53 traces per class. It is expected that
with a larger training set, the usefulness of non-Gaussian variables to RndF classification
should improve. In addition, for Template Attacks with a non-pooled covariance matrix, a
larger training set will allow a better estimation of the class covariance matrix and Template
Attack classification performance should improve. Future work should use larger training
sets to compare classifier performance.
Data collections with the PIC microcontroller produced non-Gaussian variables
and RndF classification performed better than Template Attack. XY-scans of the PIC
microcontroller revealed that regions near the wires connecting the CPU die to the external
pins with high CEMA values have larger numbers of non-Gaussian variables. However,
the number of non-Gaussian variables as a percentage of the total variables collected was
not nearly as high as in the original 40PIC dataset. The cause for non-Gaussian variables
needs to be investigated further. In addition, side channel collections using a similar setup
on more advanced ARM and FPGA devices have not revealed any non-Gaussian variables.
For those devices Template Attack outperforms RndF profiling attack. The cause for this
should be investigated further in our future work.
A variant of RndF called Rotation Forest [64] grows trees on a randomly selected
subspace of the full dimensional set, using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to rotate
the subspace variables. Rotation Forest may be beneficial in cases with correlated variables
by performing PCA on a smaller subset of variables for each tree. Initial rotation forest
experiments have shown a 10% improvement in correct classification rate using a ARM
Cortex M3 processor. Future research could compare the performance with Template
Attack, and possibly perform a limited cross-device attack on another ARM processor.
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7.2.3 RF-DNA Fingerprinting on ZigBee with RndF
Classifiers in this work were trained to learn the PHY layer attributes of authorized
devices, and subsequently used to detect network intrusion by rogue devices. Training
in this way is based on an underlying assumption that variables from authorized devices
comprise the complete variable space. Test metrics such as posterior class probabilities
reflect how much an unknown observation “looks like” one of the authorized devices and
can be used to establish separation boundaries between known classes. However, these
models are not trained to define boundaries between known and unknown devices operating
in the variable space. Future work in RF-DNA fingerprinting with RndF should investigate
verification-driven learning which allows for this possibility. A probability decision tree
estimates a normal distribution around each region partitioned by a tree. Decision forests
have been used to combine density estimates from multiple trees to define distributions
around training observations [50]. Regions with no training observations are given lower
likelihood and could be relabeled as rogue regions for network intrusion scenarios. This
type of verification-driven learning is expected to enhance rogue identification and give
better warning of network intrusion attacks.
The observation waveform Region of Interest (ROI) used to generate parametric
summary statistics of variance, skewness and kurtosis is not typically Gaussian, but often
multi-modal. Hence non-parametric summary statistics may summarize these ROIs better.
Non-parametric feature generation methods should be investigated to assess classification
improvement relative to the parametric summary statistics as used here. Other ensemble
learning algorithms may be examined such as those specified in Section 2.3.3. Although
only 15% of the pair-wise correlation between variables in datasets here were greater than
0.5, classification performance may be improved with ensembles of multivariate decision
trees such as those used in [64, 73]. Finally, for the XRx dataset, only RndF was used
for device classification and rogue rejection experiments. An analysis of variables and
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subsequent comparison of RndF to other classifiers would provide insight into which
classifiers are best to use with this type of collection data.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Linear Least Squares Estimator
This appendix provides the derivation of the Least Squares estimator as described
in [65].
Suppose for an observation y dependent on a series of independent variables
{x1, x2, · · · , xu}, we have the linear model
y = r +
u∑
i=1
βixi , (A.1)
with r as the residual term. For N observations, these can be represented in the forms
Y =
[
y1, y2, · · · , yN]′ (A.2)
R = [r1, r2, · · · , rN]′
β =
[
β1, β2, · · · , βu]′
X =

1 x11 x12 . . . x1u
...
...
. . .
...
1 xN1 xN2 . . . xNu
 ,
where ′ represents the transpose. The linear model can be represented in matrix form by
Y = Xβ + R . (A.3)
The linear Least Squares estimator estimates the dependent term with model
parameters estimates given by
Yˆ = Xβˆ, (A.4)
leading to the error term
Rˆ = Y − Yˆ = Y − Xβˆ (A.5)
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The goal of Least Squares is to minimize the Sum of Squares Error (SSE) Rˆ′Rˆ, that is
min
w.r.t. βˆ
R′R = (Y − Xβˆ)′(Y − Xβˆ) (A.6)
= (Y′ − X′βˆ′)(Y − Xβˆ)
= Y′Y − 2βˆ′X′Y + βˆ′X′Xβˆ
To find the minimum, the partial derivative with respect to βˆ is taken in
∂Rˆ′Rˆ
∂β
=
∂Y′Y − 2βˆ′X′Y + βˆ′X′Xβˆ
∂β
= 0 (A.7)
− 2X′Y + 2X′Xβˆ = 0
X′Y = X′Xβˆ
βˆ = (X′X)−1X′Y
This estimate for βˆ is the least squares estimator.
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Appendix B: ZigBee Stat RF-DNA Fingerprint Features
This appendix shows the histograms of all 25 top ranked Stat RF-DNA variables at
S NR = 30.0 dB identified by RndF VI metric. Each variable shows a distinct non-Gaussian
shape. These results were presented in [93].
Figure B.1: Histogram of the top-ranked 25 Stat variables at S NR = 30.0 dB identified by
RndF VI metric. Each variable shows distinct non-Gaussian shape.
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